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173d Airborne Brigade



20-800

COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT

OPERATION BOLLING - DAN HOA

(19 SEPTEMBER 1967 / 31 JANUARY 1969)

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Authority NND 927623

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 173D AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96250

AVBE-SC/MHD

2 March 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report
Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa
(19 September 1967 - 31 January 1969)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. REFERENCE: Directive 335-8, Hq USMACV, Combat Operations After Action Report, dated 2 April 1966.

2. GENERAL: The 173d Airborne Brigade assumed combat operations in AO Bolling on 19 September 1967, when the Brigade Headquarters element deployed from the DAK TO/OAK SEANG area of KONTUM Province in Vietnam's Central Highlands. AO Bolling is located to the north and northwest of TUY HOA City (CQ 1547) in PHU YEN Province, Republic of Vietnam. Its population is approximately 350,000 with most of its inhabitants engaged in rice production or fishing in the waters of the South China Sea.

a. Co-located in AO Bolling is one regiment of the 22d Infantry Division (ARVN), the 47th Infantry Regiment. Also located in AO Bolling are the Camp Strike Force units of CUNG SON (CQ 8143) and DONG TRE (CQ 8969). Regional Force/Popular Force units were also present in AO Bolling in varying degrees of strength. To the south and north of AO Bolling Republic of Korea forces conduct combat operations.

b. In addition, Route QL 1, Vietnam's coastal highway and primary land communication route for all business and commerce (it is the only highway that runs the length of the country), runs through PHU YEN Province's. Due to its importance for both civilian and military traffic, QL 1 has now been almost completely asphalt surfaced in AO Bolling. The Vietnamese National Railroad, which runs parallel to QL 1, is heavily damaged and has not been operatable in AO Bolling for some time.

3. NAME OF OPERATION: Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa.

4. TYPE OF OPERATION: Search and Destroy.

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5. DATES OF OPERATION: 19 September 1968 - 31 January 1969.
6. LOCATION: AO Bolling area of operations is depicted on inclosure II, Area of Operations, AO Bolling. Reference Map Sheets.
7. CONTROL AND COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 173d Airborne Brigade.
8. REPORTING OFFICER: BG John W. Barnes
9. TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. Assigned Units:

- (1) 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry
- (2) 2d Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry
- (3) 3d Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry
- (4) 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry
- (5) Company D 16th Armor
- (6) 3d Bn 319th Field Artillery (-)
- (7) 173d Support Battalion (-)
- (8) 173d Signal Company (-)
- (9) 173d Engineer Company (-)
- (10) 74th Infantry Detachment
- (11) HHC, 173d Airborne Brigade (-)
- (12) 51st Chemical Detachment (-)
- (13) 172d Military Intelligence Detachment (-)

b. Attached Units:

- (1) 404th Radio Research Unit (-)
- (2) 45th Army Postal Unit (-)

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- (3) 39th Infantry Platoon Scout Dog (-)
- (4) 75th Combat Tracker Team (-)
- (5) 46th Public Information Detachment (-)
- (6) United States Air Force Control Party (-)

c. OPCON Units:

134th Assault Helicopter Company (-)

10. SUPPORTING UNITS:

a. Artillery:

- (1) 6th Bn 32d Artillery (-)
- (2) 6th Bn 84th Artillery (-)

b. Aviation:

- (1) 180th Assault Support Helicopter Company, 268th Combat Aviation Bn.
- (2) 196th Assault Support Helicopter Company, 268th Combat Aviation Bn.
- (3) 355th Heavy Helicopter Company, 268th Combat Aviation Battalion.
- (4) 203d Reconnaissance Airplane Company, 17th Aviation Group.

c. Naval Gunfire Support: Sub Unit One, 1st ANGLICO

d. Tactical Air Support: United States Air Force Control Party

e. Psychological Operations: 8th PSYOPS Battalion

11. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Enemy Missions Prior to Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa: Prior to the beginning of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa the mission of enemy forces in AO Bolling was to attack and destroy friendly personnel, units and installations in the area of operations. These attacks were to be combined with widespread guerrilla harassment and terrorist acts, intended to contribute to the goal of inflicting heavy casualties on US - ARVN forces and disrupting the Republic of South Vietnam's Revolutionary Development Programs.

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b. Enemy Compositions, Strength and Location Prior to Operation Bolling-Dan Hoa:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>PROBABLE LOCATION</u>
95th NVA Regiment	1410	BQ 8833
4th Bn, 95th NVA Regiment	300	CQ 0258
5th Bn, 95th NVA Regiment	300	CQ 0244
6th Bn, 95th NVA Regiment	300	BQ 9082
30th MF Battalion	350	BQ 1328
85th LF Battalion	250	CQ 0464

c. Enemy Activity During Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa: AO Bolling is located north and west of Tuy Hoa City. The major enemy force close enough to have influence within the Bolling area of operations continues to be the 5th NVA Division with an estimated strength of 5,200 men. Currently located in the general location of BQ 8920. The 5th NVA Division has two subordinate regiments, the 18B operates to the south of our AO in the Nha Trang area, and has recently been involved with elements of the "White Horse" ROK Division, suffering heavy casualties.

The 95th NVA Regiment suffered heavy losses during the TET offensive in the Battle of Tuy Hoa North (see 173d Airborne Brigade CAAR) and withdrew to the west to receive replacements and train. It appeared next on 5 April at CQ 0943, and had its fourth and sixth Battalions soundly beaten by a combined ARVN/ROK Task Force. After this second defeat, the 95th again withdrew to the jungle and mountains to the west and avoided contact until July.

On 11 July a captured POW indicated that the 95th NVA Regiment and its 4th and 5th Battalions had moved further west into Cambodia for resupply and to conduct a training cycle, leaving the 6th Battalion as a stay-behind element in AO Bolling. The current strength of the 6th Battalion, 95th Regiment is estimated at 500. It is expected that the 95th NVA Regiment will return to AO Bolling in November from its Cambodian base camps.

The 30th MF Battalion, with a strength of 140 is subordinate to the 5th Division and continues to operate in AO Bolling - Dan Hoa. It is currently operating in squad sized "sapper" units, being targeted against military installations in Phu Yen Province, particularly in Phu Hiep. Since August, the 47th Regiment, 22d Infantry Division (ARVN) has had two contacts with the

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85th LF Battalion, resulting in 74 enemy KIA (BC).

During August and September enemy activity was generally light in AO Bolling - Dan Hoa, which added credence to earlier reports of the 95th NVA Regiment's moving west to train and receive replacements. A prisoner captured by the 4th Infantry Division indicated that the 95th NVA Regimental Headquarters and its 4th and 5th Battalions had relocated in the Duc Lap area, close to or into the Cambodian border.

The 6th Battalion, 95th NVA Regiment continued to operate in AO Bolling-Dan Hoa and in September conducted company-sized harassment attacks, for the most part designed to keep Republic of Vietnam forces from protecting the civilian rice harvests so that the 6th Battalion's own rice supply might be supplemented. These attacks were not successful.

