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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P(M) (28 Jul 67) FOR OT

8 August 1967

SUBJECT: Combat after Action Report - Operation Junction City -
HQ, 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) (U). ⑥

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173d Airborne Brigade
Commanding Officers
3d Battalion, 503rd Airborne Infantry
3d Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry
198th Infantry Brigade

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OPERATION DOWNTIME



PHASE I: 22 February - 15 March 1967

PHASE II: 20 March - 13 April 1967

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(10) **FORWORD**

Due to the length of Operation JUNCTION CITY, and the fact that the operation was conducted in two distinct phases (JUNCTION CITY I and JUNCTION CITY II), this report will be divided into two sections. The first phase will cover the planning, staging and execution of the parachute assault, and the inclusive dates 22 February through 15 March 1967. The second phase of this report (JUNCTION CITY II), will cover operations in the MINH THANH Region of WAR ZONE "C", 20 March through 13 April, whereupon the 173d Airborne Brigade's role in the operation was terminated.

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Tab A

Combat Operations After Action Report

Operation JUNCTION CITY I

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE)
APO San Francisco 96250

AVBEE-SC

15 June 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report - Operation JUNCTION CITY I & II

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff
For Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

The following report is submitted in accordance with MACV Directive Number 355-8. (RCS Exempt)

1. General: Operation JUNCTION CITY was originally conceived in the latter part of November 1966. The original concept of operations called for the employment of the 1st Infantry Division, the 173d Airborne Brigade, the 25th Infantry Division, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, the 9th Infantry Division (-), the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-), and the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division. Initially, the 101st was selected to perform the parachute phase of the operation. The rationale behind this selection was that they were already staged, which would mean a considerable saving of time. This unit was dropped, however, since they were scheduled for another operation or participation in another operation in the I Corps Tactical Zone. Operation JUNCTION CITY was aimed directly toward the destruction of the COSVN (Central Office of South Vietnam), and the 9th North Vietnamese Division.

The original date of Operation JUNCTION CITY was to be in the latter part of January 1967, shortly after the completion of Operation NIAGAR/CEDAR FALLS, however, intelligence reports of Viet Cong activity led to the 173d Airborne Brigade's deployment to WAR ZONE "D" on Operation BIG SPRING. Planning continued on Operation JUNCTION CITY however, and upon the termination of operations in the "D ZONE", the final touches were put on plans for JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE. The new plan called for a reverse in the original concept of operations, that is, the Brigade was to assault the eastern portion of WAR ZONE "C", and in the second phase, the western portion. The Brigade's own study of the plan, reconnaissance etc. led to the execution of the parachute assault phase of Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE. The previous plan had called for the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) to conduct air-mobile assaults and then search and destroy operations. The primary factor behind the jump was to place the maximum number of troops on the ground in the shortest period of time to reduce the requirement for helicopter support. In addition, this maneuver would give Allied Forces the complete element of surprise, leaving the enemy confused and scattered, more so than a heliborne assault since a larger force could be introduced.

At 0900 hours on 22 February 1967, the jumpmaster's voice rose above the roar of the C-130, "STAND IN THE DOOR" and Brigadier General John R. Deane Jr. shuffled into the right door. LTC Robert H. Sigholtz, the Airborne Task Force Commander (2/503d Infantry (+)), took his position in the left door. As the green light flashed, "GO!", General Deane jumped, leading the first parachute assault in the Republic of VIETNAM and the first such assault since the KOREAN CONFLICT.

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One other person that we would like to cite is Chief Warrant Officer Howard P. Melvin, presently assigned to the Supply and Transportation Company of the 173d Support Battalion. CWO Melvin, who is now 53 years old and a resident of San Francisco, California, made this parachute assault, his fifth in over 20 years of combat service. His four previous combat assaults were at GELA, SICILY, SALERNO, ST. MEHE (night jump) and now, vicinity of KATUM, RVN. This is a significant accomplishment in every sense.

2. Name of Operation: Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE

3. References: Maps, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L-7014, Sheets 6232 II and 6232 III.

4. Type of Operation: Parachute Assault and Search and Destroy

5. Date of Operation: 22 February through 15 March 1967

6. Location: Northern TAY NINH PROVINCE, vicinity of KATUM (WAR ZONE "C")

7. Command Headquarters: 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)

8. Reporting Officer: Brigadier General John R. Deane Jr.

9. Task Force Organization:

Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE

Airborne Task Force

1/503d Inf - LTC SACHS

4/503d Inf - LTC JACKLEY

Engr Demo Tn
3 Scout Dog Tns

Engr Demo Tn
3 Scout Dog Tns

Bde Control

D/16th Armor
E/17th Cav (Dismounted)
173d Engr Co (-)
3/319th Arty (-)
4.2" Ft 1/503d OPCOM
4.2" Ft 4/503d OPCOM
HHC (-)

Airborne Task Force - LTC SIGMUNDZ

2/503d Inf

MP Sqd	IPW Team
Engr Sqd	Signal Section
A/3/319th Arty	Spt Bn Team
Bde TAC CP	
MP Sec Sqd	

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10. Supporting Forces:a. United States Air Force

(1) Size of Force:

- (a) 3d Tactical Fighter Wing
- (b) 12th Tactical Fighter Wing
- (c) 31st Tactical Fighter Wing
- (d) 35th Tactical Fighter Wing

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) TAC Sorties

3d TFW	122
12th TFW	32
31st TFW	54
35th TFW	94
TOTAL SORTIES	<u>302</u>

(b) FAC Sorties	52
(c) VNAF Sorties	0
(d) Tons of Ordnance	339.5
(e) Visual Reconnaissance	56
(f) Escort Missions	3
(g) Airborne Assault Support	32
(h) Aerial Resupply	151

(3) Results and Effectiveness: Tactical Air Support during this operation was highly effective. Delays were encountered on isolated occasions when troops were not properly drilled in marking their positions for air identification. It is felt that with a better understanding of FAC procedure and sequence of events in conducting airstrikes will enable ordnance to be placed on targets with minimum delay.

(4) Timeliness: All sorties provided arrived within a usable time frame and most were effectively employed.

b. Army Aviation

(1) Size of Force:

During Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE, the Brigade was supported by the following aviation units:

- (a) 11th Aviation Battalion

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- (b) 145th Aviation Battalion
- (c) 1st Aviation Battalion
- (d) 173d Aviation Platoon (Casper Platoon)

(2) How and When Employed:

<u>Missions</u>	<u>Sorties</u>
Combat Assault	1,179
Armed Helicopter	342
Resupply	3,982
Command and Liaison	1,179
Aerial Reconnaissance	12
Psychological Operations	0
Aerial Observer	51
TOTAL	9,717

(3) Highlights of Aviation Activities: An increasing number of night missions were flown by aircraft supporting the Brigade. The majority of the requirement were for command and control aircraft in covering night operations and contacts.

(4) A total of 2,821 hours were flown in support of Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE for a daily average of 123 hours per day.

(5) A total of 9,518 passengers were transported by rotary wing aircraft during the operation.

(6) A total of 691 tons of cargo was flown during the course of Operation JUNCTION CITY I for a daily average of 50 tons.

(7) Results and Effectiveness: The aviation support which the Brigade received was adequate to perform its assigned mission. The use of helicopters to perform airmobile assaults resulted in the battalions being placed into areas where hostile forces were unable to react. All aviation support missions were completed with minimal damage to aircraft.

(8) Timeliness: Aviation support was available to units at all times except when complete absence of aircraft existed.

c. Artillery

(1) Size of Force:

Btry A, 3d Bn, 319th Arty (6 105mm How)
 Btry B, 3d Bn, 319th Arty (6 105mm How)
 Btry C, 3d Bn, 319th Arty (6 105mm How)
 4.2" Mortar Plt, 1st Bn, 503d Inf (Attached)
 4.2" Mortar Plt, 4th Bn, 503d Inf (Attached)

(2) How and When Employed:

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(a) On 19 February 1967, at 1230 hours, Batteries B and C of the 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery were moved by C-130 aircraft from BIEN HOA to a forward staging area vicinity of DIAN LOI Airstrip (XT 807899) closing at 1917 hours. On 22 February 1967, Battery A, 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery moved by C-130 aircraft from BIEN HOA. At 0900 hours, Alpha Battery, in conjunction and under the Operational Control of the 2/503d Infantry, made a parachute assault into Position LZ, vicinity of KATUM (XT 344925). The 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery moved by road from Position LZ to Fire Support Base III vicinity coordinates XT 288815 on 5 March 1967, closing at 1405 hours. The 3/319th Artillery, in direct support of the 173d Airborne Brigade, fired on call missions daily throughout the operation. The air observer was used daily for registration and missions as requested by ground elements. The ground observers attached to the Infantry companies fired contact missions and defensive concentrations in support of their units.

(b) H & I fires were planned daily by forward observers, battalion liaison officers and the battalion S3.

(c) Preparation of Landing Zones:

2 Mar 67 - 0800-0815H - XT 29349184, XT 29539170, XT 2927-9127, XT 29089140, XT 29349184.

4 Mar 67 - 0800-0830H - 2/503d Inf Prep - XT 3694, XT 375-945, XT 37659385, XT 379948.

4 Mar 67 - 1222-1252H - 4/503d Inf Prep - LZ 41, 41A - XT 373823, XT 372828, XT 372828 - XT 375825, XT 375825 - XT 371852.

6 Mar 67 - 0900-0930H - 2/503d Inf Prep - LZ 21 - XT 371852 - 370857, XT 370857 - XT 376859, XT 378855 - 371852.

6 Mar 67 - 1100-1130H - 1/503d Inf Prep - LZ 11, 31A - XT 357792 - XT 355799 - 3580, XT 359792, XT 357792, XT 358798 - 359792. Grid XT 374790 - XT 373795 - XT 3780, XT 378790 - XT 374790, XT 375795 - XT 378790.

(3) Results and Effectiveness: Preparatory fires on landing and extraction zones were very effective as proven by the relatively small amount of ground fire that was received by the assaulting and extracting troops. Advancing fires were employed on numerous occasions. These fires enabled the infantry to move with greater speed and less contact. When contact was made, devastating artillery fire both on the enemy and in blocking positions were fired in the infantry's support. Defensive concentrations were stressed and were fired for all elements. Counter-mortar fires were employed on two occasions with outstanding results. H & I missions received increased emphasis with an average of 500 rounds per night. Results of these fires are unknown. TOT's were fired on previous base camps and intelligence targets both day and night.

(4) Timeliness: Coordination between artillery, TAC Air and gunships on preparations was very effective. Problems arose on contact missions when TAC Air was employed. The artillery was given check fire too long before the air strikes began, resulting in a period of time when no ordnance was being delivered. The delay between receipt of fire missions until first round shot was governed by time required for air and ground clearance. Fire missions requested

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in areas requiring 1st Division clearance also caused delays. The technical computations required by all FDC's were accomplished with both speed and accuracy.

(5) Missions and Rounds Fired:

(a) 105mm Howitzer

Missions - 1,423
Rounds Expended - 45,282

(b) 4.2" Mortar

Missions - 48
Rounds Expended - 4,947

d. E Troop, 17th Cavalry

(1) Size of Force:

Cavalry Troop
LRRP Platoon and Troop Headquarters
Vehicles - 26 1/4-ton vehicles, 11 3/4-ton vehicles and 2 2 1/2-ton trucks (to include one (1) 500-gallon tanker).

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) Initially, the Troop was flown to QUAN LOI without its combat vehicles due to the original plan calling for the troop to be employed as a clandestine rifle company. On the 21st of February, the Troop flew back to BIEN HOA, where the vehicles were picked up and "E" Troop drove to SOUI DA.

(b) During the period 21 February - 3 March 1967, the Troop assisted in the defense of SOUI DA. On 3 March, the Troop moved to Artillery Base 1. Attached to E/17th Cav was an Armored Cavalry Platoon from the 1/4th Cavalry and four M-42 "Dusters" (Twin 40mm).

(c) While securing Artillery Base 1, the Troop engaged in an aggressive patrol plan keeping one platoon out at all times.

(3) Results and Effectiveness: During the operation, numerous patrols were deployed around the area which the Troop was responsible for securing. This resulted in Five (5) VC KIA (BC). The Cavalry Troop spent many hours in preparing their position with overhead cover, and for the first time, the Troop CP operated underground. This proved very effective during the mortar attack which the unit underwent, and because of this, the operations and communications personnel were able to continue to operate with little difficulty. Also during this operation, the Troop mortars were consolidated into one separate platoon. This proved very effective, because under the jurisdiction of one man they operated more rapidly and efficiently.

(4) Timeliness: All missions of the Troop were accomplished on time during the operation.

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e. Company D, 16th Armor

(1) Size of Force:

(a) Phase I - D/16th Armor (3 APC Plts), organic to 173d Abn Bde (Sep)

(b) Phase II - TF TANKER: C/2/34th Armor
D/16th Armor
D/4/503d Inf

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) On 20 February 1967, D/16th Armor provided security for convoys moving to SUOI DA.

(b) On D-1, D/16th Armor was attached to 1/4th Cavalry at the vicinity of SUOI DA and moved with 1/4th Cavalry north to link up with the 1/503d Infantry at XT 324886. D/16th Armor was detached from 1/4 Cavalry upon linking up.

(c) D/16th Armor (-) was OPCON to the 4/503d Infantry, effective 270700 hours February 1967. At the same time, one platoon from the Armor Company became under the Operational Control of the 2/503d Infantry. Two (2) APC's were provided for support of the BSOC.

(d) D/16th Armor OPCON to the 2/503d Infantry as of 28 February 1967.

(e) D/16th Armor as a part of TF TANKER (D/16th Armor, C/2/34th Armor and D/4/503d Infantry), to attack at 060700H March 1967 southeast along ROUTE 246 to clear the route to BO TUC (XT 380857). Then movement south was initiated from BO TUC and Search and Destroy operations were conducted in zone throughout Objective RON. During this time, TF TANKER had to be prepared to assist the 1/503d Infantry, the 2/503d Infantry and/or the 4/503d Infantry on order and maintain coordination with the 2/503d Infantry while moving along ROUTE 246.

(f) D/16th Armor was detached from duty on 13 March 1967 and remained at FSB III. On 14 March, D/16th provided road convoy security to the 3/319th Artillery returning to BIEN HOA.

