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4th Bn 95 B NVA Regt	1st Co	Between An Khe	Unknown
STR: 250	2d Co	and the Mang Yang	
	4th Co	Pass	
5th Bn 95B NVA Regt	4 Co's	VC Valley (Binh	82mm Mortars
STR: 200		Dinh-Pleiku Prov)	
124th Mortar Co			
STR: Unk	Unk	Unk	4-82mm Mortars
D-26 LF Co	Unk	Southwest of AO	Unk
STR: 87		Walker	

(4) Operation BOLLING:

(a) Enemy Situation:

1. Disposition: Since 1 February 1968, the BOLLING Area of Operations has been the site of increased enemy activity. The enemy does not fully control the area around TUY HOA City because of the presence of friendly troops plus an aggressive revolutionary development program which has reduced the hold by the enemy on the population. Recently, reliable agents have reported the following units within the TUY HOA area or close enough to have influence upon the BOLLING Area of Operations. These units are:

- a. HQ, 5th NVA Division
(Total Approximate Strength: 2800)
- b. 95th NVA Regiment
(Total Approximate Strength: 900)
- c. 4th Battalion 95th NVA Regiment
(Total Approximate Strength: 100)
- d. 5th Battalion 95th NVA Regiment
(Total Approximate Strength: 150)
- e. 6th Battalion 95th NVA Regiment
(Total Approximate Strength: 200)
- f. 18B NVA Regiment
(Total Approximate Strength: 905)
- g. 95th Artillery Regiment
(Total Approximate Strength: 150)
- h. 30th Main Force (MF) Battalion
(Total Approximate Strength: 200)
- i. 85th Local Force (LF) Battalion
(Total Approximate Strength: 150)
- j. K-65 Engineer (Sapper) Company
(Total Approximate Strength: 80)
- k. K-76 Engineer (Sapper) Company
(Total Approximate Strength: 90)

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2. Regularities and Weaknesses:

- a. The supply system of the enemy flows from west to east and can be best interdicted on the western edge of PHU YEN Province.

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b. The major weakness of the enemy is his inability to maintain contact due to his marginal logistics system.

c. Recent successes by US, ROK and ARVN troops (4-503d Infantry) reflects the vulnerability of the NVA to psychological operations. The theme of the psychological operations should be to surrender to the ARVN and the direction of surrender should be given in the broadcast/leaflets.

3. Enemy Capabilities:

a. Continue to build up their units through infiltration, recruitment and conscription. Recent reports indicate that the 5th NVA Division has received replacements and is nearing the posture to launch offensive operations.

b. Attack installations and friendly forces in northern central PHU YEN Province with up to 4 combat effective battalions. These 4 battalions would consist of the 4th, 5th, and 6th Battalions of the 95th NVA Regiment and the 85th Local Force (LF) Battalion. The 30th Main Force (MF) Battalion is not believed to be presently combat effective. Attack in central and southern PHU YEN Province with the same combat battalions as listed; however, this effort in south PHU YEN could be reinforced by the 18B NVA Regiment. This would bring the strength of the enemy force to 7 combat battalions.

c. Continue harassment, terrorist and unconventional warfare activities throughout the province. The pontoon bridge at CQ 201351 is a target of particular interest as is the large bridge across the SONG BA River at TUY HOA.

d. Conduct battalion sized attacks reinforced by local forces on weakly defended district headquarters and outposts.

e. Reinforce the TUY HOA Valley area with elements of the 18B NVA Regiment within 5 days.

f. Combat Efficiency (PHU YEN Province, AO BOLLING): In PHU YEN Province, the 85th LF Bn is apparently regrouping and attempting to rebuild its combat effectiveness for continuing operation's in TUY AN District. The heavy casualties inflicted on the 11th (AKA 4th) and 13th (AKA 6th) Bn's, 95th NVA Regt in early April 1968 by ARVN/ROK forces southwest of TUY HOA City has seriously impaired the combat effectiveness of these Bn's. The 12th Bn, 95th Regt, has remained out of contact and is believed to be rebuilding its combat potential in northwestern TUY HOA District. The 30th MF Bn will probably continue to conduct limited, small scale harassing operations in eastern HIEU XUONG District.