The 30th MF Battalion continued to remain out of contact, south of AO Bolling-Dan Hoa, in the ROK area of operations. The 85th LF Battalion continued its harassment attacks along highways QL 1 and 7A and conducted rice-gathering operations but, as previously mentioned suffered substantial losses at the hands of the 47th ARVN Regiment.

In October activity remained light, with the major elements of the 95th NVA Regiment continuing to remain along the Cambodian border. Low level agent reports, however, indicate that the 95th NVA Regimental Headquarters, with its subordinate 4th and 5th Battalions, will return to the Bolling - Dan Hoa area of operations within the next 30-60 days. The 6th Battalion 95th Regiment continued its harassment attacks against the rice harvests and traffic along Highways QL 1 and 7A, as did the 85th LF Battalion. The 30th MF Battalion remained out of contact south of AO Bolling - Dan Hoa, in the ROK area of operations. The most significant allied achievement was the discovery on 27 October of a hospital complex at BQ 9356 by elements of the 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry. The complex, 100 meters in diameter, included beds, medical supplies, seven NVA rucksacks, and a POW from the 5th Battalion 95th NVA Regiment who was a patient at the hospital. The loss of the facility will be a severe set back for VC/NVA forces, as this hospital is reportedly the only one in Phu Yen Province capable of surgical operations.

In November AO Bolling - Dan Hoa remained quiet, with the 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry conducting operations north of Tuy Hoa City and in and around Base Area 202. In late November the 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry deployed from AO Bolling - Dan Hoa to AO Walker, leaving D Company 16th Armor the primary Brigade combat element in AO Bolling - Dan Hoa. In December and January, D Company 16th Armor conducted combined operations with Regional Force and Popular Force elements in support of the Phu Yen Province Accelerated Pacification Program, designed to upgrade Government of the Republic of Vietnam con-

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trol of AN NGHIEP Village (CQ 0741). The 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry returned to AC Bolling - Dan Hoa from AO Walker on 22 January and immediately began conducting reconnaissance in force and HAWK Team operations to the west of DONG TRE, with these operations continuing as the operation period ended.

d. Enemy Composition, Strength and Location at the Completion of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>PROBABLE LOCATION</u>
6th Bn, 95th NVA Regiment	300	BQ 9951
30th MF Bn	350	CQ 1926
35th LF Bn	220	'CQ 0951

(1) The significant reduction of enemy forces is, in large part, due to the relocation of the headquarters of the 95th Regiment, with its subordinate 4th and 5th Battalions to Cambodia in June, 1968. This movement was effected at the direction of the 95th NVA Regiment's parent unit, the 5th NVA Division. The purpose of the movement was to receive replacements and for the Regiment to resupply and train. Although indications were received of possible return of the entire 95th NVA Regiment to its former area of operations in late December 1968, no hard intelligence was available to confirm this. At the termination of the operation, the following enemy units were possibly operating in the area of operations.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>PROBABLE LOCATION</u>
95 NVA Regt	1500	Unloc
4th Bn, 95 NVA Regt	325	Unloc
5th Bn, 95 NVA Regt	325	Unloc

e. Enemy Courses of Action, Methods, Peculiarities and Weaknesses:

(1) Of notable interest has been the deterioration in the quantity of replacements received by enemy units. At the beginning of the operation, replacements to enemy units had received three or more months of training prior to infiltration. At the termination of the operation, enemy replacements had received one month or less of military training. This lack of training, when coupled with the loss of personnel in leadership positions,

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has caused a deterioration of the enemy's combat efficiency and effectiveness. In an effort to compensate for these losses, the enemy had been forced to change his age requirements; many of his current replacements are under 15 years or over 30 years of age.

(2) After suffering humiliating defeats during TET, the 95th NVA Regiment withdrew west into the jungle to receive replacements and to train. The Regiment next appeared on the 5th of April vic CQ0943, where his 4th and 6th Battalions were soundly beaten by one ARVN battalion and one ROK battalion. After the engagement, the regiment once again moved west. In June, the 18B and 95 NVA Regiments withdrew west into Cambodia, each leaving behind a battalion size force. The 6th Battalion, 95 NVA Regiment with an estimated strength of 500 men avoided contact whenever possible. Indications were received normally in the form of agent reports, PW statements and captured documents, during December 1968 and January 1969, that the remainder of the 95 NVA Regiment was returning to its former AO. However, at the termination of the operation, no hard intelligence was available to confirm these reports, and the units remain unlocated.

(3) The 30th Main Force Battalion primarily remained out of contact whenever possible. On 30 November, the battalion conducted a stand-off mortar attack on the Vung Ro Bay transportation installation. Throughout the operation, the 30th MF Battalion has been targeted against the Phu Hiep and Vung Ro Bay complexes. Allied operations, however, have pre-empted his offensive capabilities a majority of the time.

(4) During the operation the 85th Local Force Battalion has been primarily targeted against the Tuy Hoa city area and against pacification efforts in the Tuy Hoa plains. The battalion has consistently suffered defeat. On 26 September 68, vic CQ094424, 3/47th ARVN made contact with elements of the 85th LF Bn, killing 45 VC/NVA, capturing 11 small arms and one crew served weapon. On 30-31 January 1969, the enemy lost 20 killed and 3 small arms captured to D/16 Armor vic CQ140500.

(5) Throughout the operation, enemy forces have had the capability to attack population centers and allied installations in multi-battalion strength, although loss of men, equipment and logistical strength decreased his capabilities in the latter stages of the operation. The enemy was capable of stand-off attacks by fire, sapper attacks against friendly controlled areas and restricting movement on LOC's by mining, sniping and multi-company ambush activity.

(6) At the beginning of the operation, the enemy possessed a strong logistical system of base camps, cadre sites and medical facilities, previously located in the HUB area. These installations are vital to the enemy

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effort and would be replaceable only with extreme difficulty due to his extended LOC. As a result of this operation, with its attendant loss of weapons, ammunition, tons of rice and equipment, the enemy's logistical system has been dealt an irreparable blow. On 27 October 1968, vic BQ9359, elements of the 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry found a large hospital complex. Inside the complex were beds, medical supplies, running water in bamboo pipes and a PW from the 5th Battalion, 95th NVA Regiment. The PW confirmed the departure of the 95th Regiment in June 1968. The loss of the hospital complex was a particularly severe blow to the enemy, as this complex reportedly was the only facility in Phu Yen Province with a surgical capability. Brigade operations in support of GVN pacification programs have denied the enemy the support of the populace, either voluntary or involuntary. This loss of logistical capabilities has severely decreased the offensive capabilities of the enemy.

(7) In the areas of leadership and morale, enemy forces have suffered greatly. Throughout the conduct of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa, the enemy has been hampered by the continuing loss of experienced leadership personnel in all units, with the possible exception of the 30th MF Battalion. This loss has been most acute in the non-commissioned officers ranks. Morale of the enemy, both by unit and individual, has also suffered. The morale problems experienced in enemy units have been induced by shortages of experienced medical support and proper medical facilities. Sickness, compounded by hunger, personal illness, allied firepower, a lack of significant victories and the unexpected length of the war has been overwhelming. The result has been decreased enemy combat effectiveness and a lack of willingness on the enemy's part to engage in sustained contact.