(3) Results and Effectiveness: The company was once again properly deployed in the role of Armor, and with the attachment of D/1/503d Infantry, the unit functioned as a mechanized rifle company. By utilizing tanks to break the trails, D/16th Armor was able to cover large areas of jungle, and to deploy the infantry in a S & D role. The company reacted well to enemy contact and exercised good fire control and discipline. It was discovered that the number of infantrymen that can be safely transported by vehicle is ten. Any more than this will cause the TC to be unable to fight with his .50 caliber MG. Overall, the operation was highly successful from the Armor point of view. When deployed, the company was able to make maximum utilization of all assets found in an armor unit.

f. 173d Engineer Company

(1) Size of Force:

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Three (3) Line Platoons (-)
One (1) Maintenance Platoon (-)
One (1) Headquarters Section

(2) How and When Employed: On 20 February 1967, the 173d Engineer Company (-) departed BIEN HOA for SUOI DA in WAR ZONE "C". From 20 February to 23 February 1967, the company cleared the single lane by-pass road of mines between coordinates XT 292606 and XT 286645 and constructed a second lane to this critical supply road. On 23 February, the company moved by convoy from SUOI DA to KATUM. The following activities were conducted by the 173d Engineer Company between 23 February 1967 and 7 March 1967:

- (a) Cleared road between coordinates XT 323883 and XT 314943 of mines daily.
- (b) Constructed and installed five (5) 36" diameter metal culverts along road between coordinates XT 323883 and XT 314943.
- (c) Constructed a hasty-type road from the BSOC to 3/319th Artillery.
- (d) Constructed 70' timber trestle bridge at XT 337894.
- (e) Constructed the TOC bunker at Brigade headquarters vicinity XT 345925.
- (f) Cleared ROUTE 246 of mines from XT 333897 to XT 380857 and constructed two abutments for an AVLB vicinity XT 321939.
- (g) Upgraded the road net in the vicinity of the Brigade's AGR to class 50 and rendered except ambush sites along roads in this area by clearing brush to a distance of 100 meters on sides of all roads.
- (h) Loaned the 1st Engineer Battalion a dozer, several trucks and an air compressor in which to build a C-130 airstrip vicinity of KATUM.
- (i) Produced approximately 220,000 gallons of potable water for the Brigade.
- (j) On 7 March, the Engineer Company moved from KATUM to SUOI DA and set up a perimeter. At this location, the company carried on the following activities between 7 March 1967 and 12 March 1967:
 - 1. Constructed the TOC Bunker
 - 2. Helped repair the MSR in support of A/168th Engineer Battalion.
 - 3. Conducted training classes on maintenance, demolitions, weapons, engineering tools, and mine detectors.
 - 4. Supported the 168th Engineer Battalion with mine detection teams.

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(3) Results and Effectiveness: The 173d Engineer Company provided timely and competent engineering support whenever called upon.

g. 173d Military Police Platoon

(1) Size of Force: The force constituting the 173d MP's during Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE was as follows:

Personnel:

Four (4) 10-man squads
Two (2) Officers
Four (4) National Policemen
One (1) Interpreter

Equipment:

One (1) 3/4-ton truck
Seven (7) 1/4-ton trucks
Six (6) M-60 machineguns
One (1) .50 caliber machinegun

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) One squad was attached to the 2/503d Infantry for immediate MP support, to provide one more rifle squad and to make the first combat parachute assault in VIETNAM with the infantry task force.

(b) Employed to provide the necessary traffic control points and security for the movement of the Brigade (-) from BIEN HOA to the area of operations.

(c) Employed to provide and maintain a POW Collecting Point at the Brigade Forward Base Camp to include guarding, feeding and evacuation of captives.

(d) Employed to provide necessary traffic control points and security for the movement of the Brigade BSOC to the tactical area of operations with E/17th Cavalry.

(e) To provide security for the TOC during the hours of darkness.

(f) To provide a security guard on the Commanding General's living area during the hours of darkness.

(g) To provide one MP squad for the CG during the parachute assault for security purposes.

(h) Employed to provide security and TCP's for the movement of the Brigade Headquarters elements from KATUM to SUOI DA.

(i) To patrol Off-Limits areas of SUOI DA.

(j) Employed to provide security for Engineer work parties and BSOC resupply convoys from SUOI DA to KATUM.

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(k) Employed to escort an Engineer Platoon back to BIEN HOA prior to the Brigade Forward CP displacing to Base Camp.

(l) The remaining Military Police who were left at Base Camp (BIEN HOA) were employed to provide law, order and discipline to the Brigade rear.

(3) Results and Effectiveness: The road move from BIEN HOA to SUOI DA by the Brigade BSOC was accomplished with no difficulty. The squad attached to the 2/503d Infantry, after participating in the parachute assault, performed many and varied missions with the rifle battalion to include perimeter guard, recon patrols with the Reconnaissance Platoon and clearing patrols. This MP Squad did an outstanding job while attached to the infantry unit in both the field of infantry and in military policing. When the Brigade arrived at SUOI DA, the town was placed "Off-Limits" and on two occasions, the MP's were called upon late at night to go into the village and locate Brigade personnel who had broken the restriction. On both occasions, the personnel were found and returned to their units. The movement back to BIEN HOA was accomplished with no difficulty or enemy contact. There were no POW's processed during the operation.

(4) Timeliness: All missions of the 173d MP Platoon were accomplished on time during the operation.

II. Intelligence

a. Enemy Situation Before Operation: Prior to the commencement of the operation, the following units were believed to be in the AO: The Military Affairs Committee, COSVN (Central Office of South Viet Nam), the Headquarters of the 101st NVA Regiment, and the 272d VC Regiment. The enemy was attributed with the following capabilities:

(1) To defend up to Battalion size forces to permit withdrawal of key personnel, equipment and records.

(2) To conduct limited attacks against small friendly units when he believed he had tactical superiority or the surprise factor.

(3) To make maximum use of mortars, sniper fire, mines and booby-traps.

b. Enemy Situation During Operation: From 22 February to 15 March, elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) with 2/34th Armor, maintained daily contact with the enemy. The contacts were usually initiated by friendly forces and terminated by withdrawal by the VC. The largest contacts by elements of the 173d were: 3 March 1967 contacts, a Battalion size attack on one friendly company. The VC force was believed to be one Battalion of the VC 70th Guard Regiment, reinforced by local guerrilla elements. The 11 March attack was at least one battalion of the 101st NVA Regiment. The contact lasted sporadically for 3 days. The 3/319th Artillery Battalion on 11 March supported a US 1st Division FSB under attack from an estimated battalion from the 272d Regiment. Numerous VC base camps were found which contained fortifications, weapons, foodstuffs, and documents. The size ranged from squad to regimental. When possible, base camps were destroyed. One base camp believed to be the Signal Report Military Affairs Section, COSVN contained the following significant items: 1 DAG 1 Portable DF CIA 4617 SN 530, 1 XMTR Model 102E w/microphone (Chicom), 1 U/I switch board (possibly Chicom), 11 receivers, 2 - 12MC

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(Communist bloc), 15 telephones (Czech made), assorted component parts. Also, in a base camp believed to be the Headquarters for the Administrative Staff Section for Assault Youth Group, COSVN, which contained the following significant equipment: 625 rolls and reels of movie film, 2,000 photos, five (5) 16mm movie cameras, one (1) box camera, 1,000 lbs of photo equipment. Also captured were films of the 56 AA Artillery Battalion, the 69th Artillery Regiment and papers indicating the presence of the 70th Guard Regiment and the 272d Regiment within the AO.

c. Area of Operations:

(1) Weather and Climate: The weather during Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE was clear and dry throughout the entire period. Light fog occasionally appeared in the early morning hours, but dissipated prior to 0300 hours. One light afternoon shower occurred during the period. The mean maximum temperature was 72°. The weather was ideal for ground operations throughout the entire period.

(2) Terrain: The operational area was in the northern section of TAY NINH Province which forms the major portion of WAR ZONE "C". The topography was characterized by gently rolling hills and flat land. NUI BA DEN, a 986 meter high mountain located at XT 280580, was the most predominant terrain feature in the area. The SONG DONG NAI and the CONG VAM CO DONG form the major drainage pattern in the area of interest. Other streams and intermittent waterways were interlaced throughout the AO. Fifty percent of the area was covered with dense forest. The dense underbrush and thick forest made movement off the primary trails slow and difficult. The main US road in the area was NATIONAL HIGHWAY 22. ROUTE 4, which extends north from TAY NINH is in good condition up to KATUM. All of the bridges on ROUTE 4 between TAY NINH and KATUM were capable of supporting military traffic. During the dry season, the hardened soil conditions caused some difficulty in constructing ground positions.

d. Final Analysis: Contacts with the enemy ranged in size from squad to possibly battalion size contact. Daily contact was made throughout the Operation. The VC did not attack without the advantage of surprise, superior strength or unless occupying fortified positions. The VC stood and fought longer than expected, indicating they were blocking for the movement of important persons or materials. Numerous base camps, food and supply caches located throughout the AO, combined with a vast, well used trail system, indicated that the area was an infiltration route and rest area for VC entering VIETNAM from CAMBODIA, as well as a well established base camp area. The COSVN was further weakened by the loss of valuable equipment and important records and the VC morale was lowered by their incapability to protect their most important headquarters, Signal Depot - Military Affairs Section COSVN, the 56th AA Artillery Battalion, the 69th Artillery Regiment, the 70th Guard Regiment and the 272d VC Regiment.

e. Sources of Intelligence: During Operation JUNCTION CITY I (ALTERNATE), the 172d Military Intelligence Detachment supported the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) in fulfilling its mission. The activities of each section are given below.

(1) Imagery Interpretation Section:

(a) Imagery Interpretation support for Operation JUNCTION CITY I consisted of the preparation of immediate reports, detailed LZ and DZ analysis, construction of mosaics, aerial reconnaissance and weather support. The DZ was

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selected tentatively from examination of picto-map coverage of the operational area. Aerial photography was obtained confirming the original selection. A detailed analysis of the DZ area was written and a mosaic of the LZ was constructed, annotated and reproduced in 50 copies. Hand held photography of the general DZ area immediately prior to the jump was obtained through Det "A", 1st MIBARS.

(b) Aerial Reconnaissance was flown during the operation exclusively in Air Force FAC aircraft flying from TAY NINH.

(c) Imagery Interpretation support for Operation JUNCTION CITY I consisted of the following:

<u>Aerial Reconnaissance</u>	<u>Missions</u>	<u>Hours</u>
Army UH-1B	-	-
Air Force C1-E	30	75
Photo Mosaics Completed	3
<u>Photo Interpretation Reports</u>		
Immediate	5
LZ Analysis	6
Detailed DZ Analysis	2

(2) Counterintelligence Section: The counterintelligence support for Operation JUNCTION CITY I consisted primarily of liaison with other intelligence agencies located near the AO. The USARV augmentation team provided valuable information prior to the operation.

(3) Interrogation: A statistical summary of personnel, documents and material processed during Operation JUNCTION CITY I follows:

Detainees:

VC	5
Returnees	0
Civil Defendants	0
TOTAL	5

Documents 10,800

Weapons:

Rifles and Carbines	13
Flare Pistols	10
AT Grenade Launchers	2
Light Machinegun	1
Shot Guns	2

Ammunition:

Mortar Rounds	1
Howitzer (75mm pack)	3

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AT Grenade Rounds	8
Small Arms Rounds	3,250
Grenades	50

Mines:

Anti-Tank	4
Anti-Personnel	3
Claymores	8

Demolitions:

Blasting Caps	200
Explosives	1 lb
Fuse	500 ft
Electric	650 ft

Communication Equipment - 3,000 pounds including:

1 DAG 1 Portable DF CIA 4617A SW 530	
1 XMTR Model 102E w/microphone (Chicom)	
1 U/I Switch Board (Possible Chicom)	
Receiver, 2-12 MC (Communist bloc)	11
Telephones (Czech made)	15
Assorted Component Parts	

Clothing 207 lbs

Medical Supplies 38 lbs

Web Gear 105 lbs

Miscellaneous:

Rolls & Reels of Movie Film	625
Photographs	2,000
16mm Movie Cameras	16
Box Camera	1
Photo Equipment	1,000 lbs

(4) Significant findings as a result of document exploitation:

(a) Documents captured with the films and photo equipment indicate that the Troop Entertainment for COSVN and the photographic training center for the COSVN Military School Committee were located at the base area where the items were captured.

(b) Communication equipment and documents indicated that the Brigade had captured significant amounts of material belonging to the signal section for the Military Affairs Committee COSVN. This equipment is estimated to have been of high value militarily and financially.

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12. Mission: Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE

The mission of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) during Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE was as follows:

a. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) (-) was given the mission to proceed to a staging area at QUAN LOI and prepare for subsequent airborne assaults into the vicinity of KATUM. This was to take place between the period 19 - 20 February 1967.

b. The 2d Battalion of the 503d Infantry with A/3/319th Artillery and elements of the Brigade HHC were given the mission of conducting a parachute assault at SEOC COM TRANG (vic KATUM) on D - Day. The Battalion (+) was then to establish the Brigade CP at Position LZ2 and provide security for heavy drops which were to continue for several days. At the same time, the Brigade (-) was to conduct airborne assaults in the vicinity of KATUM and conduct search and destroy operations in assigned areas of operation.

13. Concept of Operation: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), OPCOM to the 1st Infantry Division conducted Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE in the following five phases:

a. PHASE I: Operation JUNCTION CITY I - D - 3 to E - 1 (19 - 21 February 1967)

The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) (-) moved from BIEN HOA to a staging area at QUAN LOI and made final preparation for assault into the objective area on D - Day. In addition, the TF 2/503d Infantry made final coordination and planning for the parachute assault on D - Day. This took place while the Task Force was at BIEN HOA Base Camp.

b. PHASE II: Parachute and Heliborne Assault into SEOC COM TRANG DZ (DZ CHARLIE) on D - Day (22 February 1967)

The 2/503d Infantry with A/3/319th Artillery and elements of the Brigade HHC conducted a parachute assault into DZ "C" at 0900 hours on D - Day. The assault spearheaded Operation JUNCTION CITY I and the Task Force had the assigned mission of establishing the Bde CP at Position LZ2. At the same time, the Infantry elements of the Brigade made final preparations before assaulting various assigned LZ's in the vicinity of KATUM. This was also accomplished on 22 February 1967.

c. PHASE III: Conducting S & D operations in assigned AO's - D - Day - D + 9 (22 February - 3 March 1967)

During this phase, the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) conducted extensive search and destroy operations in the respective AO's in the vicinity of KATUM, south of the Cambodian Border.

d. PHASE IV - Redeployment of the Brigade CP and units of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate); (-) D + 9 - D + 20 (3 March - 14 March 1967)

The Brigade was further given the mission to displace the main element from the vicinity of the Brigade CP (Position LZ2) and conduct S & D operations southeast of KATUM. To accommodate this change in order, the CP displaced from Pos LZ2 to the vicinity of SUOI DA.

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e. PHASE V - Redeployment of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) D + 21
(15 March 1967)

The Brigade deployed to Base Camp (BIEN HOA) by intra-theater airlift and road convoy.

13. Execution

a. D - 3 (19 February 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) under the Operational Control of the 1st Infantry Division, began deployment from base camp at BIEN HOA to a staging area at QUAN LOI. OPORD 4-67, published on 18 February, required all units to be prepared to move to QUAN LOI during the period 19 - 20 February in preparation for future operations.

The first elements of the 1/503d Infantry departed base camp at 1115 hours. A continuous air stream of C-130 aircraft shuttled troops and equipment between BIEN HOA Airbase to QUAN LOI. The entire move of troops and equipment elapsed over a period of 10 hours and 40 minutes. Upon arrival at QUAN LOI, the Battalion took up predesignated defensive positions.