(b) Summary of Operation: In February Brigade Headquarters (-), 4th Bn-503d Inf, C and D Btry 3d Bn-319th Artillery, E Troop, 17th Cav and D Company 16th Armor participated in Operation BOLLING through 7 February. On 7 February Brigade Headquarters (-) and E Troop 17th Cav joined other Brigade Forces in Operation MACARTHUR. From 8-29 February 1968 the 4th Bn 503d Infantry, C and D Btry 3d Bn 319th Artillery and D Company 16th Armor participated in Operation BOLLING during which they were involved in 47 incidents, 30 of which were friendly initiated. The Brigade line up in Operation BOLLING remained the same throughout the month of March. The largest contact on 4 March was made by D-16th Armor when they smashed two enemy battalions (5th Bn 95th NVA Regt and the 85th VC Bn) which had attacked the 47th ARVN Headquarters at TUY HOA. Over 200 enemy soldiers were killed in the combined FWMAF operation.

(c) Significant Contacts:

1. 060315 Feb 68: CQ 1548 A/4/503 sighted 4 VC outside of their perimeter and took them under fire. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC).

2. 061145 Feb 68: CQ 051492 C/4/503 sighted and engaged 1 VC wearing khakis and rucksack moving NNE. Results: 1 NVA KIA (BC)

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2. 110300 Feb 68: CQ 047435 C/4/503 ambushed 2 VC. Results:
2 VC KIA (BC).

4. 041210 Mar 68: CQ 159471 D-16th Armor reinforced the 47th ARVN Regt in contact with two battalions. Contact continued until 041930. Results:
5 US KHA, 16 US WHA, 2 US MHA: 137 NVA KIA (BC).

5. 121100 Mar 68: CQ 102988 D-16th Armor had one M113 hit a mine. Area was searched and several VC were engaged. Results: 4 US WHA, 2 VC KIA (BC).

6. 181215 Mar 68: CQ 045446 A/4/503 observed 10 VC in the open. Artillery, airstrikes, and gunships were called. Results: 4 VC KIA (BC).

7. 042350 Apr 68: B/4/503 made contact with estimated 45 VC/NVA vic CQ 046466. Results: 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

8. 06 Apr 68: A/4/503 fired on 15 VC with weapons. Results:
1 VC KIA (BC).

9. 072050 Apr 68: CQ 053393 A/4/503 made contact with 8 VC while moving to an ambush site. Results: 2 VC KIA (BC).

10. 171334 Apr 68: C/4/503 sighted one NVA Co digging into their front. Artillery and A/S called. Results: 1 NVA KIA (BC), 1 AK-47, 1 81mm mortar CIA.

11. 171436 Apr 68: CQ 8844 D-16th Armor while escorting a convoy received SA from both sides of the road, head track destroyed by a mine. Artillery and A/S supported. Results: 1 US WHA, 1 APC destroyed; 5 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(d) Terrain and Weather:

1. Terrain: The area of interest is located in PHU YEN Province and is bounded by coordinates BQ 7000, BQ 7060, CQ 1060 and CQ 3000. The eastern boundary is the South China Sea. Three-fourths of the area is mountainous and forested. Most of the remainder of the area is flat land used either for cultivation of rice, or other lowland crops. Along the coast there are rolling hills and sand dunes except where the mountain outcroppings meet the sea. Since most of the area consists of mountains and hills, there is no drainage problem. The major drainage system is formed by the DA RANG or SONG BA River and its tributaries. This river traverses the center of the AO from west to east, (BQ 7039 - CQ 6346). The tributaries flow generally north - south depending upon their location relative to the SONG BA. The river empties into the South China Sea. Vegetation in the plains area is predominantly rice fields. Further inland, dense broadleaf evergreen forest covers the mountain ridges with canopy rising in excess of 80 feet. Interprovincial Route 7B and Route 1 are the main lines of communication in the area.

2. Weather: The month of November, December and January are months of the Northeast Monsoon season in the area of operations. Surface winds during the period will prevail from the north-northeast. Wind speeds range up to 16 knots. Winds gusting to 30 knots may be expected in the immediate vicinity of thunderstorms, along exposed locations during strong northeasterly flow, and area under the influence of typhoons or tropical storms. Calm conditions are observed most frequently during night and early morning hours.