(8) Significant enemy vulnerabilities noted throughout the conduct of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa were:

(a) The enemy remained generally short of medicine and proper medical treatment facilities. This lack of medicine, particularly for treatment of malaria cases, deeply erodes the combat effectiveness of the enemy.

(b) Recruited and impressed Viet Cong personnel are relatively untrained and inexperienced. NVA units are short experienced leaders and the caliber of NVA replacements has declined drastically. This absence of promised victory and popular support lowers morale and makes the enemy extremely vulnerable to psychological operations.

(c) The enemy's limited capability to engage in conventional warfare for extended periods made him vulnerable to allied airpower and superior allied firepower.

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(d) The continued loss of logistical facilities and Republic of Vietnam pacification operations have forced the enemy's infrastructure into the open. Their identification and neutralization have resulted in an irreparable loss of hard core cadre, resulting in further deterioration of his logistic capabilities and combat effectiveness.

(e) Extensive use of visual reconnaissance, LRP's, hand held photography and technical detection devices combined with the use of air-strikes, artillery and mobile reaction forces severely limits enemy's mobility and activity.

f. Nature of the Weather: AO Bolling - Dan Hoa during the months of November, December and January is under the influence of the Northeast Monsoon. Surface winds during the period prevail from the north-northeast. Wind speeds range up to 16 knots. Winds gusting to 30 knots are not uncommon in the immediate vicinity of thunderstorms, along exposed locations during strong northeasterly flow, and areas under the influence of typhoons or tropical storms. Calm conditions are observed most frequently during the night and early morning hours. Precipitation from mid-December thru March is in the form of light to moderate showers that normally occur in the mornings. Periods of three to five days without rain are common during the period. Cloudiness in the morning with ceilings below 1000 feet are common in exposed valleys. In general, the afternoons along the coast are partly cloudy with most clouds above 2000 feet. Temperatures range from 70 to 80 degrees along the coast and from 60 to 88 degrees in the interior. Relative humidities are high throughout the year. Mean monthly relative humidities are within the range of 70 to 90 percent. In the northeast Monsoon the humidity along the northeast is about 91 percent.

g. Nature of the Terrain: The area of interest is located in PHU YEN Province and is bounded by coordinates BQ7000, BQ7060, CQ1060 and CQ3000. The eastern boundary is the South China Sea. Three-fourths of the area is mountainous and forested. Most of the remainder of the area is flat land used either for cultivation of rice, or other lowland crops. Along the coast there are rolling hills and sand area consists of mountains and hills, there is no drainage problem. The major drainage system is formed by the DA RANG or SONG BA River and its tributaries it traverses the center of the AO from west to east. (BQ7039 - CQ6346). The tributaries flow generally north-south depending upon their location relative to the SONG BA. The river empties into the South China Sea. Vegetation in the plains area is predominantly rice fields. Interprovincial Route 7B and Route 1 are the main lines of communication in the area.

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h. Operational Methods of Sapper Units:

(1) Sapper action is often a specific sabotage tactic employed in two levels; In separate attacks on installations and in support of Infantry and artillery attacks.

(a) In separate attacks conducted by small forces, the sappers infiltrate deep into US and PWMAF controlled areas to sabotage airfields, docks, vital bridges and important buildings and equipment. In this small force a sapper also has the mission of kidnapping, assassination and performing other terrorist acts. Their greatest aid is their relative freedom of movement through a possible area of operation, affording the sapper unit access to and surveillance of their intended targets.

(b) In employing sapper units in support of infantry and artillery units in a general, all out attack, their mission is to create a breach in the defensive network of the attacked installation to permit an infantry-type frontal attack. They use sticks, prongs and C-hooks to raise or spread the outer perimeter barbed wire, or either, with wire cutters snip the lower strands or wire. The sapper units also mark passages through mine fields with pegs or other means of identification. The infantry and heavy weapons units will wait in concealment while these tasks are performed.

(c) The final task in preparing for the assault is the destruction of installation barricades, watchtowers, machine guns and other targets with satchel charges and grenades, and, at the same time, to detonate explosives planted along the perimeter defenses or in the minefields. After breaching an entrance for the infantry, the sapper units may remain in the battle or withdraw and prepare to cover the infantry withdrawal.

(2) Sappers are well-schooled, selection criteria are high, and only the most outstanding and dedicated are selected for training. Thus, they enjoy a higher esprit de corps than conventional units, and, as a result, their combat effectiveness is generally high.

(3) Sappers units employ five basic tactical principals:

(a) Detailed planning and reconnaissance, insured through minute planning and rehearsal until performance w/o error is assured.

(b) Secrecy and surprise in the planning and performance of the assigned mission.

(c) Speed, with sapper units moving rapidly to enable assault troops to reach their objectives in as short a time as possible and thus exploit all aspects of the defender's disorganization.

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(d) Initiative, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances which might arise during the performance of the mission. Initiative is constantly encouraged through training and indoctrination.

(e) Flexibility, sapper units tailor its needs for men, weapons and equipment according to the missions.

4i. Long Range Patrol Operations: During the conduct of Operation Bolling Dan Hoa a total of 82 long range patrol missions were conducted. Long Range Patrol Teams were generally assigned surveillance missions, with a secondary mission of prisoner of war capture. These patrols made 191 separate sightings of 512 enemy personnel, accounting for 26 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 16 VC/NVA KIA (Poss) and 9 prisoners of war captured. In conjunction with these long range patrols, LRP Teams on 9 occasions employed artillery on enemy elements. Long range patrols were one of the most effective intelligence collections agencies utilized during the conduct of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa.

j. All combat operations were based on a maximum utilization of all intelligence resources. During the conduct of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa, as noted, 82 long range patrols were conducted. Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance assets were also used extensively.

12. MISSION: The 173d Airborne Brigade conducted combat operations in AO Bolling - Dan Hoa to:

- a. Find, fix and destroy enemy forces in the area of operations.
- b. Provide security for engineer construction, land clearing, road upgrading and highways QL 1 and 7A.
- c. Support the Republic of Vietnam's Revolutionary Development and Accelerated Pacification Programs.
- d. Conduct a continuing civic action program consisting of both short range, high impact projects and long range, nation building projects.

13. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: Upon incipiency, the desire of the 173d Airborne Brigade was to continually emphasize the security of QL 1 and QL 7A and, using its combat maneuver elements, to deploy into the jungle highlands areas to the west of the coastal plains areas with the mission of seeking out and destroying enemy forces and base camp and logistical areas.

a. Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa was planned so that organic, attached and OPCON elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade could be utilized to achieve maximum combat effectiveness. Toward this end, D Company 16th Armor was utilized throughout the conduct of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa as the Bri-

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ade's reaction element. This unit conducted sweeps along QL 1 and 7A daily and helped to secure various bridge and strong points as needed, while, at the same time, conducting operations of an offensive nature in the coastal plains areas. Thus, the combat maneuver battalions of the Brigade were able to conduct operations in the jungle highlands areas with the full combat strength rather than having elements tied down in static defensive positions.

b. This concept of operation proved itself to be both worthwhile and profitable, and the basic concept was retained throughout the conduct of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa. It is of note that during Operation Walker, spanning a time period of more than one year, QL 1 or 7A were never closed to either civilian or military traffic for a period of longer than thirty minutes. This in itself substantiates the basic operational concept of the Brigade.