The 4/503d Infantry and E/17th Cavalry departed BIEN HOA Airbase by C-130 aircraft with the first lift arriving at QUAN LOI (XT 821907) at 0736 hours. Clearing patrols were conducted with negative contact.

D/16th Armor received final instruction on the deployment of the Armor Company and BSOC elements on 20 February.

b. D - 2 (20 February 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: The Brigade continued preparation for Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE. Ambush sites and listening posts of the 1/503d Infantry met with negative contact during the hours of darkness.

The 4/503d Infantry also remained at QUAN LOI in preparation for future operations. Each company established one ambush site per unit with negative contact. The 3/319th Artillery (-) was also kept in readiness for future deployment.

D/16th Armor escorted the 173d Engineer Company and the BSOC on a road march commencing at 0100 hours. The march route was as follows: from BIEN HOA to SAIGON, where delays were encountered due to congested traffic. From SAIGON, the convoy traveled northwest on HIGHWAY 1 to GO DAU HA, and then moved north on HIGHWAY 22 to TAY NINH. From TAY NINH, the convoy moved east on HIGHWAY 13 to PHU CONG Airfield and logged within the perimeter (XT 343583).

c. D - 1 (21 February 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: D/16th Armor OPCON to 1/4th Cav

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Operational Summary: All units of the 173d Airborne Brigade continued in their preparation for the initial phases of Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE on 22 February. The 1/503d Infantry continued preparation for introduction into the operational area by helicopter on the following day. Briefings at squad and platoon level were conducted in each unit in addition to final maintenance checks of equipment. At 1600 hours, a commanders and staff meeting was conducted to re-affirm unit missions published in FRAG ORDER 1 to OPCRD 4-67.

Both the 1/503d Infantry and the 4/503d Infantry were still prepositioned at QUAN LOI. The 4/503d Infantry was also engaged in final briefings/maintenance of equipment.

Initially, E/17th Cavalry was flown to QUAN LOI without its combat vehicles due to the original plan calling for the troop to be employed as a clandestine rifle company. On the 21st of February, the troop was flown back to BIEN HOA where vehicles were picked up and E/17th Cavalry drove to SUOI DA.

At 0700 hours, D/16th Armor, attached to the 1/4th Cavalry, departed PHU KUONG Airfield, SUOI DA on mission of security for mine clearing on ROUTE 2A3 up to ROUTE 4 and north on ROUTE 4 to XT 2868. The road clearing was accomplished without incident. Throughout the afternoon, the Armor Company provided security for mine sweeping teams at XT 2868. At 1345 hours, the mission was accomplished without incident and the Company regrouped and returned to SUOI DA and participated in the security of the perimeter.

The true plan concerning the parachute assault was not published until the night of 20 February 1967 and was not distributed until 1900 hours on 21 February. The Task Force Commander (LTC Sigholtz) briefed the troops on the operation on the afternoon of the 21st. The Battalion area was then sealed off so that there would be no spreading of the operational plan to other troopers or to indigenous personnel. Parachutes and other air equipment such as PAE bags were issued at this time. For a complete analysis of the jump phase of Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE, see Tab D, "Parachute Assault".

d. D - Day (22 February 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: D/16th Armor OPCON to 1/503d Inf
E/17th Cav OPCON to 3d Bde 1st Inf Div

Operational Summary: The 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry with A/3/319th Artillery and elements of the Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company spearheaded the largest operation of the Vietnam War at 0900 hours by conducting the first combat parachute assault in 15 years. The Battalion (+) dropped into an area known as SROC CON TRANG (DZ "C" - XT 339929) employing 13 C-130 aircraft. A detailed analysis of the planning, coordination and actual execution of the parachute assault can be found in Tab D of this report. By 0920 hours, all companies had established CP locations. A heavy equipment drop commenced at 0925 hours and continued throughout the day. By 1230 hours, the Battalion Command Post was established. There was a total of eleven minor injuries as a result of the parachute jump.

At 0930 hours, Companies A, B, and C/1/503d Infantry and HHC (-) departed QUAN LOI Airstrip to LZ 11 and LZ 12 in 70 UH-1D helicopters. The first landing on the LZ (LZ 11) by A/1/503d Infantry took place at 1035 hours with the rest of the battalion following shortly thereafter. Immediately after landing, all companies began movement to their assigned sectors for clearing operations and establishing defensive perimeters. CP's for this date were located at the following

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coordinates: Battalion and Company A - XT 339908, Company B - XT 334907, Company C - XT 332893, Recon Platoon - XT 334918. No direct contact with an enemy force occurred during this period.

The 4/503d Infantry conducted a heliborne assault into LZ BRAVO at 1415 hours and LZ CHARLIE at 1420 hours (XT 325940 and XT 335928 respectively). The Battalion closed at LZ B at 1755 hours. Company A/4/503d Infantry moved to a position at XT 317941 and established a perimeter for the night. Company B set up at XT 325938 and Companies C, D and HHC at XT 331929. A contact patrol from Company C established contact with the 1/503d Infantry at XT 335925. Clearing patrols were dispatched and two ambush sites were established with negative contact reported.

At 0700 hours, D/16th Armor, attached to 1/4th Cavalry, departed north on HIGHWAY 4 enroute to link up with the 1/503d Infantry vicinity XT 324886. Primary mission of the task force while enroute was to open the highway and to provide initial security for the introduction of Fire Support Bases. While enroute, a total of 10 tanks belonging to the 1/4th Cavalry were damaged by mines. At 1510 hours, D/16th Armor linked up with C/1/503d Infantry and proceeded to XT 334906 to await further instructions. D/16th Armor came under the OPCON of 1/503d Infantry at this time. At 1800 hours, the Armor Company was instructed to move to a Fire Support Base at vicinity XT 336914. Arriving at the FSB at 1820 hours, the company deployed to provide perimeter security for the 1/6th Artillery, 1st Infantry Division.

E/17th Cavalry, having picked up their combat vehicles, began a road march from BIEN HOA to the objective area at 0200 hours. At approximately 1230 hours, the Cavalry Troop became under the operational control of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division.

e. D + 1 (23 February 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: D/16th Armor OPCON to 173d Abn Bde

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade continued its support of Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE. Ambush sites established by the 1/503d Infantry resulted in enemy contacts in the Company A and Company B sectors. At 0030 hours at XT 332904, an element from Company B sighted and fired on one VC with unknown results. An element of Company C at 0045 hours, threw a hand grenade at suspected movement which ricocheted into the foxhole of origin causing two US KIA and one WIA. Additionally, at 0050 hours, the unit fired at suspected movement near the second platoon positions which had unknown results. During the hours of daylight, units continued improvement of defensive positions and conducted patrolling activities in assigned AO's. One AK-47 magazine was found by B/1/503d Infantry containing 7 rounds of unexpended ammunition at XT 332899. Throughout the day, elements of the 1/503d Infantry made numerous discoveries of enemy bunkers, barbed wire etc. indicating recent use. Listening and ambush sites were established during the hours of darkness. At 2330 hours, B/1/503d Infantry received 6 - 7 rounds of small arms fire. Fire was returned with unknown results.

The 2/503d Infantry continued their mission of providing security for the Brigade CP and Fire Support Base. In addition, defensive positions were improved and small unit patrolling was conducted in the immediate AO. At 1055 hours at XT 349941, an element of A/2/503d Infantry received 1 rifle grenade and 10 rounds of s/a fire resulting in 1 US WIA. Four VC were taken under fire, however, contact was broken with unknown results.

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The 4/503d Infantry continued to block along HIGHWAY 4 to XT 307946 in AO 2 with Company A moving its CP location to XT 311945 closing at 1515 hours. Company D moved to Position BRAVO closing at 1300 hours to assist B/4/503d Infantry in securing artillery elements located at that position. Local security and contact patrols were dispatched from all units with negative contact. At 0235 hours, A/4/503d Infantry reported detonating a claymore mine and ten minutes later observed two (2) VC carrying a body from that location. M-79 fire was placed on the VC with unknown results. The 4/503d Infantry was assigned the mission of securing all engineer constructed bridges within AO 2, and to clear the roads with attached Engineer mine detector teams. Two ambush patrols were established with negative results.

At 0730 hours, the 3d Platoon, D/16th Armor was sent to Position LIZ to aid in clearing the DZ of heavy drop material. At 1100 hours, the remainder of the company departed the FSB and went to Position LIZ vic XT 340923 where the company was to aid in clearing the DZ of ammunition dropped in by parachute. Operational Control of the company was transferred to the Brigade Headquarters. At 1800 hours, D/16th Armor was released for the day and then the company pulled into an inner perimeter, with the 2/503d Infantry securing the outer perimeter.

f. D + 2 (24 February 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division continued Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE in northern TAY NINH Province. Ambush sites and listening posts of the 1/503d Infantry met with negative contact during the hours of darkness. The Battalion remained in blocking positions on the east flank of the objective area paralleling HIGHWAY 4, tied in on the north with 4/503d Infantry and on the south with the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. Organic units continued improvements of defensive positions and patrolling in assigned AO's which resulted in the discovery of several huts, bunkers, and miscellaneous supplies. VC were sighted by Battalion elements on several occasions, however, effective fire could not be placed. Ambush sites and listening posts were again established during the hours of darkness.

The 2/503d Infantry continued to secure the DZ for the heavy drops which continued throughout this period and issued patrols in the immediate area of the Brigade CP (Position LIZ). At 2225 hours, at XT 353928, an Observation Post from C/2/503d Infantry received an incoming grenade and sighted 4 VC. The OP was pulled in and artillery fired into the area. Several screams were heard indicating that the artillery was effectively employed.

The 4/503d Infantry continued to block and clear HIGHWAY 4 within AO 2 with no change in unit locations. Two mine detector teams were picked up by Companies A and C/4/503d Infantry's security elements at the limits of Company B's AO (XT 315943 and XT 329937). At 0755 hours, Company A/4/503d Infantry's mine detector security squad contacted an unknown number of VC, vic XT 313944 resulting in two (2) US WIA with enemy casualties unknown. Dustoff was completed by 0847 hours. Roads were cleared within the Battalion AO by 0955 hours. At 1231 hours, a recon patrol from D/4/503d Infantry located an old platoon size base camp vic XT 322937. VC were contacted on two separate occasions during the day by the 4/503d Infantry elements with negative friendly losses and enemy losses unknown. Two ambush sites were established during the night which met with negative contact.

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D/16th Armor continued its mission of clearing the drop zone of ammunition and supplies being dropped by parachute. This was accomplished between the hours of 0730 and 1700 hours.

At 1900 hours, an LRRP fired on three VC who returned the fire with semi-automatic weapons. The enemy broke contact after sustaining 2 VC KIA (BC). E/17th Cavalry remained attached to the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division and aided in the defense of SUOI DA. At 0300 hours, E/17th Cavalry and elements of the 173d Support Battalion received 20 - 30 rounds of 81mm - 82mm mortar fire at SUOI DA, resulting in 24 US WIA and one (1) US KIA.

g. D + 3 (25 February 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade continued to conduct combat activities in the JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE AO under the Operational Control of the 1st Infantry Division. The 1/503d Infantry continued its blocking mission, improvement of defensive positions and small unit patrolling in assigned AO. Of significance was an abandoned squad size defensive position located by B/1/503d Infantry at XT 338898, consisting of eleven foxholes which appeared to be 2 - 4 weeks old and were subsequently destroyed by the unit. Engineer elements working in the Battalion AO were subjected to 10 - 15 rounds of sniper fire which resulted in 1 US WIA. A/1/503d Infantry dispatched an element to check out the source of fire, however, the party met with negative results. Ambush sites and listening posts were again dispatched during the hours of darkness with negative results.

The 2/503d Infantry continued its security mission in the AO of Position LIZ and conducted local patrolling with no significant contact reported.

The 4/503d Infantry continued to block and clear along HIGHWAY 4 within AO 2 with no change in unit locations. Platoon size patrols were also dispatched from each company except C/1/503d Infantry which provided security for the Battalion CP. At 0900 hours, a Brigade convoy was hit by a claymore mine resulting in two (2) US WIA from the 4/503d Infantry. At 1305 hours, B/4/503d Infantry located a trench system and way station via XT 324917 and at 1620 hours a large cache of enemy equipment to include 13 Bicycles, 4 bags of cooking utensils, 500 assorted uniforms, 20 - 30 gallons of oil, 25 pounds of documents, including maps, repair parts for bicycles, a miner's lamp and a homemade gas mask. All items were either destroyed or confiscated.

D/16th Armor continued its mission of providing security and clearing the DZ of items dropped by parachute. E/17th Cavalry remained at SUOI DA under the OPCON of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division.

h. D + 4 (26 February 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: D/16th Armor OPCON 4/503d Inf

Operational Summary: Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE continued with the 173d Airborne Brigade OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division. The 1/503d Infantry reported that ambush sites established on the morning of 26 February met with negative results. The Battalion remained in blocking positions on the east flank of the operational area, improving defensive positions and conducting patrols in assigned AO's. Ambush/listening sites were again established during the hours of darkness.

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The 2/503d Infantry continued its security mission of Position LIZ and the FSB. At 1645 hours, Recon Platoon/2/503d Infantry observed 4 VC moving west at XT 352911. Contact was established resulting in 2 US WIA and 2 VC KIA. An M-14 and an M-1 rifle were captured as a result of this engagement.

The 4/503d Infantry continued to block and clear along HIGHWAY 4 within AO 2 with no change in unit locations. Companies A, B, and C/4/503d Infantry conducted local searching patrols in their assigned sectors. Company D/4/503d Infantry under the OPCON of D/16th Armor conducted a reinforced company S & D mission within AO's 2 and 3, moving within 50 meters of the CAMBODIAN BORDER. The mission began at 0930 hours. At vic XT 325947, D/4/503d Infantry had two claymores thrust and 20 rounds of s/a fire placed against them. Artillery was called in to flush out the enemy. D/16th Armor was called to the contact area to aid in the search for the VC. There were no friendly casualties resulting from the enemy fire. While enroute, D/16th Armor spotted 3 VC at XT 345957, however, the VC disappeared before effective fire could be placed, and the proximity of friendly forces restricted the use of recon by .50 caliber machinegun. A large cache was located in the area where the claymore mine had been detonated which consisted of 100 sheets of tin, ten 200-pound bags of shelled peanuts, fifty 4-gallon cans of brown sugar, approximately four tons of loose paddy rice, 250 200-pound bags of polished rice and two tons of dried fish. For the remainder of the day, the APCs of D/16th Armor shuttled the captured food back to Position LIZ.