Precipitation from mid-December to March is light to moderate showers that occur in the mornings in the area of operations. Periods of three to five days without rain are common during the period. Cloudiness during the period includes considerable cloudiness in the mornings with ceilings below 1000 feet common in the exposed valleys. In general, the afternoons along the coast are partly cloudy with most clouds above 2000 feet. The major effect of clouds on operations will occur during the early or mid-morning hours in the exposed coastal area. Temperatures will range from 80 to

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all made contact with NVA troops. Units of the 3-503d Inf, 1-8th Inf and 2-8th Inf concentrated their effort in coordinated attacks on enemy positions vic of Hill 600 (ZA 153957). The enemy was pounded by air and artillery throughout the day. Losses for the fighting were light with only 1 US KHA and 20 US WHA, while 6 NVA were killed by body count. Enemy casualties by air and artillery were unknown.

The morning of the 23d saw C-3-503d Inf move from their night laager site to a position east of Hill 600 and then attacked west against the bunker complex on Hill 600, killing 1 NVA and finding 27 bunkers and 3 claymore mines. As C Company pushed on west A-3-503d Inf linked up with them and they made contact with an unknown size enemy force about 1400 hours vic ZA 151960. The two companies maneuvered against the enemy bunkers and came under heavy fire to include B-40 rockets and rifle grenades. Contact was broken at 1730 hours to allow A/S to hit the enemy. The paratroopers loss 1 killed and 10 wounded while counting 5 NVA bodies. C & D 3-8th Inf passed thru the complex finding 3 NVA KIA and 2 rifles; as they pressed on they suffered two wounded from AW fire. The company then called in A/S on a group of NVA they observed digging in vic VA 937923; a sweep of the area combined with A/S claimed 18 NVA KIA.

Summary of Operation MACARTHUR: During February and March the Brigade responded to several different situations which developed during Operation-MACARTHUR. The first movement was to Pleiku in AO JULIAN to counter the threat of the 5th Bn 95B Regt which apparently was stopped initially when one Company of the 2-503d had contact shortly after landing on the LZ. At the same time the 2-1st Cav on Highway 19 made contact with an ambush resulting in two companies of the 5th Bn being routed. After that the 2d Bn continued to move to the east to find and fix the 5th Bn but this never evolved. The 1st Bn 503d Inf had gone to Ban Me Thout in response to a definite threat of two enemy battalions against the city. ARVN elements had gathered in around the city itself. The 1st Bn 503d had only one good contact and they were basically unable to develop this contact because they only had their organic 4.2 mortars and 1 battery (5 guns) of 105 howitzers (supporting) at the time. Once contact was made the enemy moved out of range of the 105's and the 1st Bn couldn't pursue. When the 2d Bn 503d Inf moved to Ban Me Thout they made contact with local VC forces and elements of the 32d NVA Regt which successfully moved out of their range. While at Ban Me Thout 3 American prisoners were reported held by the NVA and the Brigade almost ceased all offensive operations for three days to pursue and free the prisoners.

When the Brigade was called away from Ban Me Thout a threat had developed at Pleiku again so the Brigade was given orders to move northeast of Pleiku into an area which was the home of high level elements of both NVA and Front activities; however, before the Brigade could deploy it was ordered to Kontum where the 1st Bn 22d Inf was in heavy contact. Once the Brigade moved into Kontum with the TAC CP the Brigade assumed OPCON of the 1st Bn 22d Inf Bde. The 24th NVA Regt northeast of Kontum never engaged the Brigade without being dug in and knowing that they were covered with mortar fire. The first two or three times Brigade units had real trouble with these contacts and took the worst end of the bargain. The Brigade was into a real tough fight; the enemy soldiers were well trained and disciplined.

In brief at Kontum the Brigade entered areas where nobody else had gone, even the USSF at Poler Klang states they had operated throughout the area but when pinned down they indicated they hadn't been in the area of contact for six or eight months. The NVA positions were well dug in; tunnels, bunkers, ect. The place was evidently used as a forward base area when they would store 120mm mortars and rocket warheads. Although the Brigade didn't stay and finish the campaign it was a worthwhile effort in that the Brigade moved into these known base camps. The NVA was a tough opponent. During this crucial period the 1st Bn 503d Inf received over 60 new replacements. Some troopers were killed after less than a day in combat. Major Gunderson had taken over command of the 1-503d and his baptism under fire was under difficult circumstances. At the same time the 3d Bn 503d Inf had been taken over by LTC Fisher and both new commanders were feeling their way around.