14. EXECUTION: Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa was initiated by the 173d Airborne Brigade on 190001 September 1967. This AO is located in Phu Yen Province, to the west and north of Tuy Hoa city. Its population is estimated at 150,000 people, less than 5000 are considered as being under Viet Cong control and approximately 13,000 are inhabitants of contested areas. The inhabitants principal occupation, as in AO Cochise is fishing, again on an individual small boat basis, and farming, with rice being the main crop.

a. 19 September 1967 - 31 October 1967: During this period almost all the contacts during Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa were with squad sized or smaller elements. The following is a list of significant contacts for this period:

- (1) 191150 Sept CQ 078405 E Troop 17th Cav engaged a squad sized enemy unit with und results.
- (2) 271150 Sept BQ 984734 A/4/503d Infantry threw a grenade in a cave resulting in 5 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC WIA.
- (3) 271945 Sept BQ 914580 A/1/503d Infantry engaged an unk size enemy unit with und results.
- (4) 091145 Oct BQ 942589 A/1/503d Infantry made contact w/an estimated squad of NVA resulting in 6 NVA KIA (BC), 4 US WHA and 2 AK-47's CIA.
- (5) 200555 Oct BQ 974367 LRP Team A ambushed 5 VC resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC).

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b. 1 November 1967 - 31 January 1968: During this period of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa, units of the 173d Airborne Brigade were involved in 239 incidents, 140 of which were friendly initiated. Significant contacts during this period were as follows:

(1) 13 Nov 67 CQ041471 A/3/503d Infantry made contact with 16 VC resulting in 8 VC KIA (BC).

(2) 16 Nov 67 CQ074524 D/3/503d Infantry made contact with 6 VC resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC).

(3) 10 Dec 67 B/3/503d Infantry made contact with 3 NVA resulting in 3 NVA KIA (BC).

(4) 15 Dec 67 CQ016467 A/3/503d Infantry engaged 3 NVA resulting in 3 NVA KIA (BC).

(5) 22 Dec 67 BQ918192 A/3/503d Infantry engaged an est VC platoon resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC).

(6) 27 Dec 67 BQ904791 B+D/3/503d Infantry engaged an estimated VC company resulting in 69 VC KIA (BC).

(7) 7 Jan 68 BQ821790 B/4/503d Infantry engaged an estimated VC squad resulting in 6 VC KIA (BC).

(8) 27 Jan 68 BQ955593 LRP Team E engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC).

(9) 30 Jan 68 CQ165473 C+D/4/503d Infantry engaged an estimated NVA battalion. The attack was launched against the TUY HOA North Airfield by the 5th Bn, 95th NVA Regiment. C and D Companies, 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry were committed on 30 January with the 47th ARVN Regiment and Regional Forces and Popular Forces (RF/PT) supporting. Contact continued until 311900 January. Total enemy losses by elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade were 77 NVA KIA (BC), 2 NVA POW.

c. 1 February 1968 - 30 April 1968: In February Brigade Headquarters (-), 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry, C and D Btry 3d Bn 319th Artillery, E Troop 17th Cav and D company 16th Armor participated in Operation Bolling through 7 February. On 7 February Brigade Headquarters (-) and E Troop 17th Cav joined other Brigade Forces in Operation MacArthur. From 8-29 February 1968 the 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry, C and D Btry 3d Bn 319th Artillery and D Company 16th Armor participated in Operation Bolling during which they were involved in 47 incidents, 30 of which were friendly initiated. The Brigade

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line up in Operation Bolling remained the same throughout the month of March. The largest contact on 4 March was made by D/16th Armor when they smashed two enemy battalions (5th Bn 95th NVA Regt and the 35th VC Bn) which had attacked the 47th ARVN Headquarters at TUY HOA. Over 200 enemy soldiers were killed in the combined FWMAF operation. Significant contacts for this period were as follows:

(1) 060315 Feb 68: CQ1548 A/4/503 sighted 4 VC outside of their perimeter and took them under fire. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC).

(2) 061145 Feb 68: CQ051492 C/4/503d Infantry sighted and engaged 1 VC wearing khakis and rucksack moving NNE. Results: 1 NVA KIA (BC).

(3) 110300 Feb 68: CQ047435 C/4/503d Infantry ambushed 2 VC. Results: 2 VC KIA (BC).

(4) 041210 Mar 68: CQ159471 D/16th Armor had one M113 hit a mine. Area was searched and several VC were engaged. Results: 4 US WHA, 2 VC KIA.

(5) 181215 Mar 68: CQ045446 A/4/503d Infantry observed 10 VC in the open. Artillery, airstrikes, and gunships were called. Results: 4 VC KIA (BC).

(6) 042350 Apr 68: B/4/503d Infantry made contact with estimated 45 VC/NVA vic CQ046466. Results: 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(7) 06 Apr 68: A/4/503d Infantry fired on 15 VC with weapons. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC).

(8) 072050 Apr CQ053393 A/4/503d Infantry made contact with 8 VC while moving to an ambush site. Results: 2 VC KIA (BC).

(9) 171334 Apr 68: C/4/503d Infantry sighted 1 NVA Co digging into their front. Artillery and A/S were called. Results: 1 NVA KIA (BC), 1 AK-47 1 81mm mortar CIA.

(10) 171436 Apr 68: CQ8844 D/16th Armor while escorting a convoy received SA fire from both sides of the road, head track destroyed by a mine. Artillery and A/S supported. Results: 1 US WHA, 1 APC destroyed; 5 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

d. 1 May 1968 - 31 July 1968: In May the 173d Airborne Brigade (-), Task Force 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry, continued Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa in Phu Yen Province, with the continuing mission of locating and des-

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troying the 95th NVA Regiment security for the 577th Engineer Battalion and the 173d Engineer Company, and providing AO Bolling - Dan Hoa with an Infantry rapid reaction company. The 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry, in conjunction with elements of D Company 16th Armor, continued to conduct reconnaissance in force and search and destroy Operations west of TUY HOA in efforts to locate and destroy enemy forces. Significant contacts during this period were as follows:

(1) May:

(a) 021005 CQ006496 C/4/503d Infantry squad size ambush engaged an unk enemy force. Results: 7 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(b) 021310 CQ005498 C/4/503d Infantry squad size element engaged 2 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC).

(c) 041030 CQ022342 B/4/503d Infantry engaged 1 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC).

(d) 131430 BQ967555 B/4/503d Infantry engaged 2 NVA. Results: 2 NVA KIA (BC).