3/17th Cavalry remained at SUOI DA under the OPCON of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, and assisted in the defense of that position.

i. D + 5 (27 February 1967)Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE was continued today with the 173d Airborne Brigade OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division. The 1/503d Infantry continued its clearing mission of HIGHWAY 4 with the battalion sector of responsibility being extended 3000 meters west. At 1035 hours at XT 328919, one member of a patrol from the recon platoon inadvertently activated a grenade, killing himself and wounding one other soldier. Company C, at XT 337894 was subjected to a mortar round or rifle grenade resulting in one slightly wounded. The Brigade reported that at 1818 hours, a hostile force was located at XT 340901. An element of A/1/503d Infantry was dispatched to the area after 81mm mortar preparation, finding two heavily used footpaths but no hostile element. During the night, an element of A/1/503d Infantry heard movement at XT 337893 while on ambush patrol and subsequently threw grenades and called in a mortar attack. The unit searched the area in the morning with negative results.

The 2/503d Infantry continued search and destroy operations into AO 3, AO 5, and AO 6 with one platoon from D/16th Armor OPCON. A mounted patrol from C/2/503d Infantry made contact with 3 VC at XT 357938 at 0930 hours. The VC were observed at a distance of 50 meters and a hasty ambush was established. When the ambush was executed, the VC broke contact and fled east leaving three blood trails. Following the trails, Company C/2/503d Infantry found 1 VC KIA and 1 Chicom carbine.

The 4/503d Infantry continued to block and clear along HIGHWAY 4 within AO 2 with no change in unit locations. Companies B and C continued road security. D/16th Armor (-) was attached to the 4/503d Infantry to aid in the evacuation of the

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food found on the previous day activities. At 1130 hours, D/4/503d Infantry located a harbor area with the center mass at vic IT 335955. The camp showed signs of recent use and was destroyed. The task force then moved on to extract 99 200-pound bags of rice and 309 sheets of corrugated tin from the other site. At 1600 hours, D/16th Armor returned to Position LIZ and turned in the captured enemy material.

At 1345 hours, a UH-1B aircraft received light anti-aircraft fire at IT 309930. The helicopter made a precautionary landing with 2 rounds in the rotor and 1 round in the transmission. Two (2) US crewmen were WIA. The aircraft subsequently flew to BIEN HOA for repair.

Elements of the LRRP at 0850 hours killed 1 VC (BC) and 2 VC (poss) at IT 377855. E/17th Cavalry continued operations OPCON to the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division.

j. D + 6 (28 February 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTEIDATE was continued on this day with the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division. Ambush sites established by the 1/503d Infantry met with no enemy contact with the exception of A/1/503d Infantry's site which heard suspected movement during the night. At daylight, the area was searched and two blood trails were located which led to a tunnel. The tunnel was searched and 5 AT mines, 6 mine fuses and miscellaneous items were located. The 1/503d Infantry remained in blocking positions along the east flank of the operational area, continued improvement of defensive positions and conducted small unit patrolling. Companies A and B/1/503d Infantry provided security for engineer work parties in the area. Several bunkers, huts and bomb shelters were discovered throughout the day by elements of the battalion. LTC Goad relinquished command of the 1/503d Infantry to LTC Sacha at 1300 hours on this day. Ambush sites and listening posts were again established during the hours of darkness.

At 2045 hours, A/2/503d Infantry spotted 6 VC in front of their perimeter with the aid of a starlight scope mounted on a .50 caliber MG. The VC were engaged with the .50 caliber and M-79 fire and fragmentary grenades. It was believed that 5 VC were killed.

At 1007 hours, D/4/503d Infantry found an old platoon size base camp at IT 322937. At 1217 hours, B/4/503d Infantry located 6 bunkers with overhead cover and 3 bunkers with metal tops. A/4/503d Infantry located at 1317 hours at IT 306932 an extensive bunker system with mess hall and livestock on hand. Later that day, Alpha Company uncovered 3,000 pounds of polished rice, 400 pounds of salt, one typewriter, one electric water pump, one dark room with exposed and unexposed film and equipment, two electric transformers, two claymore mines, two plaster busts of Ho Chi Minh and Lenin with miscellaneous portraits of communist leaders and one generator.

D/16th Armor transported B/2/503d Infantry from Position LIZ to a bridge vic IT 338841 and secured the bridge until Bravo Company returned from their mission. D/16th then returned to Position LIZ.

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E/17th Cavalry, under the Operational Control of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, assisted in the defense of SUOI DA.

k. D + 7 (1 March 1967)Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) under the Operational Control of the 1st Infantry Division continued Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE on this date. The 1/503d Infantry continued its mission of securing the Battalion Base Area, blocking and road security. No enemy contact occurred during the hours of daylight.

The 2/503d Infantry continued its primary mission of securing the Fire Support Base and Brigade CP at Position LIZ. At 1920 hours, an ambush element from C/2/503d Infantry made contact with 3 VC, killing 2 and wounding the third. The wounded VC was later killed while trying to crawl away. Two weapons and a telephone were captured as a result of this contact.

The 4/503d Infantry with one Platoon of D/16th Armor continued to block and clear along HIGHWAY 4 within AO 2 with no change in unit locations. Within AO ORANGE, Company A/4/503d Infantry located a movie camera with film, twenty-two (22) still movie cameras, five (5) movie projectors, two (2) speaker systems and assorted clothing and documents at XT 304931. At 1005 hours, C/4/503d Infantry found one medical kit with small quantities of food and one ox-cart and hay stack, all of which was destroyed. Three ambushes were set during the night by the 4th Battalion, meeting with negative contact.

D/16th Armor remained in position to pull maintenance on vehicles and equipment. Two APC's were provided to BSOC for clearing equipment from the DZ. The 1st and 3d Platoons were assigned for reinforcement of the perimeter of 2/503d Infantry.

E/17th Cavalry remained under the OPCON of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division at SUOI DA.

l. D + 8 (2 March 1967)Changes in Task Organization: Recon Flt/i/503d Inf OPCON 4/503d Inf

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade continued their participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE on this day in WAR ZONE "C" near KATUM. The 1/503d Infantry continued their blocking/road security mission meeting with negative enemy contact throughout the day.

The 2/503d Infantry continued to secure the Fire Support Base and Brigade CP at Position LIZ. While patrolling to the north of Psn LIZ, elements of A/2/503d Infantry received received automatic and semi-automatic weapons fire at 0951 hours at XT 350941. The firing came from the north where two groups of VC, one moving east and the other west, were observed. The enemy broke contact and A/2/503d took up the pursuit. Contact was again established at 1140 hours and one VC was killed (BC). Continuing to the northeast, A/2/503d Infantry again observed 6 VC (XT 352943) and called for 82mm mortar support with unknown results, however a quantity of blood was found in the area.

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The 4/503d Infantry continued to block and clear along HIGHWAY 4 within AO 2. A/4/503d Infantry executed an air assault on LZ JO (XT 295917) and then conducted search and destroy operations to the east, harboring vic XT 297927. Companies B, C, and D/4/503d Infantry continued local security missions with the help of one platoon of D/16th Armor OPCON. At 1209 hours, A/4/503d Infantry fired on one VC at XT 311927. The enemy soldier returned fire and the contact resulted in 1 US WIA and 1 VC KIA (BC). At 1248 hours at XT 308917, Company A captured one wounded VC and an AK-47 rifle. At 1350 hours, A/4/503d Infantry found another VC KIA resulting from previous action. At 1545 hours, Company D OPCON to Company A/4/503d Infantry found six newly constructed bunkers. At 1610 hours, B/4/503d Infantry reported five to seven WIA at their location as a result of a 155 mm shell explosion in the gun tube. Ambushes set during the hours of darkness by Alpha and Bravo Companies met with negative results.

At 0800 hours, the 3d Platoon of D/16th Armor was sent south to rice caches found by B/2/503d Infantry vic XT 3388. At 0900 hours, the 1st Platoon of D/16th Armor moved to the 4/503d Infantry CP to reinforce their perimeter security and remained there throughout the night. At 1730 hours, the 3d Platoon returned to Position LZ after having extracted 209 200-pound bags of rice. At 2255 hours, the Brigade S2 informed the company that an enemy radio transmission had been intercepted at 2040 hours ordering an attack. At 1455 hours, the S2 informed the company that at 1800 hours, an unknown radio station entered one of DANGER's nets and ordered a cease fire between 1800 hours and 1900 hours. Nothing significant occurred during the hours of darkness.

E/17th Cavalry remained at SUOI DA under the OPCON of the 3d Brigade 1st Infantry Division. An element of the Cavalry Troop spotted 12 VC with 2 machineguns at XT 361807 and called in an armed helicopter to suppress the area. They captured one VC WIA and were extracted at 1830 hours. After extraction, armed helicopters again swept the area resulting in 8 VC KIA (poss).

m. D + 9 (3 March 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: A/1/4th Cav OPCON to E/17th Cav

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade, under the Operational Control of the 1st Infantry Division began displacement of the Brigade CP (-) from Position LZ to SUOI DA (XT 3457). The 1/503d Infantry retained their blocking positions on the east flank of the operational area, provided security and conducted patrolling in the eastern sector of the AO. The Recon Platoon remained under the OPCON of the 4/503d Infantry. Two batteries of artillery from the 1st Division took up firing positions in the Battalion sector and B/1/503d Infantry was assigned with the security of the site. At 0810 hours, Major Hodges assumed the duties of the Battalion XO. There were no hostile contacts resulting from patrols during this day.

At 1200 hours, C/2/503d Infantry made contact with a large enemy force. Elements of A/2/503d Infantry were later called from the north and south of the contact area to aid Charlie Company. The enemy broke contact with A/2/503d Infantry in pursuit. The enemy employed 60mm mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles, automatic and semi-automatic weapons, claymore mines and grenades. Four (4) TAC air strikes, artillery and 4.2" mortars supported the 2/503d Infantry (-). The contact resulted in 20 US KIA, 28 US WIA and 39 VC KIA (BC).

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The 4/503d Infantry continued their blocking mission along HIGHWAY 4 within AO 2. The Companies continued local security patrolling in assigned AO's. At 1313 hours, C/4/503d Infantry was alerted to have two platoons ready to reinforce the 2/503d Infantry (-) at vicinity XT 3694.

At 0705 hours, the 2d and 3d Platoons of D/16th Armor returned to the company CP area and at 1110 hours, the 1st Platoon was instructed to return. At 1200 hours, C/2/503d Infantry had established contact with an estimated company (+) size VC force. The 1st Platoon was instructed to transport an infantry Platoon of A/2/503d Infantry as far as possible into the contact area. At XT 352938, the 1st Platoon/D/16th Armor was barred from further progress by a large ditch and the infantry platoon was dismounted at that point to proceed toward the point of contact. At 1920 hours, the infantry elements of the 2/503d Infantry returned and the 1st Platoon of D/16th Armor transported them back to Position LIZ.

On this day, E/17th Cavalry received the mission of moving to Artillery Base 1 and securing a 155mm Howitzer Battery. Attached to the Troop was the 1st Platoon of Troop A/1/4th Cavalry plus a section of twin 40mm Dusters. Since the attachment with the original strength of E/17th Cavalry consisted of a fairly sizeable force, it was decided to keep one Cavalry Platoon on continuous patrolling throughout the AO.

On the evening of 3 March 1967, it was decided that elements of the 2/503d Infantry would return to the contact site of C/2/503d Infantry in order to retrieve 3 bodies which were left behind due to the fierceness of the contact and to recon the area for further enemy resistance.

n. D + 10 (4 March 1967)

<u>Changes in Task Force Organization:</u>	2/28th Inf OPCON to 173d Abn Bde
	2/34th Armor OPCON to 173d Abn Bde
	Ren Plt/1/503d Inf released OPCON
	<u>4/503d</u>

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade continued Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE vic KATUM in northern TAY NINH PROVINCE under the Operational Control of the 1st Infantry Division. The 1/503d Infantry continued their mission of patrolling, bridge and road security in their assigned sectors. An element of A/1/503d Infantry while securing a bridge site at XT 337894 was subjected to 30 - 40 rounds of automatic weapons fire and 2 - 4 command detonated devices. The a/w fire originated south of the bridge site and the mines were detonated from both sides of the road. Three air strikes were directed into the area by the Battalion CO with unknown results. The hostile action caused one US KIA.

The 2/503d Infantry continued to secure Position LIZ and conducted an air assault on an LZ located at XT 378940 in the vicinity of Company C's contact of 3 March 1967. Two platoons from C/2/503d Infantry and one Platoon of A/2/503d Infantry (total force amounting to 118 men) landed in 3 lifts commencing at 1025 hours and closing at 1048 hours. They received sporadic semi-automatic fire on the third lift. While in the area, this element recovered the 3 bodies of missing paratroopers and counted 39 enemy bodies from the previous days action. Also recovered were one (1) M-60 machinegun, 1 M-79, 2 M-16 rifles and 1 PRC-25. The element returned to the CP location at 1836 hours.

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The 4/503d Infantry continued to block and clear along HIGHWAY 4 within AO 2. The battalion began preparation to deploy to a new AO. The movement was delayed for a 24 hour period. Items found by D/4/503d Infantry had all been extracted with the exception of 300 sheets of tin and 400 bags of rice.

On 4 March, D/16th Armor provided security for a convoy from Artillery Base 3 north to the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division CP. The 1st Platoon provided transportation for B/2/503d Infantry.

At 1855 hours, a 106 Jeep from the 2d Platoon, E/17th Cavalry hit a mine inside the perimeter which resulted in the wounding of one paratrooper.

c. D + 11 (5 March 1967)Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued to participate in Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE under the OPCON of the 1st Infantry Division. The 1/503d Infantry was relieved on this date of road and bridge security missions and were instructed by the Brigade to consolidate all units at one location in preparation for redeployment on 6 March 1967. At 1325 hours, A/1/503d Infantry while patrolling in the vicinity of KT 349910, discovered a base camp containing huts, bunkers, live stock and other miscellaneous items. A commander and staff meeting was held at 1400 hours to discuss the battalion redeployment to the southeast on 6 March. At this time, FRAG ORDER 2 to OPORD 4-67 was issued. All units closed the Battalion CP and established a perimeter for the night. There were no enemy contacts during the hours of darkness.

The 2/503d Infantry made similar arrangements for deployment on the following day. Local patrols reported negative contact during the day.

The 4/503d Infantry continued to block and clear along HIGHWAY 4 within AO 2. Companies A and D moved to Companies B and C respectively. Companies B and C continued local searching within sectors. At 1025 hours, D/4/503d Infantry closed into Charlie Company's area. At 1245 hours, the advance CP departed FSB III (KT 289816) arriving at 1423 hours. At 1455 hours, A/4/503d Infantry arrived at Position 41 (B/4/503d Infantry).

The 2/28th Infantry continued its security mission in the vicinity of KATUM Airfield. 2/34th Armor with D/16th Armor secured the engineer work site at KATUM. At 1810 hours, 1 APC from the 2/28th Infantry was ambushed by an estimated 5 - 8 VC. D/16th Armor, responding to a call for aid, moved in from the north and attacked west into the enemy positions. Two VC were seen falling but the enemy fled before a true estimate of the enemy casualties could be obtained. There were two US WIA as a result of this action.