During March Task Force 5th Battalion 503d Infantry with C and D Battery 3d

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Battalion 319th Artillery, D Company 16th Armor and Camp Strike Force units OPCON to the Task Force continued search and destroy missions in AO BOLLING (west of Tuy Hoa). Task Force elements maintained daily contact with VC/NVA forces operating in the Tuy Hoa area; however, the enemy was almost always found in small groups. The largest enemy contact took place on 4 March when D-16th Armor was committed in support of units of the 47th ARVN Regiment just north of Tuy Hoa City which had come under attack early on the morning of the 4th by the 5th Bn 95th NVA Regiment, 85th Local Force VC Battalion, 25th Recon Sapper Company and elements of the 17th Mortar Recoilless Rifle Company. The NVA were dug in in three villages between Tuy Hoa North Airfield and the ocean.

The 47th ARVN Regiment blocked the enemy to the south and west while the D Co 16th Armor Company Commander placed one platoon in full defilade to the ocean side of the last village as a blocking force. Between 1000 and 1100 hours the remaining two platoons of APC's supported by F-100's from the 308th Tactical Fighter Squadron, helicopter gunships and ARVN Infantry began their push against the first NVA held village from the north. Enemy resistance was fierce and the attack was halted momentarily when one APC was knocked out and another damaged. The airborne armor troopers renewed the attack and pushed through the village killing many NVA and VC. As the afternoon continued the armored APC's cleared the second village with massed .50 caliber fire and air support. The continuous pressure on the NVA/VC caused many of the enemy to try and flee across the open rice paddies covered by the interlocking .50 caliber machine guns of the blocking force platoon and they inflicted heavy casualties on all escape attempts with their massed fire.

The attack continued into the third village where the fighting became especially fierce as the APC's approached the enemy CP. The withdrawal of the supporting ARVN Infantry as the APC's closed on the enemy CP allowed the NVA/VC to work close to the APC's with anti tank weapons from prepared positions. After several of the attacking APC's took direct B-40 Rocket and Recoilless Rifle hits, the lack of supporting infantry and rapidly approaching darkness forced the armor to withdraw but not until they had recovered their wounded and destroyed all damaged equipment.

D-16th Armor was credited with 137 NVA KIA (BC) during the action. D Company losses were 7 killed, 21 wounded and 3 missing (burned beyond recognition when their gasoline powered APC exploded). ROK and ARVN units completed the mop up of the battlefield the next day.

LRP teams were utilized during the month for recon, surveillance and screening missions. They made contact with small bands of NVA/VC almost every mission. D Company 16th Armor escorted convoys between An Khe and Phu Hiep and Phu Hiep and Vung Ro Bay for the most of March. The only aggressive action by enemy forces besides their major effort on 4 March was a 12 to 20 round 60mm mortar attack on FSB 16 27 March which caused negative casualties.

Only light contact was made throughout the month of March in AO WALKER. During the first of the month LRP teams made several contacts and were supported by air and artillery before being extracted. The NVA/VC continued to erect occasional hasty road blocks and conduct small ambushes along Highway 19. Checkpoint along the road from An Khe to the Mang Yang Pass were harassed by random sniper fire. Light movement was constantly spotted around the Camp Radcliff perimeter and engaged with small arms fire, usually with unknown results.

Operations during the month of March were supported by on call TAC Sorties and daily FAC Sorties. Air Force fighter bombers were on call for immediate response and pre-planned air strikes were approved 90 - 95% of the time. Air Force support remained excellent. Supporting artillery (3d Bn 319th Artillery) fired a total of 1760 missions and expended 25,544 rounds. The Brigade Aviation Platoon (Casper) supported all operations. A statistical report of their activities follows:

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program, a series of day and night ambushes along known infiltration and exfiltration routes. The Brigade is breaking down into platoon size elements since if Charlie is going to move in small size groups the Brigade will put out small size ambushes to stop him from moving his rice or whatever he wants to do. It looks to be a long and difficult campaign in the present area of operation since the enemy doesn't really have that many forces in the area and you're not going to find the enemy in large groups. He is going to have to be reduced a little at a time. Many problems in Province control need to be solved in the future; such as how much rice do you take from a village and when. Present district policy is you leave X number kilo's of rice for each person in the village and take the rest to the district, this is not working out very well at all. The Brigade is also conducting combined operations with ARVN elements and this idea is working fairly well. The Brigade has started Advisor Teams to work with RF/PF units in an effort to increase their efficiency.