(e) 151230 BQ933544 B/4/503d Infantry engaged 6 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC PW.

(f) 151415 CQ041084 LRRP Tm 15 made contact with an estimated VC squad. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC).

(2) June:

(a) 011645 BQ870602 B/4/503d Infantry engaged 4 NVA with SA fire. Results: 1 NVA KIA (BC), 1 SKS rifle CIA.

(b) 012300 CQ007415 LRRP Tm 15 engaged 2 VC/NVA with SA fire. Results: 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(c) 121445 CQ015445 LRRP Tm 14 made contact with an estimated 3 VC/NVA with SA fire. Results: 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 1 rucksack CIA.

(d) 100843 BQ939757 D/16th Armor had a APC hit a mine. Results: 6 US WHA.

(e) 301630 BQ908533 B/4/503d Infantry made contact with an estimated 3 VC armed with SA. Results: 2 NVA KIA (BC), 1 M-2 Carbine CIA.

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(3) July:

(a) 021300 BQ938857 A/4/503d Infantry engaged 1 VC/NVA with SA fire resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(b) 041600 BQ898748 LRRP Tm 12 made contact with an estimated VC platoon and was extracted without incident.

(c) 041830 BQ867754 LRRP Tm 16 made contact with an unk sized enemy force resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC). Gunships were called with unk results.

(d) 081150 BQ903759 LRRP Tm 13 engaged 1 indiv with SA fire resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(e) 101120 BQ909660 C/4/503d Infantry engaged 7 indiv armed with weapons resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(f) 142100 CQ266349 4/503d Infantry reported an OP received SA fire from a sampan. SA fire was returned and swift boat called to support the contact. There were neg US cas and unk enemy cas.

(g) 201610 BQ159390 D/4/503d Infantry reported a platoon made contact with an unk enemy force. There were 3 US WHA as a result of the contact.

(h) 281750 BQ902459 LRRP Tm 14 made contact with an unk size enemy force and SA fire and AW fore was exchanged resulting in 1 US WHA and an unk enemy casualty figure.

(i) 300945 CQ006467 LRRP Tm 12 made contact with an estimated VC squad. SA and AW fire was exchanged resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 1 Mauser rifle and 1 rucksack CIA.

e. 1 August 1968 - 31 October 1968:

(1) August:

(a) 011805 BQ835785 A/4/503d Infantry made contact w/1 VC armed with SA, SA fire was returned and indiv fled W leaving a blood trail. The trail was followed w/neg results.

(b) 061100 BQ987554 B/4/503d Infantry received SA fire from

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approx 6 indiv's. Fire was returned w/SA and arty employed. There were neg enemy cas and 2 US WHA.

(c) 080925 BQ960525 C/4/503d Infantry engaged 1 VC/NVA w/SA fire resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(d) 111123 CQ012503 C/4/503d Infantry engaged 1 NVA w/SA fire resulting in 1 NVA KIA (BC), and 1 SKS rifle, 1 rucksack and 1 hammock CIA.

(e) 111440 CQ045447 A/4/503d Infantry made contact w/est 3 VC and engaged them w/SA, AW. The VC fled and the area searched resulting in 1 SKS rifle CIA.

(f) 111521 CQ045420 Recon 4/503d Infantry made contact w/unk size VC force resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 1 Chicom HQ CIA.

(g) 122200 CQ041488 D/16th Armor rec'd 3-4 M-79 rds fm the N resulting in 1 US WHA slightly; fire was returned with unk results.

(h) 150240 CQ046437 A/4/503d Infantry made contact w/und ant enemy results and 1 US WHA not evacuated.

(i) 150950 BQ985572 LRP Tm 12 established 4 VC w/SA fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 Russian 7.62mm pistol, 1 rucksack CIA.

(j) 151940 CQ055413 A/4/503d Infantry established contact w/poss Co sized enemy force and was reinforced by D/16th Armor. There were 5 US WHA and neg enemy cas.

(k) 151945 CQ044432 E/4/503d Infantry rec'd 2-3 rds of (Poss) 60mm mortar and SA fire. Fire was returned with 2 VC KIA (BC).

(l) 160833 CQ046435 elements of 4/503d Infantry made contact w/und size enemy force. Fire was returned resulting in 1 US WHA.

(m) 211341 CQ034511 A/4/503d Infantry engaged 1 VC w/SA resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

(n) 221240 CQ059520 A/4/503d Infantry engaged 1 VC sqd resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 AK-47, 2 Chicom HQ's and 1 wallet w/papers CIA.

(o) 270945 CQ015421 LRP Tm 16 made contact w/und size enemy force. SA fire was exchanged and the team broke contact and moved to an LZ and were extracted at 1035H.

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(2) September: From period 28 September 1968 to 15 October 1968, the 4th Battalion (Airborne) 503d Infantry was OPCOM to the 4th Infantry Division: Operation McArthur. For review, see ORLL, 1 August - 31 October, 4th Infantry Division.

(3) October:

(a) 241350 BQ939649 C/4/503d Infantry rec'd 2 SA rds of harassing fire. Arty was fired on the enemy position and the area searched with neg results. Neg US cas.

(b) 250830 CQ123298 4/503d Infantry reported FAC A/C sighted 7 VC and arty fired resulting in 1 VC WHA. The other 6 VC fled SE from the area. Search of the area resulted in Neg US cas. They were extracted w/o incident.

f. 1 November 1968 - 31 January 1969: Activity remained light in AO Bolling - Dan Hoa during this period. TF 4th Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry conducted combat operations in Base Area 236 during the months of November and January. Base Area 236 was the scene of suspected re-supply and training operations conducted by the 6th Bn 95th NVA Regiment. The 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry accounted for 10 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 1 VC/NVA CIA and significant enemy ammunition and supply caches uncovered. Significant contacts during this period were as follows:

(1) November:

(a) 011400 CQ009595 B/4/503d Infantry engaged 4 VC/NVA digging up a stump in an old US night location resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(b) 060520 BQ999517 A/4/503d Infantry rec'd 4 incoming rds resulting in 1 US WHA.

(c) 111400 BQ999517 HAWK Team 1/4/503d Infantry engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC CIA, and 1 AK-47 rifle CIA.

(d) 131340 CQ038493 A/4/503d Infantry rec'd sniper fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1xAK-47, 1xB-40 rkt rd and 1 rucksack CIA.

(e) 301845 01557367 Hawk Team 4/503d Infantry engaged 1 VC sniper resulting in 1 US WHA. Fire was returned with unk results.

(2) December: 310400 CQ868409 D/16th Armor and 152d RF Co engaged an unk size enemy force with SA. SA fire was returned and contact broke 0415H resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA (poss).

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(3) January:

(a) 310840 CQ000510 B/503d Infantry was engaged by an und size enemy force armed w/SA, AW, gunships and arty. The enemy broke contact at 0855H when the enemy fled SW resulting in 3 frdly WHA and 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(b) 311251 CQ000518 C/4/503d Infantry made contact with an und size VC element. Small arms and auto weapons fire was exchanged. At 1305H the contact broke. At 1320H vic BR999518 contact was re-established with a dug in enemy element, estimated to be a reinforced platoon. SA fire was exchanged. Arty and gunships supported the contact which resulted in 1 US KHA. 11 US WHA and und enemy losses.