E/17th Cavalry continued under the OPCON of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. The 3/319th Artillery displaced from Fire Support Base 5 (Position LIZ) at 1250 hours and closed at Fire Support Base 3 at 1405 hours (KT 290813).

p. D + 12 (6 March 1967)Changes in Task Force Organization: 2/28th Inf released OPCON 173d Abn Bde (Sep)

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Operational Summary. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) commenced Phase II of Operation JUNCTION CITY I with airmobile and ground assaults southeast of KATUM. The departure of the 1/503d Infantry began at 0930 hours with the Mortar Platoon and CP control group departing to FSB III by vehicle. At 1022 hours, the first increment of UH-1D helicopters for transport into the objective area arrived and provided a steady flow of aircraft to the objective area (LZ II) until all units had closed at 1225 hours. The 1/503d Infantry then consolidated its forces and began movement to Objective PTE, arriving and securing the objective at 1420 hours.

At 0935 hours, the 2/503d Infantry, employing 30 helicopters, extracted from Position LZ I and made a heliborne assault on LZ II (X 323858). Sniper fire was received during the assault which resulted in one door gunner being wounded. A/2/503d Infantry suppressed the sniper fire with 60mm mortars. A/2/503d Infantry further secured the Battalion FSB and CP at X 737859. Companies E and C/2/503d Infantry and the Recon Platoon established blocking positions at X 348846, X 362857, and X 364885 respectively.

The 4/503d Infantry conducted a heliborne assault on LZ II beginning at 1303 hours and closing at 1335 hours. At 1615 hours, A/4/503d Infantry, while clearing LZ II, received 40 - 50 rounds f/a and automatic fire and several M-79 rounds from an estimated squad or larger size hostile unit at X 366828. The VC attacked from an "L" shaped position. The action resulted in 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA. Enemy losses were unknown.

On 6 March 1967, D/16th Armor as a part of Task Force Tackier was instructed to attack south, clearing ROUTE 246 from KATUM to POC TGC with mine detector teams and then continue south to Objective POC. At 0610 hours, D/16th Armor linked up with 2/34th Armor and D/4/503d Infantry at a rendezvous area at X 322-927. At 0640 hours, the Task Force began its move. On ROUTE 246, five mines were found, two tanks were damaged and a 155mm round and a claymore mine were found off the road. At 1600 hours, the Task Force linked up with the 2/503d Infantry and moved into a logger position at X 373857.

The 173d Engineer Company (-) remained north of KATUM in support of Brigade operations. E/17th Cavalry remain in KATUM to the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. The 3d Platoon of E/17th Cavalry left for a 3 day patrol east of the main river. The 3/19th Artillery supported the Brigade from FSB III (X 249813).

q. D + 13 (7 March 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTAISAGE was continued on this date with the 173d Airborne Brigade operating southeast of KATUM in TAY NINH Province. The 1/503d Infantry conducted search and destroy operations generally northeast developing into the following incidents: at 1000 hours at X 359807, A/1/503d Infantry located five bunkers and thirteen 2 - 3 man foxholes. At 1140 hours, at X 366806, B/1/503d Infantry engaged three VC, one of whom was armed with an automatic weapon. Artillery was called in and the enemy fled to the northeast.

The 2/503d Infantry received approximately fifty 82mm mortar rounds landing near the Alpha Company perimeter with negative US casualties. Counter-mortar fire was directed into suspected enemy locations with unknown results. At 0950 hours, a patrol from B/2/503d Infantry detonated a boobytrap resulting in 1 US KIA.

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The 4/503d Infantry conducted search and destroy operations from LZ 41 within AO 2. C/4/503d Infantry remained at the LZ to provide security of the area. Task Force Tanker, consisting of D/16th Armor, 2/34th Armor and B/4/503d Infantry moved to XT 380856 at 0840 hours with the tanks on line and the APC's of D/16th forming a second line. A reserve force followed in column. At 0845 hours, the TF began the sweep south toward Position RON. At 1305 hours, vicinity of XT 378830, the TF broke into a clearing and proceeded across it. The first of the tanks had broken into the jungle when small arms fire was received from the northwest. The tanks swung their turrets toward the incoming enemy fire and opened fire with .50 caliber MG's and 90mm canisters. Several personnel from D/4/503d Infantry received wounds and one man was killed. Incoming fire was returned from the south and the forward elements of the TF swung into a perimeter and returned the fire. The wounded were extracted to the rear elements at XT 381828 where a Dustoff ship had landed. Cannister rounds from the tanks and small arms from D/4/503d Infantry accounted for 6 VC KIA (BC). D/16th Armor accounted for 1 VC KIA (a sniper that had fired from the south). From 1530 hours until nightfall, air strikes were called in on the enemy positions to include intermittent artillery fire. TF Tanker continued west to linkup with the 4/503d Infantry (-). There was no further contact. At 1320 hours, B/4/503d Infantry received an estimated 360 rounds of automatic weapons fire from 2 VC at XT 374830. The VC withdrew before effective fire could be placed upon them. The action that TF Tanker had been involved in resulted in one US KIA and six US WIA. Two AK-47 rifles, three Mosin-Nagant rifles, 50 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, 2 AK-47 magazines and five documents were also captured.

The 173d Engineer Company departed vic north of KATUM (XT 338906) and moved south on HIGHWAY 4 closing at SUOI DA at approximately 1620 hours without incident. At XT 288630, a 5-ton truck from the 173d Support Battalion hit a land mine while moving with a 1st Infantry Division Supply convoy from SUOI DA enroute to FSB 3. E/17th Cavalry remained under the OPCON of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division.

r. D + 14 (8 March 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade continued Phase II of Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE southeast of KATUM conducting search and destroy operations in assigned AO's. The 1/503d Infantry continued operations east of Objective PETE moving approximately 700 meters without significant contact.

At 0325 hours, the perimeter of A/2/503d Infantry again received 25 - 30 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. The rounds impacted along the southeast portion of the perimeter and resulted in 1 US WIA. At 1446 hours, a platoon from Alpha Company, while patrolling in the vicinity of XT 389872, made contact with an estimated 8 VC. The friendly element received s/a fire from the southeast and northeast. The contact, supported by 4.2" mortar and artillery fire, was broken when the VC withdrew to the east at 1530 hours. Results were 1 US WIA and enemy casualties unknown. At 2205 hours, a 12-man ambush element from C/2/503d Infantry located at XT 354860, received 5 incoming grenades resulting in 9 US WIA. A relief force was dispatched to the location arriving at 0328 hours on 9 March. Artillery and 4.2" mortar fire continued to support the ambush element until the relief force arrived and contact was not reestablished after the initial incident.

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At 1032 hours, Company C/4/503d Infantry made contact with five VC at XT 362837 on the edge of a small base camp. Results were negative friendly casualties and one VC KIA (BC) and one new Chicom rifle captured. Airstrikes and artillery followed the incident. By 1730 hours, all units closed into the harboring area at XT 359833.

At 1140 hours, TF Tanker departed position at XT 369830 heading southwest. The Armor element met with no contact during the day and loggered at XT 352-817 at 1630 hours.

The 173d Engineer Company remained at SUGI DA in support of Brigade operations. E/17th Cavalry remained under the OPCON of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division.

s. D + 15 (9 March 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade continued Phase II of Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE southeast of KATUM under the Operational Control of the 1st Division. The 1/503d Infantry reversed its direction of operation and conducted S & D operations to the west with two rifle companies deployed abreast, followed by the third company and HHC (-). The day's operations resulted in the discovery of three relatively large base areas containing bunkers and miscellaneous supplies. The fortifications were destroyed. At 1720 hours, B/1/503d Infantry discovered two dead VC bodies in a grave at XT 359794. The bodies were 4 days old and it was estimated that they were possibly killed by artillery fire.

The 2/503d Infantry continued blocking and screening operations along the PREK KRAI Stream and conducted local patrolling in AO 1. At 1007 hours, the Recon Platoon/2/503d Infantry received one command detonated claymore mine approximately 150 meters south of their location (XT 384854). In addition, they received 16 rounds of s/a fire while spotting 3 VC. The VC fled before contact could be established.

The 4/503d Infantry continued search and destroy operations toward Objective MIKE in AO 2. At 1015 hours, B/4/503d Infantry received s/a fire from the southwest (XT 351828). Artillery was called in. Bravo Company spotted 3 VC at XT 353826 ten minutes later and took them under fire with unknown results. Supporting artillery resulted in one US WIA. At 1025 hours, C/4/503d Infantry located a small base area with 1000 pounds of polished rice. At 1300 hours, Company C saw 2 VC at XT 348838 and took them under fire. Over an hour later, Charlie Company captured a POW in the same area. B/4/503d Infantry was engaged by an estimated 2 squads of VC at 1302 hours at XT 349829. The lead element of Bravo Company was pinned down initially. Artillery and Air were called in for support while B/4/503d Infantry withdrew. The company was hit with two claymores during withdrawal resulting in 3 WIA. At 1550 hours, the company again made contact and again they became pinned. The fight terminated at 1715 hour resulting in 4 US WIA, 2 KIA and 1 MIA. TF Tanker supported the activity of Bravo Company by providing a blocking force, however, they did not make contact with the enemy.

t. D + 16 (10 March 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: None

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Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE, Phase II under the OPCON of the 1st Infantry Division. The 1/503d Infantry conducted search and destroy operations south of Objective RON in AO 5 with light contact. At 1305 hours, B/1/503d Infantry fired on an estimated 20 - 30 VC at XT 382800. The enemy returned fire (approximately 200 - 250 rounds of s/a weapons fire) with negative results. It was estimated that 3 VC were killed as a result of the firefight. At 1430 hours, Recon Platoon/1/503d Infantry fired on an unknown number of VC dressed in mixed clothing. The action resulted in one VC POW (WIA) and four VC KIA (poss). In addition, one rocket launcher, four B-40 type rockets, two Chicom hand grenades, one map, a lantern and a canteen were captured from the POW. No further contact was made during the day.

The 2/503d Infantry continued search and destroy operations, uncovering several old base camps but making no significant contact. During the hours of darkness, the Battalion logged in the vicinity of XT 346852.

The 4/503d Infantry conducted search and destroy operations on this date meeting with little enemy resistance. At 0745 hours, A/4/503d Infantry was test firing a caliber .50 machinegun to the southwest which shed off VC fires aimed at elements of the 2/34th Armor from the northeast. Semi-automatic fire from a VC probe resulted in two slightly US WIA. No further contact was made.

Elements of TF Tanker, while harbored for the night, received 10 - 16 rounds of semi-automatic fire and an unknown number of grenades at XT 339836. Fire was returned with unknown results. The 173d Engineer Company received one WIA at 1140 hours when a 5-ton truck from the 68th Engineer Battalion hit a pressure type mine at XT 283672.

At approximately 2217 hours, the 2d Battalion (Mech), 2d Infantry (-) was attacked at a Fire Support Base along ROUTE 4 by the 272d VC Regiment. The attack was initiated by heavy 30 minute mortar, recoilless rifle preparation, employing 120mm, 82mm and 60mm mortars. Near the end of the barrage, the enemy launched a two battalion ground attack on the eastern portion of the perimeter. The attack was met with withering US caliber .50 and M-60 machinegun fire from armored personnel carriers and ground-mounted positions. As the battle continued, mutually supporting artillery (including the 3/319th Artillery and Mortars of E/17th Cavalry of the 173d Airborne Brigade) rained over 5,000 rounds into the area surrounding the base being attacked. The 3/319th Artillery was later credited with 127 kills resulting from this action which took a total of 196 Viet Cong lives.

u. D + 17 (11 March 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: D/16th Armor OPCON 3d Bde, 1st Inf

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade continued Phase II of Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE today with the 1/503d Infantry meeting with heavy contact. The Battalion's operations called for a three company search and destroy mission to the north, while the Recon Platoon screened to the south and the rifle company weapons platoon remained at the CP site for security and fire support. This tactic produced the following sequence of events: At 0945 hours, Company C observed one VC at XT 383800 who initiated fire on the unit with an AK-47. At the same time, C/1/503d Infantry was subjected to one incoming small arms round from a VC at XT 385794 which resulted in one US WIA. The units returned fire with artillery and 81mm

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mortars. At 0950 hours, 10 - 15 60mm mortar rounds landed south and west of the 1/503d Infantry's CP (XT 381799) after which, 8 VC were observed south of the LZ moving west to east. A/1/503d Infantry simultaneously observed an unknown number of VC to the west in a woodline and the Recon Platoon reported another 20 VC. Both units engaged the enemy with small arms fire from the east and west which lasted a short while, then the contact subsided. At 1105 hours, the Battalion CP was again subjected to small arms rounds, this time from the north, requiring a force comorised of the HHC element and the Recon Platoon to deploy to the area and engage the enemy. The Battalion CO at this time ordered B and C/1/503d Infantry to return to the perimeter and also requested air strikes be made available. The perimeter was reestablished with B/1/503d Infantry on the north, Alpha Company on the west and Charlie Company on the east with the Recon Platoon on the south. In this configuration, the companies reported engaging 25 - 30 VC on the north, 20 - 25 VC on the west and 18 - 20 VC on the east. Concurrent with this firefight, air strikes and artillery were directed close to the perimeter. The engagement terminated at 1222 hours, at which time B and C/1/503d Infantry moved north and east respectively to exploit the air and artillery attacks while the Recon Platoon was ordered to proceed south to search in that direction. The units reported finding 29 VC KIA (EC) and one captured VC WIA. US casualties totaled 12 WIA, 11 of which required evacuation. Weapons, equipment and miscellaneous items were found in the area of engagement. Interrogation of the captured VC revealed that the 1/503d Infantry was attacked by a Battalion of the 9th NVA Division. The prisoner further stated that he was a member of 8 Co, H3 Bn, 16th Regt, 9th NVA Division. Later that day, an air strike uncovered a large bunker and trench system, however, darkness prevented the troopers from fully exploiting the area and that mission was assigned for the following day.

The 2/503d Infantry continued search and destroy operations on 11 March with A/2/503d Infantry uncovering an equipment cache at XT 349857. Among the items extracted were extensive signal equipment.

The 4/503d Infantry continued S & D operations in the vicinity of Objective MME within AO 2. The unit made negative enemy contact during the day. The one MIA resulting from the action of 9 March was located (KIA) at XT 349830. All units closed into harbor area XT 342837 by 1605 hours.

TF Tanker moved west to HIGHWAY TL-4 arriving at 1505 hours. At this time, the Task Force reverted to the OPCON of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. The 173d Engineer Company and E/17th Cavalry maintained their positions of the previous day.

▼. D + 18 (12 March 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: 4/503d Inf OPCON 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div until 130700H Mar 67

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade continued its participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE. The 1/503d Infantry conducted S & D operations in the vicinity of Objective RON with light contact. At 0707 hours, a clearing patrol of A/1/503d Infantry made contact with 5 VC southeast of their perimeter. The enemy immediately broke contact and the incident resulted in no US casualties and 1 VC KIA (EC). At 1000 hours, C/1/503d Infantry discovered 2 dead VC at XT 384797. The two KIA had been dead for approximately 24 hours and were a result of the 1st Battalion's contact of 11 March. The 1/503d Infantry located several base camps containing numerous supplies which were either destroyed or evacuated.