ARVN troops are also incorporated in the Brigade LRP teams and ARVN LRP teams are also being trained. The Brigade is doing everything possible to enhance the prestige of the ARVN soldier and ARVN leaders in order to give them credit for what takes place so we can gradually withdraw.

The 4th Battalion 503d Airborne Infantry and Company D (-) 16th Armor continued operations in Area of Operations BOLLING. Contact was light during the month with the enemy more intent on resupply and exercising maximum effort to avoid contact with American units. On 5 April Company B 4-503d ambushed a 15 man NVA food carrying party killing one. The company also captured 30 children age 12 years to 16 years who were engaged in food carrying operations in support of a VC Bn. Elements of the 47th ARVN Regiment made heavy contact with 2 NVA Bn's at Ma Hoa Village (vic CQ 095 430) in Tuy Hoa Valley just off Highway 7B above the Song Dai Giang River. D Co (-) 16th Armored stood by in a supporting role. The enemy forces continued to avoid contact through mid April when C Company 4th Bn 503d Inf made contact with an estimated NVA/VC Company on the 17th, airstrikes and artillery supported. One enemy body was found and 1 AK-47 and 1 81mm mortar were captured. Using Kit Carson Scouts (former NVA soldiers hired and trained by the Brigade S5) C Company uncovered an enemy base camp under construction. A and C Company continued searching the area on the 19th and uncovered more enemy dead from the 17th. Light contact occurred during the day resulting in half a dozen enemy killed and weapons captured. The reconnaissance in Force Missions continued with small discoveries of enemy ammunition and food. A Company chasing a single VC in the vic of BQ 991573 located several huts, a classroom and hospital area along with a small amount of enemy equipment. All was destroyed. With the continued assistance of the Kit Carson Scouts A Company located another enemy company size area complete with building material on the 25th. Both A and C Companies found evidence during the remainder of the month that the VC/NVA were fleeing before them. The searching paratroopers killed several stragglers and took two prisoners but the main enemy forces exerted their main effort to avoid contact with Lieutenant Colonel David L. Buckner's 4th Battalion 503d Airborne Infantry.

The 1st Bn 503d Infantry under the command of Major Raymond E. Gunderson continued to perform its assigned missions in the Camp Radcliff/Walker area of operations. The Quick Strike Battalion (temporary designation of the infantry Bn located at Camp Radcliff) mission continued to be the responsibility for the defense of Camp Radcliff with three Provisional Companies drawn from each of the major tenant units located at Camp Radcliff in An Khe: 173d Airborne Support Bn, rear elements of the 1st Cavalry Division and elements of the Qui Nhon area command. The 1st Bn also mans the Camp Tactical Operations Center and keeps a one company reaction force standing by for any emergency in AO Walker. Two companies conducted reconnaissance in force missions in AO Walker and up until 0600 hours 10 April the 1st Bn also had the security of Highway 19 between checkpoints 18 (west of the An Khe pass) and checkpoint 27 (east of Man Yang Pass). The security of Highway 19 required the resources of one infantry company to occupy checkpoints and secure bridges along the route. On 10 April the 1st Bn 69th Armor (under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade from the 4th Infantry Division) became responsible for the highway security mission. The 1st Bn 503d Infantry was still required to place one infantry company under the control of the 1st Bn 69th Armor to maintain security of the checkpoints and bridge sites.