(c) 302200 CQ140500 D/16th Armor and RF/PF elements made contact with an estimated VC/NVA company armed with SA, AW, artillery and Spooky. The contact broke at 310600H and resulted in 7 US KHA, 3 US WHA, 3 PF WHA and 1 APC destroyed. There were 20 VC/NVA KIA (BC) 3 small arms and 1 B-40 rkt CIA.

g. Tactical Air Support: Tactical air support was provided throughout the conduct of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa by elements of the 7th Air Force. Liaison and forward air control was provided by the United States Air Force Control Party. 173d Airborne Brigade, through DASC Alpha, I Field Force Vietnam. Timeliness of air support was insistantly excellent, as in nearly every instance strike aircraft were ready to attack at the preplanned TOT. The average reaction time for immediate requests was thirty minutes (time from request to ordnance delivery). Immediate requests are relayed directly to DASC Alpha via Air Force Request Net. Preplanned requests were submitted in a weekly basis with daily "add on" requests available.

(1) Quantity of Force:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>SORTIES FLOWN</u>
FAC/Preplanned	533
FAC/Immediate	213
Combat Sky Spot/Preplanned	81
Combat Sky Spot/Immediate	13
Spooky	9
Total Sorties Flown	847

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(2) Type Employment:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER FLOWN</u>
Troops in Contact	49
Confirmed Enemy Location	41
Acquired Enemy Location	59
Suspected Enemy Location	149
Fixed Target Destruction	48
Troop Assault Preparation	24
Landing Zone Construction	4

(3) Results and Effectiveness:

KBA (confirmed)	87
KBA (poss)	102
Bunkers Destroyed	110
Secondary Fires	51
Secondary Explosions	22
Cave Entrances Sealed	9
Pack Animals Killed	7
Structures Destroyed	150

h. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations: During the conduct of Operation Bolling particular emphasis was given to civil affairs and psychological operations, with Brigade elements rendering support to requested projects, for the most part of a "self help" nature, whenever possible. The most significant of the actions and operations are reported as follows:

(1) Civil Affairs:

(a) MEDCAP activities continued throughout the reporting per-

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iod, visiting hamlets and villages throughout AO Bolling. MEDCAPS were performed by battalion surgeons, the office of the Brigade surgeon and personnel assigned to Company B (Medical), 173d Airborne Brigade, from the period 19 September 1967 through 31 January 1969 MEDCAP activities treated a total of 4,250 patients.

(b) In the scope of Community Relations, Brigade personnel participated in numerous religious and official ceremonies. At these ceremonies clothing, food, school kits and other commodities were distributed. Brigade personnel attended numerous meetings with Republic of Vietnam officials to coordinate and plan civic action projects.

(c) In civic action participation, personnel representing the 173d Airborne Brigade contributed a total of 1,538 man-hours in assisting in "self help" projects. Projects were undertaken at the request of Republic of Vietnam officials and included the repair and reconstruction of schools, churches, public and official buildings, roads and bridges. As noted, the majority of these projects were of the "self help" classification with Brigade personnel providing technical assistance and over 90% of needed material and equipment.

(2) Psychological Operations: During the conduct of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa a total of 21,755,000 leaflets were disseminated over the area of operation in both ground and aerial missions and 200 hours of ground and aerial loudspeaker time was utilized. Basic themes used in both leaflet and loudspeaker, missions revolved around the Volunteer Information Program, National Safe Conduct Pass, CHIEU HOI and Republic of Vietnam image.

i. Chemical Operations: Chemical operations supported the 173d Airborne Brigade throughout the conduct of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa. For the most part, this support was of two categories, defoliation and personnel detector mission. A summary of chemical activities is reported as follows:

(1) On 2 Jan 68 the SASS was used in a UH-1D crop destruction mission. 100 gallons of herbicide were used.

(2) On 3 Jan 68 the SASS was used in a UH-1D rice destruction mission. 100 gallons of herbicide were used.

(3) On 6 Jan 68 the SASS was used in a UH-1D rice destruction mission. 100 gallons of herbicide were used.

(4) On 14 Jan 68 the SASS was used in a UH-1D rice destruction mission. 100 gallons of herbicide were used.

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(5) On 18 Feb 68 the Agavence sprayer was used in a UH-1D rice destruction mission vic BQ 8064, BQ 8068, BQ 8168 and BQ7969. Approximately 90% of the rice was destroyed.

(6) On 18 March 1968 the Agavence sprayer was used in two UH-1D crop destruction missions on rice paddies in the area enclosed by BQ7963 and BQ8163. 100 gallons of agent BLUE were dispensed.

(7) On 11 May 68 the CH-47 with 600 gallon bladder was used in a defoliation mission along QL7B vic BQ8844 to BQ9243. 1200 gallons of agent WHITE were used on ambush sites along the road.

(8) On 12 May 68 the CH47 with 600 gallon bladder was used in a defoliation mission along QL7B vic BQ8844 to BQ9243. 495 gallons of agent WHITE were used.

(9) On 15 July 68 the SASS was used in a UH-1D rice crop destruction mission vic grid squares BQ7875, BQ7775, BQ7963, BQ9160, BQ9162. 80 gallons of agent BLUE were used.

j. Airborne personnel detectors and Man Pack personnel detectors were utilized as major sources of intelligence data during the conduct of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa. CS E-153 clusters, air cavalry gunships and artillery support were utilized as a means of follow-up on the personnel detector readings. From 15 May 1968 through 31 January 1969, 78 APD/MPD missions, totaling 127 hours and 50 minutes, were flown in AO Bolling.

15. COMBAT SERVICES, LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION:

a. Logistical Operations:

(1) Logistical Support for AO Bolling was provided jointly by units of the 1st Logistical Command and 173d Support Battalion. The 1st Logistical Command through the TUY HOA Sub Area Command provided Class I, Class III, Class IV and Class V Support. In addition, Services such as laundry, bath and Graves Registration were provided by supporting 1st Logistical Command units. Units of the 173d Support Battalion, to include elements of "C" Company (S&S) and "D" Company (Maint) provided Class II and 3rd Echelon Maintenance Service. In addition, the Brigade Support Operations Center (BSOC) provided back up assistance to 1st Logistical Command units whenever required. From the beginning of operations in AO Bolling, the logistical picture was bright. The 1st Logistical Command had an operation in the PHU HEIP-TUY HOA area. Prior to the arrival of the Brigade, so it was not necessary to begin anew. The only initial problem was in the area of Class III. The dispersed operations of the Brigade in AO Bolling initially caused a shortage of dispensing equipment and personnel. However, by February 1968, 1st Log Command

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had supplemented their POL equipment and personnel so that the area was effectively covered. During operations in the AO, over 1,500 gallons of diesel and 5,000 gallons of mogas were distributed monthly.