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The 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry moved by foot from Objective BOB to a PZ vicinity KATUM during the early morning hours. At 1410 hours, the Battalion commenced a helilift from this area to SUOI DA, closing at 1700 hours.

The 4/503d Infantry continued search and destroy operations around Objective MIKE within AO 2, and then moved west toward HIGHWAY 4 and an extraction LZ. At 1730 hours, D/16th Armor picked up all elements of the 4/503d Infantry in a shuttle move to the extraction LZ near KATUM. All elements were closed at a harbor site (XT 337907) by 1930 hours. Until 0700 hours on 13 March, the 4/503d Infantry was under the OPCON of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division.

w. D + 19 (13 March 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: 4/503d Inf return OPCON 173d Abn Bde (Sep)

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade continued Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE under the OPCON of the 1st Infantry Division in WAR ZONE "C". The 1/503d Infantry conducted patrolling during the morning hours, locating numerous trench and bunker systems which were destroyed. At 1405 hours, C/1/503d Infantry made contact with an estimated 20 - 25 VC at XT 393795. The enemy returned fire from dug in positions employing automatic weapons and claymore mines. Before Charlie Company withdrew so that TAC Air and artillery could be placed on the contact area, they reported 11 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (Pos). At 1559 hours at XT 389798, Bravo Company again made contact with a small Viet Cong element which resulted in one more confirmed enemy KIA. At 1805 hours, while Company B/1/503d Infantry was enroute to the Battalion perimeter, two VC bodies were found which had been killed by artillery. The 1st Battalion sustained 2 US WIA during the day's contacts, neither of whom required evacuation.

The 2/503d Infantry remained at SUOI DA with no significant contact reported.

The 4/503d Infantry began a helilift at 0730 hours from KATUM to SUOI DA completing the move at 1030 hours. At this time the 4/503d Infantry assumed responsibility for the southern portion of the perimeter in the vicinity of the Brigade CP.

x. D + 20 (14 March 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: E/17th Cav reverted OPCON 173d Abn Bde (Sep)

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade began preparations for a movement to Base Camp at BIEN HOA. The 1/503d Infantry was extracted from Objective RON by helicopter beginning at 0830 hours and closed at SUOI DA at 0945 hours. At 0630 hours, one short 105mm artillery round landed in the A/1/503d Infantry area wounding 3 personnel.

The 2/503d Infantry was airlifted by intra-theater air (C-130 and C-123) from SUOI DA to BIEN HOA Airbase, closing at 1545 hours.

The 4/503d Infantry continued its perimeter missions at SUOI DA. The 3/319th Artillery and Brigade TAC CP accompanied by D/16th Armor began movement from their Fire Support Base to SUOI DA at 1230 hours and closed at 1530 hours. E/17th Cavalry reverted to the Operational Control of the Brigade and closed into SUOI DA at 1530 hours.

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y. D + 21 (15 March 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) terminated its participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE with the 1/503d Infantry and the 4/503d Infantry being transported from the area of operations to BIEN HOA by intra-theater airlift, closing at 1330 hours and 1200 respectively. The Brigade (-) departed SUOI EA at 0801 hours by road convoy and closed at the Brigade's Base Camp at 1725 hours.

15. Revolutionary Development

a. Civic Action Activities: Due to the location of the Brigade's CP, Civic Action was limited during Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE. Civic Action continued in the BIEN HOA Area.

b. Brigade S5 Activities

(1) The following is a summary of the Brigades S5 Activities during Operation JUNCTION CITY I (ALTERNATE):

(a) MEDCAP & DENTCAP - None

(b) Psychological Operations: Speaker and Leaflet Missions

DATE	THEME	MISSION	TIME/AMOUNT
22 Feb 67	Chieu Hoi/Weapons Reward	Leaflet	92,000
22 Feb 67	Rally Instructions	Speaker	1 hr
25 Feb 67	Return to Family/GVN	Leaflet	150,000
25 Feb 67	Why You Should Rally	Speaker	1 hr
28 Feb 67	Chieu Hoi/Return to Family	Leaflet	125,000
28 Feb 67	Why You Should Rally	Speaker	1 hr
1 Mar 67	Return to GVN/Safe Conduct	Leaflet	157,000
1 Mar 67	Rally Instructions	Speaker	1 hr
1 Mar 67	JUSPAO Newsletters	Leaflet	16,000
6 Mar 67	Your Family misses You/Return to GVN	Leaflet	150,000
6 Mar 67	Why You Should Rally	Speaker	1 hr
8 Mar 67	Chieu Hoi/Return to family	Leaflet	154,000
8 Mar 67	Rally Instructions	Speaker	1 hr
9 Mar 67	Return to GVN/Weapons Reward	Leaflet	156,000
9 Mar 67	Chieu Hoi/Rally Instructions	Speaker	1 hr
9 Mar 67	1967 Calendars	Handout	420
11 Mar 67	Safe Conduct/Weapons Reward/Return to GVN	Leaflet	181,000
11 Mar 67	JUSPAO Newsletter	Leaflet	16,000
11 Mar 67	Why You Should Rally	Speaker	1 hr
13 Mar 67	Return to GVN & Family/Chieu Hoi/Safe Conduct	Leaflet	336,000
13 Mar 67	Why You Should Rally	Speaker	1 hr
14 Mar 67	Chieu Hoi/Return to Family/ARVN vs VC Life	Leaflet	224,000
14 Mar 67	Speaker	1 hr	
15 Mar 67	Chieu Hoi/Safe Conduct/Tape A-12	Speaker	1 hr

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16. Logistics/Administrative Activities:

a. General: Operation JUNCTION CITY I was a large scale search and destroy operation conducted in TAY NINH Province with one battalion (+) introduced in the area of operations by airborne assault. The Brigade was OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division throughout the operational period. Logistical support was provided through a 1st Logistical Command FSA at SUOI DA, augmented during the initial phase by air dropped supplies. A Brigade Support Operations Center (BSOC) was established at SUOI DA, and a Supply Recovery and Liaison Team was set up on the Drop Zone in the vicinity of KATUM.

b. Supply:

(1) The following resupply sorties were flown from SUOI DA to the forward area:

UH-1 Helicopter	610
CH-47 Helicopter	294

(2) The following resupply sorties were flown between BIEN HOA and SUOI DA:

C-123 Aircraft	30
C-130 Aircraft	11
CV-2 Aircraft	24

(3) The following tonnages of supplies were handled:

<u>Class</u>	<u>Initial Move</u>	<u>Initial Drop</u>	<u>Flown From BIEN HOA</u>	<u>Drawn at SUOI DA</u>
Class I	10.0	20.0	23.5	307.5
Class II & IV	6.0	10.0	35.0	-
Class III	6.9	-	4.2	132.3
Class V	<u>23.5</u>	<u>110.0</u>	<u>12.2</u>	<u>1,073.3</u>
TOTAL	48.4 tons	140.0 tons	74.9 tons	1,513.1 tons

c. Maintenance: The BSOC maintenance contact team consisted of 2 officers and 24 enlisted men. Back-up support and resupply of repair parts was accomplished through a daily courier by air to BIEN HOA. The contact team received 396 requirements for support during the operation, categorized as follows:

<u>Section</u>	<u>Jobs Received</u>	<u>Jobs Completed</u>	<u>Jobs Uncompleted</u>
Armament	209	196	13
Signal	120	101	11
Mech Maint	67	56	19

d. Medical: An initial complement of thirty-six enlisted men and five officers, including a two-man KA team, composed the initial personnel strength. In addition to the clearing facility, a four man team accompanied the airborne assault made by 2/503d Infantry into the KATUM Area. The clearing station furnished medical,

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surgical, dental and medical supply support as needed. Supporting agency for medical supply was the 1st Division DMSO. In addition, Company B (Medical) furnished the mess for t... BSOC at SUOI DA. Patients were evacuated from the forward clearing station to the 45th MUST in TAY NINH or the 12th Evacuation Hospital in CU CHI. Non-emergent cases were evacuated to "B" Med clearing station (Rear).

(1) Four hundred seven patients were treated by the clearing station forward, a breakdown of which follows:

<u>Patient Type</u>	<u>172d Abn Fie (Sev)</u>	<u>Other Units</u>
KIA	12	1
BC (Sprained ankle on Abn Assault)	17	0
WIA	82	9
Injuries	62	9
FUO	12	1
Dermatological	24	8
Ear, Nose and Throat	9	3
Eye	7	1
Cardio-Respiratory	6	0
Gastro-Intestinal	14	6
Genito-Urinary (Including VB)	26	15
Neuro-Psychiatric	2	0
Other Medical	10	5
Other Surgical	12	2
Vietnamese or Victor Charlie	6	0
Dental	29	14
TOTAL	330	77

e. Communications: Communications during the marshalling phase of the parachute operation were those installed in the BIEN HOA Base Camp Area. Outloading coordination was effected by FM Radio. Initial communication on the drop zone was by AN PRC-25. By employing the RC-292 antenna, FM communications were established to the 1st Infantry Division Forward at MINH THANH. Three different heavy drop loads of communications equipment arrived on the DZ intact. Each load was capable of establishing austere communications for a Tactical Brigade CP. The condition of the ground on the DZ, however, precluded the use of this equipment. As soon as the vehicles were de-rigged and driven off, the platform became hopelessly mired. They remained on the DZ until late in the afternoon when APC's from D/16th Armor became available to pull them out. Early in the afternoon of D - Day, CH-47 sorties delivered the VHF radio equipment, HF RTT, secure teletype and FM radio shelters. Shortly after the arrival of this equipment, VHF communications were established to the 1st Infantry Division (Forward) providing telephone circuits from the Brigade Forward CP to Task Headquarters, and also providing telephone circuits to BIEN HOA ARMY. Wire was laid to all units in the objective area prior to night fall. This was the first time that it had been possible to establish wire communications to all subordinate units and was possible because all units were deployed within 3 km of the Brigade CP. On 6 March 1967, the Brigade Main Forward CP displaced to SUOI DA leaving a TAC CP at the DZ location. A relay station was established at FSB III in preparation for the move of the TAC CP to that location. Communications from the Main CP (SUOI DA) to the TAC CP (Position LIZ) were established by using 4-channel VHF (AN/MRC-112) which provided telephone service between the two command posts. On 14 March 1967, the TAC CP closed down and the Infantry Battalions assembled in the area of SUOI DA for airlift to BIEN HOA. Road movement from SUOI DA was controlled by helicopter which reported progress to the Brigade Rear CP.

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a. Airborne Operations: The various stages in coordination, planning, execution and problems encountered during the Parachute Assault of 22 February 1967 are covered in detail in Tab D, Inclosures 1 - 4 in this report.

b. Starlight Scopes and Infra-Red Equipment: Company D/16th Armor reported that Starlight Scopes and Infra-Red equipment continued to provide valuable aid in perimeter defense during the hours of darkness on Operation JUNCTION CITY I.

c. Use of Tanks: The use of tanks to break trails through heavy vegetated terrain allows the introduction of heavy fire power into areas not normally accessible to this unit and provides infantry elements with direct fire support and protection with which to move into enemy held areas and assures the neutralization of the hostile force with a minimum amount of friendly casualties.

d. Use of Staging Areas: The use of a staging area prior to the actual employment of combat elements proved desirable in that it assisted in psychologically preparing the soldiers for the impending mission.

e. Marking Unit Locations: For marking of unit and troop positions on the ground for an aerial observer, each line company was given a designated color of smoke to employ (e. g. Company A - Violet, Company B - Green, Company C - Yellow). This scheme was changed periodically and resulted in a greater ease of identifying each unit, where they were, and the proximity of the unit with others.

f. Effectiveness of Underground CP Location: The Cavalry Troop (E/17th) spent many hours in preparing their positions with overhead cover, and for the first time, the Troop CP operated underground. This proved to be very effective during the mortar attack which the Troop underwent. Because of this, operations and communications personnel were able to continue to operate with little difficulty.

g. Mine Detector Teams: It was discovered by the 173d Engineer Company that the fastest and best way to deploy mine detector teams was in groups of five men, with 25 meter spacing between the teams and with teams lined diagonally across the road being secured.

h. Use of APC's in Airborne Drops: Armored Personnel Carriers were found to be invaluable for moving ammunition off the Drop Zone during D - Day and the days immediately following the parachute assault. Provisions should be made to include them in on all future airborne operations for this purpose.

18. Results of Operation JUNCTION CITY Ia. Friendly Losses

(1) The following are personnel losses sustained by the 173d Airborne Brigade during the operation:

KIA	33
WIA	130
MIA	0

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(2) The following losses in equipment were sustained by the Brigade during Operation JUNCTION CITY:

145 caliber pistol.....	1
M-16 Rifles	9
Gas Masks	3
Compasses	7
Bayonet	1
Flash Light	4
Antennas	2
PNC-25 Radios	1
Handset	1
Helmet w/liner	2
Plotting Boards	2

b. Viet Cong Losses:(1) Personnel:

KIA (BC).....	266
KIA (Posse)	32
VCC	4

(2) Weapons:

Bolt Action Rifles	17
Automatic Rifles.....	8
Light Machineguns	1
Anti Tank Weapons (B-40 ML)	2
Flare Pistols	10

(3) Ammunition

7.92mm Rounds	54
7.62mm Rounds	1,360
.30 Caliber Rounds	507

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60mm Mortar Rounds 16

4.2" Mortar Rounds 1

B-40 Rockets 8

Assorted Semi-Automatic Rounds 931

Grenades 53

Rifle Grenades 3

(4) Mines:

Anti-Personnel Mines 4

Anti-Tank Mines 7

Claymore Mines 7

M1A1 Mines 7

(5) Demolitions:

Shape Charge 1

Elasting Caps 203

Detonating Cord 545 ft.

TNT 55 lbs

Carbide 10 Gals

Plastic Explosives 31 lbs

(6) Installations:

Foxholes 127

Tunnels 7

Bunkers 444

Huts 265

Bomb Shelters 38

(7) Communication Equipment:

Telephones 15

Multimeters 7

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Vibrator Power Unit	1
Radios	15
Antennas	2
Miscellaneous Equipment	1,000 lbs

(8) Food:

Rice	104.4 tons
Peanuts	1.2 tons
Dried Fish	2.2 tons
Salt	625 lbs

(9) Miscellaneous:

Medical Supplies	25 lbs
Clothing	600 lbs
Miscellaneous Equipment	260 lbs
Dark Room (Complete)	1
Cameras	27
Film	17,000 ft

19. Commander's Analysis and Lessons Learned:

a. Commander's Analysis

Throughout Operation JUNCTION CITY I conducted in WAR ZONE "C", the 173d Airborne Brigade's "Sky Soldiers" again distinguished themselves by an outstanding performance. The entire operation was a tremendous success as every assigned mission was accomplished in a first class manner.