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(2) Operation Bolling II

(a) Enemy Situation:

1. Disposition: Since the allied victory in the BATTLE OF TUY HOA NORTH (30 and 31 January 1968), the Bolling area has remained a relatively secure area of operation. The enemy does not fully control the area around TUY HOA City due to the presence of allied troops plus an aggressive revolutionary development program which has reduced the hold by the enemy on the population. Intelligence has reported the following units within the TUY HOA area or close enough to have influence within the Bolling area or operations:

- a. HQ, 5th NVA Division
- b. 95th NVA Regiment
- c. 4th Bn/95th NVA Regiment
- d. 5th Bn/95th NVA Regiment
- e. 6th Bn/95th NVA Regiment
- f. 30th MF Battalion
- g. 85th MF Battalion
- h. DK-7 LF Company
- i. DK-9 LF Company

The 95th NVA Regiment withdrew to the jungles west of TUY HOA City after suffering heavy casualties at the hands of ROK and ARVN forces in April, 1968. This Regiment continued to operate in this area during the months of May, June and July, appearing to be avoiding contact in order to reorganize their forces. During July, indications were received that the 95th NVA Regiment may have left one battalion as a stay behind force and moved west in order to pick up new replacements and supplies.

2. Peculiarities and Weaknesses:

a. The enemy supply system flows from west to east and can best be interdicted on the western edge of PHU YEN Province. The enemy's logistics system is currently operating at a marginal level, thus the indications of a move by the 95th NVA Regiment to the west. The major weakness of the enemy has been his inability to sustain contact due to their marginal logistics system.

b. The success of US, ARVN and ROK operations from January through April makes the VC/NVA vulnerable to psychological warfare, especially as the enemy continues to be prone to hunger and personal illness through both sustained living in the jungle environment and a marginal logistics system.

c. The enemy continues to be vulnerable to air and artillery retaliation, aerial observation and photography, intermittent artillery firing, APD and Red Haze readings.

3. Enemy Capabilities:

- a. The enemy can be expected to continue harassment,

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c. Operation Bolling II: In May the 173d Airborne Brigade (-), Task Force 4th Bn 503d Inf, continued Operation Bolling II in Phu Yen Province, with the continuing mission of locating and destroying the 95th NVA Regiment, providing security for the continuance of the all-important Vietnamese rice harvest (in conjunction with the 28th ROK Regiment and the 47th ARVN Regiment), providing security for the 577th Engineer Battalion and 173d Engineer Company for their mission of construction and mine-sweeping along Highway 436 and Routes 68 and 2D, and constantly providing AO Bolling with an infantry rapid-reaction company. The 4th Bn 503d Inf, in conjunction with elements of D Company 16th Armor, continued to conduct reconnaissance in force and search and destroy operations west of TUY HOA in efforts to locate and destroy enemy forces.

But the enemy forces, after taking heavy casualties from US, ROK and ARVN combat operations in middle and late April, were not easily located. As noted, the primary enemy organization in AO Bolling continued to be elements of the 95th NVA Regiment. On 2 May C Company 4th Bn 503d Inf, at 1005 hours at CQ006496, engaged a small size enemy reconnaissance patrol. Using SA, AW and claymores, Charley Company accounted for 7 VC KIA (BC), captured 4 AK-47 and 3 SKS rifles, and had no friendly casualties. D Company 16th Armor and the 577th Engineer Battalion, while continuing construction of a roadbed for Operation REBUILD, on 8 May found 16 60mm mortar rounds in a canal in the vicinity of BQ955414, and destroyed the rounds in place.

On 13 May, B Company, Task Force 4th Bn 503d Inf, at 1430 hours at BQ965555, spotted 2 VC/NVA moving in a westerly direction, engaged them with SA and M-79 fire, killing 1 VC (BC) and capturing an AK-47 and a Mauser. Again on 15 May, B Company made contact with six or seven NVA in khaki uniforms at BQ933544 at 1230 hours. One NVA was killed (BC), one NVA captured (POW), 12 pair of khakis, 25 pajama shirts, 45 pajama pants, 20 pounds of rice and one hand grenade were also captured, with two US wounded in action. Later on the 15th, at BQ889444 at 1845 hours, A Company, Task Force 4th Bn 503d Inf spotted and engaged 1 VC, killed the VC (BC) and captured 1 M-2 carbine. Through the remainder of the month of May, Operation Bolling II, Task Force 4th Bn 503d Inf continued reconnaissance and force and search and destroy operations, finding enemy bunkers, both fresh and well-used, several enemy rice caches and signs of recent movement, but the enemy was not to be found.

In June the enemy force was again evading contact. The largest sighting proved to be by LRP Team 15 at 0815 hours on 15 June, when, at CQ014462, they sighted 30 individuals with weapons and rucksacks. Airstrikes were called in, but with undetermined results. Other than this sighting, no contact was made with enemy elements comprised of more than five individuals. The enemy continued to avoid any contact, and was again engulfed in attempting to re-form and re-supply his forces.