(2) Class II Supplies were supplied from AN KHE by air to Tuy Hoa. Air force C-130's and C7A's were utilized for this purpose. During the 1st quarter of 1968, more than 65,000 pounds of general Class II cargo was moved each month by air. In addition, aircraft transportation provided the Major method for personnel movement from AN KHE to TUY HOA. During the 1st quarter of 1968, approximately 500 sky troopers were flown to TUY HOA. The Major Class II shortages during this period were generators, mermite cans and small size fatigues. In the area of barrier material, the supply of concertina wire continued to be a problem. However, again close liasion between 1st Logistical Command Units and depot authorities produced enough concertina to keep the stockage level from becoming critical. Class V supplies never were a problem. The Ammunition point was able to maintain an adequate stockage level on all needed types of ammunition.

(3) In conclusion, from the beginning of the operation, logistics picture was bright with a few exceptions. The 1st Logistical Command and 173d Support Battalion Units were able to provide their classes of supplies and services in a most competent manner thereby ensuring that logistics was never a handicap to combat operations.

b. Engineer Support: Engineer support for the duration of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa was provided by the 173d Engineer Company (Airborne). The company is organized under MTOE E-137F P01 and is authorized three engineer platoons and one bridge platoon. However, due to the particular tactical existing in AO Bolling, the tactical bridge equipment was turned in and the bridge platoon was organized into a fourth engineer platoon. The strength of the 173d Engineer Company generally remained at authorized strength, that is of 6 officers and 188 enlisted men. Engineer support is reported in three areas as follows:

(1) Construction: The company headquarters was stationed at Tuy Hoa from September 1967 to mid-February 1968. During this period of time the engineers supported the Brigade headquarters by constructing 2500 meters frontage of multi-row wire entanglements, 87 GP medium tent frames and floors, and mess facilities for the Commanding General and his staff. Five miles of highway 436 were repaired and upgraded and an access road to a Republic of Korea Fire support base was constructed. A fire support base was constructed on a mountain top near DONG TRE. This required leveling the mountain top and constructing a brigade command post.

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(2) Combat Operations: In AO Bolling during the period September 1967 - February 1968, the major effort of the company was to supporting the infantry and artillery companies of the Brigade. On numerous occasions the engineers were called upon to fight as infantry. In mid-February, when the major portion of the company left AO Bolling, a minesweep team was left behind and continued to conduct daily minesweeps. Daily minesweeps were continued throughout the period of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa. In February 1968, the company destroyed a huge tunnel complex near FSB Razorback. Needless to say, normal combat engineer support was afforded the Brigade elements in AO Bolling at all times. This support included a waterpoint which remained in the AO throughout the operation.

(3) Civil Affairs: The 173d Engineers reported the embankment of an aqueduct that was destroyed due to artillery fire. Had it not been for this work a large rice producing valley would have gone without irrigation water.

c. Medical and Medical Service Support: The mission of the Brigade medical service office was to provide unit and Brigade level medical services to all assigned, attached and OPCON personnel. Co B (Medical), 173d Airborne Brigade provided medical services in the forward combat area.

(1) Material: The chief medical supply problem for Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa was directly related to the fluctuating manner in which the Brigade was tactically deployed. Often it is necessary to utilize more than one source of supply (i.e.) 67th Evacuation Hospital and 25th Evacuation Hospital in QUI NHON; 91st Evacuation Hospital in TUY HOA. To fully support the line battalions, operating in separate geographic areas. This in turn hampered control administrative records and continuity of procedures. Although specific items of supply were often unavailable, shortages of general types of items and medications were negligible. Cooperation and support from the 32d Medical Depot, especially the forward platoon at QUI NHON, was consistently outstanding.

(2) Medical Civic Action: Through July 1968 all medical civic action (MEDCAP) activities in AO Bolling were coordinated and directed by the Brigade S5 office. On 1 August 1968, the Brigade Surgeons Office acquired operational control of MEDCAP missions and coordinates with the S5 to accomplish the mission. MEDCAP activities are reported in paragraph 14, Execution, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations.

(3) Preventive Medicine: In AO Bolling malaria was the principal preventive medicine problem. Malaria case notes began to rise rapidly after the Brigade began combat operations in AO Bolling and reached a peak in October when 225 cases were reported. In conjunction with the 172d Preventive Medicine Unit (SVC) (FLD), routine testing for urinary chloroquine was per-

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formed throughout the Brigade beginning in the first week in November. The test employed was modified from that described by Wilson and Edeson and uses Mayer-Tarnet's reagent. The purpose of the field testing was to identify for commanders which of their units was not using the chloroquine-primaquine medication. It was necessary to convince the individual that there was no portion of the Brigade AO that could not be reached by urine collecting teams. The goal was to test at least 25% of the Brigade each week. As the extent of testing increased the percent of negative results decreased and malaria case rates decreased. The difference between the cases of malaria in October and December 1968 is equivalent to adding the combat elements of two companies to the Brigade. Routine testing for urinary chloroquine continued throughout the conduct of Operation Bolling. No other significant preventive medicine problems were encountered.

d. Signal Support of Combat Operations:

(1) Throughout Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa telephone communications via VHF, Microwave, and Tropospheric scatter radio relay and carrier equipment were provided to all Brigade Base Camps and to higher, support and adjacent units. These long line telephone communications were provided through the support of the Brigade's 534th Signal Company, the 54th Signal Battalion, and the 1st Signal Brigade. Throughout Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa telephone was the primary means of communications utilized between Base Camps, with alternate telephone routing available between all areas. In addition, whenever a Battalion Command Post displaced from its Base Camp to a field location the brigade telephone system was extended to that fire base by utilizing the 534th Signal Company's 4-channel VHF capability and the 12-channel VHF capability of the 54th Signal Battalion. This telephone extension gave the battalion in the field the capability to talk with their battalion rear area and with Brigade Headquarters.

(2) Other communications available to each Battalion Command Post throughout Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa included FM and AM radio. The Brigade FM Radio Nets operated continuously, 24 hours a day, throughout the period covered by this report. Equipment utilized for these nets were of the AN/VRC-12 series radios. Antennas utilized were primarily RC-292 and AS 2169/G. Retransmission stations were employed when required.

(3) Also operating continuously during Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa was the Brigade AM Radio Teletype Net. This net was highly successful and invaluable to the Brigade in providing a secure means of transmitting teletype traffic from Brigade Headquarters to each Battalion Command Post. Equipment utilized for this net was the AN/VSC-2 Radio. Difficulty in transmitting was encountered during the early morning hours (0200-0700) due to the non-availability of adequate AM frequencies.

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e. Enemy Operational Totals: Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa (19 September 1968 - 31 January 1969).