Operation JUNCTION CITY I marked another first for the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), as members of the Brigade conducted the first combat jump by US Forces in VIETNAM. The jump and subsequent airborne assaults on 22 February 1967 demonstrated the Brigade's professionalism at its best. During the next 22 days, the 173d became the spearhead of the largest allied offensive conducted to date in the REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. As listed in paragraph 18, considerable damage was inflicted by the paratroopers in the Viet Cong operating in WAR ZONE "C". Of significant importance was the number of Viet Cong killed and captured and the complete destruction of the COSVN Public Information Office for Psychological Propaganda and a COSVN signal site.

As a result of this unit's accomplishments, the Brigade is continuing to receive world wide publicity and the eyes of the nation are upon us. Through the personal efforts of the paratroopers, even bigger and more significant success will be achieved by the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) in the future.

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b. Lessons Learned: The following are the most significant lessons learned during Operation JUNCTION CITY I:

Item: DZ Parachute Problem

Discussion: Rotary wing aircraft cannot safely perform missions out of a parachute Drop Zone unless all parachutes have been secured. One accident and several near misses were experienced as a result of helicopters trying to perform missions on the DZ littered with parachutes.

Observation: Special attention should be paid during future airborne operations which require helicopter support to insure that LZ on and around the DZ are properly policed of parachute equipment which may hinder the aircraft's landing or take off.

Item: Dustoff Training

Discussion: The amount of time that the Dustoff helicopter must remain in the area is dependent upon the skill and speed of the individuals on the ground who maneuver the patient into the aircraft. It was found that often this process was unnecessarily lengthy.

Observation: The need for training on the use of the Dustoff penetrator was apparent during this operation.

Item: Aerial Observers

Discussion: Continuous air observer coverage of maneuver elements requires the alternating use of two (2) aircraft.

Observation: This requirement needs to be fulfilled by two (2) O1-E's. Due to the time required to refuel, change pilots and mechanical difficulties, the use of two O1-E's working in rotation can best provide the coverage required and a smooth transition. Also, the use of two O1-E's will reduce the amount of time that the aerial observer will be required to fly each day. In this operation, the aerial averaged ten (10) hours on station each day. This is an excessive time period and has an adverse effect on the efficiency of the aerial observer.

Item: Convoy Control

Discussion: When being escorted through the city of SAIGON by MP's assigned to that district, arrangements should be made by the Brigade to have either the SAIGON MP's or the Brigade's MP's and E/17th Cavalry to set up much needed TCP's within the city itself to avoid any confusion in regard to certain turns etc. and to avoid congested areas of civilian traffic.

Observation: It is recommended that a lead element of the Brigade situate themselves in the city of SAIGON two days prior to the Brigade convoy moving through the town. Whenever possible, aerial observation of the convoy movement by an MP representative should be employed to assist the MP's manning the TCP's along the convoy route. Aerial observers could be effective to check any possible points of congestion along the way.

Item: New Model Enemy Mine

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Discussion: A new type handmade claymore mine was found by the 2/503d Infantry vic XT 361941. The mine is rectangular in shape, made of sheet metal, dark green in color, contains approximately two pounds of TNT and 200 pellets. The mine is seven and one half inches long, four and three quarters inches high and two and one eighth inches thick. The front of the mine is concave with three flat surfaces. The fuse well is in the bottom of the mine and a crude sighting device is on top. The pellets are in a single layer under the front metal covering. The pellets are cut from a steel rod, one quarter inch in diameter and three eighths of an inch long.

Observation: On the back of this new type claymore is marked: "MDH2, T 11,66B". It is believed that the VC nomenclature for this weapon is DH-2. This particular mine was probably made in November 1966.

Item: VC Mining

Discussion: Just because APC's or tanks have used a road once does not mean it is cleared. The VC bury mines upside down in troughs, necessitating as many as ten passes to detonate one of these trough deployed mines.

Discussion: Not enough time is allowed mine detector teams to clear roads of mines. Commanders and staff should allocate a greater period of time to allow a thorough clearing of a certain length of road. Under conditions where there are no mines or metal objects in the road it takes one mine detector team one hour to clear a strip of road 2.5 meters wide and 200 meters long.

Observation: When reconning by fire in conjunction with mine clearing operations, firing should be controlled so that the brass, bullets, or canister pellets do not land on the road to be cleared. If metal is on the road, mine detectors are greatly impeded as they have to check out all responses. Recommend that firing be limited to the shoulders and off to the sides of the road. It is emphasized that extreme caution must be exercised when travelling on roads that have not been thoroughly cleared and this practice should be avoided if possible.

Item: Recovery of Mined Vehicles

Discussion: In many instances, the VC place mines off the road in a turn around area to impede the recovery of mined vehicles.

Observation: When recovering mined vehicles on roads, it is essential that mine detectors have been employed off the road a sufficient distance so that the turn around area can be safely used during recovery.

Item: Test Firing of Weapons

Discussion: The practice of test firing all weapons prior to darkness was implemented by D/16th Armor and found to be a practical method of insuring that all function properly on perimeter defense.

Observation: Due to the large amount of road work done by the Armor Company, the weapons were often clogged with dust, and by actually firing, the individuals were assured of their proper functioning in the event of a probe.

Item: Staggered Perimeter Defense

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Discussion: The staggered perimeter was found to be advantageous in an open area.

Observation: The staggered formation allows the vehicles to mutually support each other and in the event that a vehicle is over-run, the vehicles to the rear can cover it with fire without endangering vehicles to the left and right.

Item: CAR-15 (Commando Automatic Rifle)

Discussion: The new CAR-15 Weapon worked well for movement as employed by the Brigade's Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, however, certain difficulties were encountered. It was found that the front hand guard heated too rapidly and that the weapon jammed more often than the M-16 Rifle.

Observation: It is desired that further modifications be made on the CAR-15 to prevent its heating at the front hand guard, and that a study be made concerning the characteristic jamming of the weapon.

Item: Units Requesting Resupply

Discussion: As on past operations, LOC helicopters were dispatched to the forward area with an incorrect location or to an element that was not ready to receive supplies. Such occurrences are extremely costly in terms of helicopter sorties lost and impede the satisfaction of unit logistical requirements.

Observation: Units must continue to refine their procedures for insuring the correctness of receiving unit locations, call signs, frequencies and that the receiving unit is, in fact, ready to accept resupply. Close and continuous coordination is essential. All units, including separate companies, must provide a representative in BSOC for liaison.

Item: Delivery of "A" Rations

Discussion: On a day when the Brigade maneuver forces are involved in large scale airmobile assaults, it is particularly difficult to complete the resupply in the late afternoon. Usually the helicopters available to work LOC are less than normal because of troop lift requirements, and the units do not get to their overnight positions until late in the afternoon. Additionally, the requirements for munitions and water are greater than on the average day.

Observation: When the majority of the Brigade's maneuver forces are involved in air assault or other major movements on a particular day, there should be no attempt to feed "A" rations for the supper meal. This would allow the LOC effort to be devoted entirely to the movement of weapons, ammunition, and water during the time available, operating under priorities established by the units.

Item: Difficulties in Unloading Aircraft

Discussion: Difficulty was experienced in unloading aircraft and in handling supplies in the BSOC Area.

Observation: An Air Force Aerial Port Team should be requested to load and unload aircraft in the forward area.

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Item: Evacuation of Routine Casualties

Discussion: During the initial phase of the operation, difficulty was experienced in evacuating routine casualties to BIEN HOA. Although this problem was later resolved by using daily resupply choppers returning to Base Camp, in the early days of the operation, there was some concern over patient evacuation.

Observation: From D - Day, a ship should be made available to evacuate routine casualties on a one flight per day basis. This could be coordinated with the Brigade Aviation Officer prior to each operation.

Item: Dust Control for Medical Purposes

Discussion: An ecological problem of dust control was constant during this operation making sanitary maintenance virtually impossible during surgical procedures.

Observation: A portable Dust-Off pad of some sort is necessary to provide some semblance of sterility in the treatment section, e. g. rubber mat, prime-prime surface.

Item: Vehicle Maintenance

Discussion: A total of eighteen vehicles had to be towed during the convoy from BIEN HOA to SUOI DA, most for 2d Echelon work. Most organization mechanics do not take PLL repair parts to the field with them.

Observation: Vehicles should be inspected prior to deployment to minimize convoy losses due to minor maintenance problems. Units should be sure to take basic PLL repair parts with them to the field.

The following items are concerned with the problems encountered immediately following the parachute assault of 22 February and the subsequent heavy drops. These lessons learned were supplied by the 173d Support Battalion.

Item: Returning of Air Delivery Equipment

Discussion: Units must, as a standard procedure, return all air delivery equipment to the Brigade Supply Office on the first available aircraft so that such equipment is available for the shipment of additional supplies.

Observation: If prompt return of air delivery equipment is accomplished, the Brigade can function on a lesser quantity of air items (approximately 20 tons of A-22 bags and associated equipment were used on Operation JUNCTION CITY I), and the loss and back-haul requirement will be reduced.

Item: Problems Encountered on Heavy Drops

Discussion: On D + 1, many aircraft were loaded with more than 12 containers. In these aircraft, the last buckles would plunge through the deployed canopies of the preceding loads causing extensive canopy and supply damage. The same problem occurred when aircraft extracted their loads while climbing at an angle greater than 8 degrees.

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Observation: Further training by the Air Force in CDS procedures would improve future operations of this nature. Concentrated CDS patterns were not achieved until the last two drop days when the angle panel system was successfully employed.

Item: Aircraft Altitude for CDS Drops

Discussion: At 0945 hours on D ~ Day, two CDS-G13 loads were 75% loss when the C-130 aircraft executed extraction at 150 to 200 feet instead of the prescribed 400 feet.

Observation: It is mandatory that Air Force personnel be oriented to the precise altitude of both CDS drops and Heavy Drops to insure the safe deployment of canopies, thereby insuring that the equipment will not be damaged due to too rapid a descent.

Item: A-22 Slings

Discussion: A-22 slings constructed of type 15 cotton webbing broke on several occasions, causing malfunctions and the loss of supplies during LOG Command drops.

Observation: A-22 containers should be carefully inspected by the rigging unit to insure that webbing and hardware are in good condition.

Item: Damaged Air Equipment

Discussion: There was extensive pilferage of parachutes and kit bags directly following the parachute assault. Helicopters landed and stole parachutes from the DZ. Equipment was damaged unnecessarily on many occasions. Parachute suspension lines were cut. Canopy sections were removed. Slings on A-22's and risers on G-13 parachutes were cut to free loads. In addition, there were insufficient personnel in the objective area to recover the supplies and air delivery equipment.

Observation: Personnel should be oriented in recovery techniques and impressed with the need for preserving air delivery equipment. Additional recovery personnel from the Support Battalion should be programmed into the objective area in an early follow up to the assault to accelerate recovery of supplies and air delivery equipment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E. B. Roberson

E. B. ROBERSON
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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Tab B

Combat Operations After Action Report

Operation JUNCTION CITY II

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE)
APO San Francisco 96250

AVBEE-SC

15 June 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report - Operation JUNCTION CITY I & II

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff
For Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

The following report is submitted in accordance with MACV Directive Number 335-8. (RCS Exempt)

1. General: During the initial planning of Operation JUNCTION CITY, the 173d Airborne Brigade was not scheduled to participate in Phase II (JUNCTION CITY II), however, immediately after the Brigade returned to BIEN HOA terminating their participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I, the 1st Infantry Division made a request to II FFORCEV for an additional Brigade in the operational area. II FFORCEV made the decision to redeploy the Brigade to the AO, now in the eastern portion of WAR ZONE "C", again under the Operational Control of the 1st Infantry Division. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) was assigned the mission of securing the staging area at MINH THANH by 20 March 1967 and to remain there for airmobile operations on 23 March 1967.

2. Name of Operation: JUNCTION CITY II
3. References: Maps Vietnam, 1:50,000 - Sheets 6231 I & IV, 6232 II & III
6331 IV, 6332 III
4. Type of Operation: Search and Destroy
5. Date of Operation: 20 March through 13 April 1967
6. Location: WAR ZONE "C", vicinity of MINH THANH
7. Command Headquarters: 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)
8. Reporting Officer: Brigadier General John R. Deane Jr.
9. Task Force Organization:

Operation JUNCTION CITY II

1/503d Inf - LTC SACHS

1 Sqd Engr
3 Set Dog Tms

2/503d Inf - LTC SIGROLTZ

1 Sqd Engr
3 Set Dog Tms

4/503d Inf - LTC JACKLEY

1 Sqd Engr
3 Set Dog Tms

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10

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Bde Control

D/16th Armor

E/17th Cav

Engr Co (-)

HHC (-)

BSCC

10. Supporting Forces:a. United States Air Force:

(1) Size of Force:

- (a) 3d Tactical Fighter Wing
- (b) 12th Tactical Fighter Wing
- (c) 31st Tactical Fighter Wing
- (d) 35th Tactical Fighter Wing

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) TAC Sorties:

3d TFW	108
12th TFW	27
31st TFW	65
35th TFW	<u>103</u>
TOTAL	303

- (b) FAC Sorties 56
- (c) VNAF Sorties 0
- (d) Tons of Ordnance 384.5
- (e) Visual Reconnaissance 117
- (f) Escort Missions 7
- (g) Aerial Resupply 295

(3) Results and Effectiveness: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) moved to the MINH THAM Area by land convoy and C-130 aircraft beginning at 0500 hours on 20 March 1967. Infantry Battalions were airlifted into the forward operating area on 21 March 1967. Sustained resupply operations were supported by C-123 and C-130 airlift. TAC Air preparation was highly effective when troops were conducting airmobile assaults into contested LZ's.

(4) Timeliness: All sorties provided arrived within a useable time frame and were effectively employed.

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b. Army Aviation

(1) Size of Force: During Operation JUNCTION CITY II, the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) was supported by the following units:

- (a) 11th Aviation Battalion
- (b) 145th Aviation Battalion
- (c) 254th Medical Detachment
- (d) 173d Aviation Platoon (Caster Platoon)

(2) How and When Employed: The above aviation units flew a total of 7,415 sorties to include Combat Assault, Armed Helicopter, Resupply, Command and Liaison, Aerial Reconnaissance and Aerial Observer.

(3) Highlights of Aviation Activities: An effective method of air-mobile extraction was utilized on the final day of the operation when two infantry companies performing road security were picked up by UH-1 helicopters and transported to a vehicle rendezvous point. The airlifts provided the ground units with a high degree of flexibility and utilizing the road way as a PZ provided an efficient extraction. Dust was a problem but extraction was successful. Gunships supported the extraction.

(4) A total of 2,737.9 hours were flown in support of Operation JUNCTION CITY II for a daily average of 119 hours.

(5) A total of 8,641 passengers were transported in support of the Brigade operation for a daily average of 360.6 passengers.

(6) A total of 2,834.9 tons of cargo were flown for a daily average of 113.3 tons.