In Operation Bolling II the month of July paralleled June's activities until the end of the month, when the enemy made use of sapper units in an attack on Tuy Hoa Air Force Base. On the 2d and 3d of July, LRP team 16 observed 25 and 23 individuals moving in the open at BQ836783 and BQ849772. On both sightings artillery was immediately called in, and on the 2 July sighting, at 1500 hours, 4 VC/NVA were killed (BC). On 3 July, at 0715 hours, 5 VC/NVA were killed (Poss). The next day, 4 July, at 1830 hours, LRP Team 16, in an overnight observation post at BQ567754, again made contact with a small but unknown size enemy force; this contact resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

From the period of 5 July until 26 July, little significant activity took place in Operation Bolling II. Task Force 4th Bn 503d Inf, under the command of LTC David L. Buckner, who had assumed command on 1 February 1968, continued to perform its mission of finding, fixing and destroying the enemy forces, but later in-

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telligence data revealed that the 95th NVA Regiment had been unable to rebuild its fighting strength after its heavy losses in the month of April and, due to steady and successful allied pressure on the regiment, had also been unable to re-develop a workable supply and logistics system.

Primarily for these reasons, the 95th NVA Regiment, in early and middle July, began to withdraw out of the TUY HOA City and the Bolling area of operations, moving westward toward and presumably into the Tri-Border Area, thus hoping to be able to re-equip itself with greater ease with new replacement personnel and supplies prior to returning to the Bolling area of operation. The 95th NVA Regiment left one of its three infantry line battalions, the 6th Bn 95th NVA Regiment, in the area to serve as a blocking force if needed.

On 29 July at 0150 hours, at Tuy Hoa Air Force Base, an enemy sapper team was successful in infiltrating the Air Force portion of the base perimeter defensive network and placing an estimated six demolition charges at various strategic areas inside TUY HOA Air Force Base itself. On exploding, these charges damaged two C-130 aircraft and one F-100 aircraft. In the ensuing action following the explosion, 6 VC were killed (BC) inside the defensive perimeter of the Air Force Base, and two AK-47's, two B-40 rockets, one 9mm pistol and an assortment of hand grenades and explosives were captured. Helicopter gunships, immediately in the air upon the explosions, accounted for another 3 VC kills (BC) at coordinates BQ195408.

This attack emphasized again the increased emphasis that the enemy is placing on sapper-type activity as a prelude or part of the expected third general offensive. For a description of sapper-units operational methods, see sub-paragraph E, Section III, Intelligence.

Thus, for the months of May, June and July, Task Force 4th Bn 503d Inf continuously carried out reconnaissance and force and search and destroy operations in AO Bolling, but were faced with the task of locating and sustaining contact with an enemy who had no desire for either being located or entering contact. In addition to its continuing field operations, the 4th Battalion and D Company, 16th Armor continued to provide security for the omnipotent Vietnamese rice harvest, provided for the security of the 577th Engineer Battalion and the 173d Engineer Company for their construction and mine-sweeping missions along Highway 436 and Routes 68 and 2D as a part of Operation Rebuild, assisted the Air Force in defending the perimeter of Tuy Hoa Air Force Base and provided at all times an infantry line company for a ready-reaction force as needed.

From 16 to 27 July, Task Force 4th Bn 503d Infantry conducted operations in AO Black, with negligible enemy contact. For significant contacts in the months of May, June and July in AO Bolling, see Section III, Intelligence: Operation Bolling II.

d. Operation Walker: In May the 1st Bn 503d Inf continued to secure the Camp Radcliff/An Khe complex, secure and maintain for vehicular traffic Highway 19 in the Tactical Area of Responsibility, conduct search and destroy, reconnaissance in force and cordon and search operations within AO Walker and to continue to support revolutionary development projects.

The continued presence of Task Force 1st Bn 503d Inf in AO Walker reflected a change in policy and desires by the Brigade, as previously infantry battalions had been rotated to Camp Radcliff and AO Walker monthly, but this policy was replaced by the thought that each infantry battalion could better fulfill its mission by remaining in a particular area of operations for a longer period of time, thus

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