(1) Enemy Personnel Losses:

(a) KIA (EC):	705
(b) KIA (Poss):	131
(c) CIA:	91
(d) HOI CHANH:	33
(e) Detainees:	2398
(f) Civil Defendants:	363

(2) Enemy Weapons Losses: Five 12.7 machine guns, three 82mm mortars, one 57mm recoilless rifle, thirteen LMG's 233 indiv weapons, to include 64x AK-47 rifles, 48x SKS rifles, 35x Carbines, 13x Mauser rifles, ten pistols, ten rocket launchers, nine M-1 rifles, eight M-16 rifles eight MAS-36 rifles, eight BAR, six M3 sub-machine guns, four M-72 laws, three shotguns, three M-79 grenade launchers, three MAT-49 sub-machine guns, one AK-50 rifle. During the conduct of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa enough weapons were captured to adequately equip an enemy infantry battalion.

(3) Enemy Ammunition Losses: 13,402 rds 3A ammo, 252 hand grenades, 120 rocket rds, 435 60mm mortar rds, 31 82mm mortar rds, 15x 75mm recoilless rifle rds, 50x 120 recoilless rifle rds, 2x 105mm artillery rds. In addition, 37,263 pounds of rice were captured and 107 pounds of documents were captured and exploited.

f. Friendly Operational Totals: Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa (19 September 1968 - 31 January 1969).

(1) KHA:	72
(2) WHA:	307

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16. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

A. The RF/PF Leadership School: In June 1968, to support the RF/PF growth effort and on the suggestion of the Commanding General, 22d Infantry Division (ARVN), the 173d Airborne Brigade established the Brigade RF/PF Leadership School. Its establishment, utilizing the facilities and the selected cadre of the Brigade Jungle School at Camp Radcliff (AO Walker), marking the beginning of one of the Brigade's most successful innovations since arriving in Vietnam in May 1965. The program of instruction covered thirteen training days, and included such subjects as techniques of patrolling, reading the compass, night navigation, M-16 breakdown, artillery call sequence and basic health and sanitation. High-caliber instruction was presented to 50 RF/PF each cycle, with two cycles graduating each month. The cycles were designed to include both officer and NCO personnel, on the basis of one officer class per three NCO classes. Students came from the provinces of BINH DINH, PHU YEN and PHU BOM. Through 31 January 1969, ten RF/PF Leadership School classes were held, with a total of 490 students graduating. The school was under the command supervision of the Brigade's Office of RF/PF Affairs, administered and supported by the 173d Support Battalion (Airborne).

b. The "Kit Carson" Scout Program: The 173d Airborne Brigade "Kit Carson" scout program was fully implemented on 24 June 1968. Since this date, scouts have been employed down to platoon level in each of the Brigade's maneuver battalions and results have been excellent. With their intimate knowledge of the territory and terrain, of various and suspected and known enemy locations and the placement techniques of booby traps and explosive devices by the enemy. The individual infantryman, while in incipency hesitant about the worth of the "Kit Carson" scout program, was quick to grasp the value the average scout possessed and as Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa ceased, regarded the scout as an integral part of his platoon organization.

c. Rome Plow Operations: Rome Plows were used extensively during the conduct of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa with most effective results. It has been noted that BINH DINH Province had long been a "hotbed" for Viet Minh and later Viet Cong elements, dating back to French control of Indochina. During the many years the insurgents had conducted operations in this area, they had continuously built and added to bunker systems. The base camp tunnel systems and attack by fire bunkers were generally to be found along routes of travel. Especially fine systems were known to exist along QL 1 and Route 7A, and it was in these areas that the Rome Plows area were most effective. Through Rome Plow employment the Viet Cong were denied the use of well-established cave and tunnel networks, not only for the duration of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa, but for future periods as well.

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d. Combined United States - ARVN Operations: A keynote of the Brigade's combat operations throughout the conduct of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa has been the continued command emphasis placed on combined combat operations with the 22d Infantry Division (ARVN) and various RF/PF units in BINH DINH Province. The 173d Airborne Brigade continued to increase its use of the combined US-ARVN operation not only as a better means of accomplishing its tactical mission by defeating the enemy but also to assist Republic of Vietnam forces in attaining a higher level of combat efficiency and to continue the progress made in the areas of rural pacification and revolutionary development. Also, the Brigade attempted to make available to Republic of Vietnam elements United States logistical support, particularly in the areas of aviation and heavy equipment assets. The 173d Airborne Brigade feels that the Combined Operations have been beneficiary to both the ARVN's and the Allied units working with them, and is looking forward to continual tactical successes through their employment.

17. HISTORIANS ANALYSIS: In all respects, Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa can be reported as a most successful combat operation. In its incipency, AO Bolling was a hotbed of enemy activity, with an estimated 65% of its populace considered as being under Viet Cong control and/or influence and main-force NVA elements within striking distance of TUY HOA City and surrounding villages and hamlets.

a. Enemy activity continued to increase until the TET offensive of 1968, when elements of the 95th NVA Regiment, 5th NVA Division attempted to overrun and destroy TUY HOA City and were defeated by elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade and the 47th Infantry Regiment, 22d Infantry Division (ARVN). Again on 4 March 1968, enemy elements attempted to enter the populated areas of PHU YEN Province and again Brigade elements, especially D Company 16th Armor, defeated these enemy forces.

b. From the period 4 March 1968 until the culmination of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa on 31 January 1969, AO Bolling was the scene of decreasing enemy activity, with Brigade elements insuring that the enemy was not allowed the opportunity to mass its forces and, by conducting battalion-sized search and destroy missions in the jungle highlands areas to the west of the populated plains, destroyed and rendered ineffective former enemy base camps and staging areas. Thus, when the enemy does return to AO Bolling, by virtue of those operations the enemy will find his logistical support areas and base camps destroyed, and will be forced to begin to build again.

c. After March 1968 it also began to be possible for the Republic of Vietnam's Rural Development and Accelerated Pacification Programs to begin, and AO Bolling was the scene of accelerated efforts on the part of both United States and Vietnamese agencies to rebuild government control of the many various hamlets and villages in the area of operation. It is notable that, upon the com-

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pletion of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa on 31 January 1969, pacification sources carried AO Bolling as having only 13% of its population under Viet Cong influence and/or control, a decrease of 52% during the conduct of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa. This in itself speaks of the success of the operation.

W. R. Stamp

W. R. Stamp

1Lt AGC

Asst AG

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INCLOSURE I

BASIC REFERENCE MATERIAL

OPERATION BOLLING

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

Basic Reference Material: The basis for the Combat Operations After Action Report: Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa has been previous Combat After Action Reports submitted by the various assigned and attached elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade which have participated in the conduct of Operation Bolling - Dan Hoa during its duration. These basic reports have previously been distributed through proper channels through the quarterly Operational Report Lessons Learned, and are listed below for the purpose of further reference material for future use.

- a. Combat After Action Interview, "The Battle of Tuy Hoa North", 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade. For the period of 30 January 1968 to 31 June 1968.
- b. CAAR, Operation Bolling II and David; 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade, for the periods of 17 January 1968 to 15 July 1968, from 16 July 1968 to 27 July 1968, from 27 July 1968 to 24 August 1968, and from 15 October 1968 to 28 November 1968.
- c. CAAR, Operation Rice Denial, dated 1 December 1968. 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade; for the period of 5 November 1968 to 8 November 1968.

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