(7) Results and Effectiveness: The aviation support which the Brigade received was adequate to meet the essential requirements. A shortage existed to support the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol and as a result, they lost a considerable amount of their effectiveness. The arrival of four (4) additional UH-1D helicopters from the 173d Aviation Platoon greatly eased the problem in furnishing Command and Liaison aircraft.

c. Artillery

(1) Size of Force:

Btry A, 3d Bn, 319th Arty (6 105mm How)
 Btry B, 3d Bn, 319th Arty (6 105mm How)
 Btry C, 3d Bn, 319th Arty (6 105mm How)

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) On Monday, 20 March 1967, at 0655 hours, the 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery (-) departed BIEN HOA Base Camp by road. The Artillery Battalion closed at MINH THANH Airfield (FSB "D" - XT 646671) at 1500 hours. Advance elements

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which consisted of 18 M-102 Howitzers with crew departed BIEN HOA Airbase by C-130 aircraft at 0921 hours closing at MINH THANH at 0930 hours. They were laid and prepared to fire at 0955 hours. Coordination was made with Destroyer TOC to support the 2/18th Infantry. A total of three missions were fired and a total of 67 rounds were expended. On Wednesday, 22 March 1967, the 3/319th Artillery moved from MINH THANH Airfield by CH-47 aircraft. The Battalion departed at 1110 hours utilizing 41 personnel and equipment sorties. The 3/319th Artillery closed at Fire Support Base PARRY (XT 495754) at 1800 hours. Thirty-one Class V sorties were completed at this time. On 28 March 1967, direct fire was employed. It proved to be effective by the decrease in sniper fire which had been received by the infantry elements protecting the fire support base. On 3 April 1967, Battery A moved by CH-47 from Position PARRY to Position ROCK (XT 6068), departing at 1124 hours and closing at 1145 hours, laid and ready to fire at 1200 hours. On 9 April, at 0720 hours, C/ 3/319th Artillery moved from Position PARRY to Position ROCK utilizing eleven sorties to complete the move. Battery C was laid and ready to fire at 0835 hours. Later that day, Bravo Battery also deployed by CH-47 to Position ROCK closing at 1530 hours.

(b) Preparation of Landing Zones:

23 Mar 67 - 0915-0945H - XT 483685 - 1100-1130H

24 Mar 67 - 0915-0945H - XT 457677 - 1100-1130H

9 Apr 67 - 0900-0930H - 1045 - 15H - XT 50956640, 5125-
6640, 50806630, 51406620, 51206660

(3) Results and Effectiveness: Three preparations were fired on landing zones and two were fired on extraction zones. The preparations fired on LZ's were fired in accordance with a time schedule in conjunction with air strikes. They were very effective and reduced the amount of ground fire that was received by the assaulting elements. The extraction preparations were in the form of clearing fires and were delivered around extraction LZ's. They were also very effective and permitted the forces to extract with little or no ground fire from the enemy. Advancing fires were employed on numerous occasions and enabled the infantry to move with greater speed and less contact. When contact was made, artillery fire was placed on both the enemy and in blocking positions. Defensive concentrations were fired daily as desired by the infantry commanders. Counter-mortar fires were employed on two occasions and were successful in silencing the enemy mortars. Numerous missions were fired on intelligence targets with unknown results. The H & I program continued to be stressed with an average of 500 rounds being fired per night with unknown results. TOF's were fired on all previous base camps with unknown results.

(4) Timeliness: On contact missions when TAC air was employed, the transition between artillery fire check firing and TAC Air ordnance being delivered was not smooth. Check fire was given too early resulting in a period of time when no ordnance was hitting the enemy. The time between receipt of fire mission and first round shot was governed by the time required for air and ground clearance. The technical computations and tactical considerations required by all FDC's were accomplished with both speed and accuracy.

(5) Missions and Rounds Fired: 105mm Howitzer

Missions - 1,729

Rounds Extended - 48,575

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d. E Troop, 17th Cavalry

(1) Size of Force:

Three (3) Reconnaissance Platoons
LRRP Platoon
Troop Headquarters

Vehicles - 26 1 1/4-ton vehicles, 11 3 1/4-ton vehicles and two 2 1/2-ton vehicles to include a 1500 gallon tanker.

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) The Troop departed BIEN HOA by road with its combat vehicles on 20 March 1967 to the MINH THANH Rubber Plantation.

(b) During the entire operation, the Troop assisted in the defense of Fire Support Base DELTA.

(c) While securing FSB "D", the Troop conducted an aggressive patrol plan by keeping a mounted or dismounted patrol out at all times.

(d) Results and Effectiveness: During the operation, a numerous amount of mounted and dismounted patrols were deployed around FSB "D". This action resulted in 1 VC KIA (BC) and the capturing of 1 AK-47 rifle. This operation proved effective in that it provided all types of combat training for new personnel.

(4) Timeliness: All missions of the Troop were accomplished on time during the operation.

e. Company D, 16th Armor

(1) Size of Force:

3 APC Platoons under Bde OPCOM

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) Secured staging area at MINH THANH on 20 March 1967 with one reinforced company. The D/16th Armor Company then staged at MINH THANH for airmobile operations on 23 March 1967.

(b) Upon closing at MINH THANH, D/16th Armor became under the Operational Control of E/17th Cavalry and conducted various missions in and around the MINH THANH Area. Primarily employed for BSOC and CP security.

(3) Results and Effectiveness: Although the company was primarily used as CP and BSOC security, they were able to operate in the local area during daylight hours. These operations were hindered by the lack of artillery support and not being able to move out of 4.2" mortar range. The time spent on the perimeter was put to good advantage with maintenance and classes being conducted by the Armor Company's personnel.

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f. 173d Engineer Company

(1) Size of Force:

3 Demolition Squads
 2 Mechanics
 2 Water Point Teams

(2) How and When Employed: On 20 March 1967, the Demolition and Water Point personnel of the 173d Engineer Company departed BIEN HOA for MINH THANH in WAR ZONE "C". The following activities were conducted by the Engineer elements between 20 March and 13 April 1967:

(a) Cleared LZ's

1. 31 March 1967, cleared an LZ employing 180 pounds of C-4.
2. On 3 April cleared an LZ employing 100 pounds of C-4.
3. On 7 - 9 April, cleared an LZ employing 420 pounds of C-4. Size of LZ was 80 meters x 150 meters.
4. On 10 April 1967, cleared an LZ employing 550 pounds of C-4. Size of LZ was 90 meters x 200 meters.

(b) A company size base camp was destroyed on 30 March 1967 at NT 436683. Forty bunkers were destroyed using 100 pounds of C-4.

(c) Throughout the period, the following were destroyed:

ITEM	NUMBER	TYPE
4.2" Rd	12	US
60mm Rd	1	US
M-72	1	US
Grenade, Frag	2	US
Grenade, WP	1	US
82mm Rd	17	US
Claymore Mine	2	Large VC
Claymore Mine	7	Small VC
60mm Rd	20	VC
Grenade, Frag	55	VC
500 lb Bomb	2	US
100 lb Bomb	2	US
AT Mine	6	VC

(3) Results and Effectiveness: Engineer elements were sometimes employed in non-engineer type missions when they could have been used to better advantage elsewhere.

(4) Timeliness: N/A

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g. 173d Military Police

(1) Size of Force: the force constituting the 173d Military Police during Operation JUNCTION CITY II was as follows:

Personnel:

Four (4) 8-man squads
Two (2) officers
Five (5) National Policemen
One (1) interpreter

Equipment:

One (1) 3/4-ton truck
Eight (8) 1/4-ton trucks
Seven (7) M-60 machineguns
One (1) .50 caliber machinegun

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) To provide necessary traffic control points for movement of the Brigade to and from the Tactical Area of Operations.

(b) To help provide security for the Brigade CP by attaching two nine-man squads to E/17th Cavalry (19 March - 12 April 1967).

(c) To provide road security from the Brigade CP to the water point with a roving gun jeep (19 March - 13 April).

(d) To provide a gun jeep patrol for the airstrip at MINH THANH to keep indigenous personnel out of the Brigade Area and to keep vehicles from crossing the runway (19 March - 13 April).

(e) To maintain a POW Collecting Point at the Brigade Forward Base Camp to include guarding, feeding and evacuation of captives (19 March - 13 April 1967).

(f) To provide security for the TOC during the hours of darkness (1800 - 0600 hours, 19 March - 13 April 1967).

(g) To patrol the "Off Limits" area of MINH THANH and the beer stands outside of the town itself that were on limits to the troops (19 March - 13 April 1967).

(h) To provide security for the S5 MEDCAP Teams operating in a MONTAGNARD Village north of the Base Camp Area.

(i) To secure a bridge with one (1) MP squad northeast of MINH THANH on the day before tactical movement back to BIEN HOA (12 - 13 April 1967).

(j) To provide a 24 hour security guard on the Commanding General (19 March - 13 April 1967).

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(1) To work in conjunction with the Special Forces in the area and the Village Chiefs and the S5 in order to curtail villagers from selling marihuana to 173d personnel (19 March - 13 April 1967).

(2) To again work in conjunction with Special Forces, Village Chiefs and the S5 to check the village of MINH THANH for a radio transmitter that was sending messages and was traced to the village.

(3) Results and Effectiveness: The traffic control of the road movement of the Brigade to and from the tactical area was accomplished without any difficulty. TCP's manned by MP and National Policemen were able to control traffic and direct Brigade vehicles to the designated routes. The Commanding General guard, normally accomplished by non-military police personnel, was augmented by MP's in order to provide better security. Control of indigenous personnel in the CP area was a constant problem. Through close coordination with National Police, Special Forces personnel and the Village Chief of MINH THANH, this problem was lessened but never solved. Constant vigilance for the presence of marihuana in the area by MP's resulted in the confiscation of seven parcels of marihuana in the immediate area. No actual enemy contact was made during the time MP's were used as road security, patrols or perimeter defense.

(4) Timeliness: All missions of the 173d Military Police Platoon were accomplished on time during the operation.

h. LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol)

(1) Size of Force:

Two (2) Officers
Forty (40) Enlisted Men

(2) How and When Employed: The LRRP moved to the forward operational area at MINH THANH on the morning of 20 March 1967 and introduced three six-man reconnaissance teams with the mission of landing zone surveillance. On 21 March 1967, a twelve man team was introduced north of MINH THANH on a combat patrol. On 7 April, a six man team was introduced for landing zone surveillance. On 10 April 1967, four combat outposts were set around MINH THANH in reaction to an alert of a proposed VC Regimental attack. Throughout the operation, the LRRP conducted observation and listening posts for the protection of the Brigade Command Post at MINH THANH. A total of six long range and twenty-two local missions were conducted.

(3) Results and Effectiveness: The long range missions were successful in either observing the landing zone or making contact with the enemy, thereby determining their presence in the area. The OP's were also successful and provided an opportunity for the training of new personnel.

(4) Timeliness: The operations were conducted at the proper time and introduced prior to large units entering the area. Due to the lack of helicopter support, the LRRP was used minimally and on one occasion, was introduced late due to commitment of gunships.

II. Intelligence

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a. Enemy Situation Before Operation: Prior to the commencement of the operation, elements of the 272d MF Regiment, the 101st NVA Regiment, the 82d Rear Services Group, the 9th VC Division Headquarters, the 1st Battalion, 70th Guard Regiment (COSVN) and two unidentified battalions of the 69th Artillery Regiment were thought to be located within the Brigade's area of operation. The enemy had the capability to:

- (1) Attack with elements of the 272d MF Regiment, 101st NVA Regiment, 70th Security Guard Regiment and the 69th Artillery Regiment.
- (2) Defend with the forces mentioned above.
- (3) Reinforce his attacks and defenses with elements of the 7th NVA Division, the 141st MF Battalion and the Phu Loi Battalion.
- (4) Withdraw from contact or avoid contact at the time and place of his choosing.

b. Enemy Situation During Operations: From 22 March to 12 April 1967, the Brigade maintained daily contact with the enemy. These contacts were usually engagements with small groups of VC up to platoon size elements. Approximately 40 per cent of these contacts were friendly initiated. Though no large engagements took place, numerous base camps were found and the documents captured in these base areas identified the following units in the AO: elements of the 9th VC Division, elements of the 272d Main Force Regiment, C15 C23, C40 and C46 Mechanized Companies subordinate to the C921 Military Staff Committee COSVN, elements of the 69th Artillery Regiment, Z-26 (Worksite Section of Group 82 COSVN Rear Service Department), Hospital 5A, (subordinate to Group 82, Headquarters and Staff Section of the Military Staff Committee, COSVN), elements of the CM, Production, Procurement and Transportation units subordinate to Group 82, elements of D46 and D47 subordinate to B2, C921 (Intelligence or Reconnaissance section of the Military Staff Committee, COSVN. The dates on the documents were from less than one week to 2 years old. The enemy in most instances gave a spirited accounting of himself, and appeared to be in good shape physically and had high morale. He makes excellent use of camouflage and evading techniques, and when dug in in his base areas, was difficult to dislodge.

c. Area of Operations:

(1) Weather and Climate: The weather during Operation JUNCTION CITY II was clear and dry. We had light rain showers on two afternoons. Light fog and low ceilings were commonplace in the morning hours until 0930 hours. The average high temperature was about 90° and the average low temperature was about 67°. The weather was ideally suited for ground operations throughout the entire operation.

(2) Terrain: The Brigade AO was bounded by XT 75 east and west grid line on the north, the XT 40 north-south grid line on the west and the SAIGON RIVER on the south and east. SUOI BA CHIEM and its tributaries is the major water course in the maneuver area. Generally, the vegetation is dense forest with a canopy of 100 feet with large areas of light forest, brush wood and bamboo thickets. HIGHWAY 244 bisects the maneuver area into western and eastern portions. The lighter areas of vegetation and open areas are more prominent west of HIGHWAY 244, while the denser jungle dominates the east side of the highway to the SAIGON RIVER. B-52 strikes in the area have caused extensive blowdown in the AO, and as such, have significantly

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altered the terrain and vegetation in target areas. The enemy skillfully used the dense jungle areas and was afforded a measure of protection from VR and observation by the high canopy of the denser jungle areas.

d. Final Analysis: There were contacts with the enemy in squad and platoon sized forces. Daily contact was made throughout the AO, though most of the contacts were harassing type engagements on the part of the enemy. Of those few occasions on which the enemy initiated the contact with platoon sized elements, he did so while in fortified positions and gave a good accounting of himself before being defeated. The enemy morale appears to be high and he seems to have adequate supplies and logistical support. The numerous base camps, wells, and extensive trail systems indicate that this particular area is an old base area for elements of the COSVN and the 9th Division as listed in paragraph 11-b above.

e. Sources of Intelligence: During Operation JUNCTION CITY II, the 172d Military Intelligence Detachment provided the 173d Airborne Brigade specialized intelligence support in the fields of Imagery Interpretation and Interrogation. The activities of each section are listed below:

(1) Imagery Interpretation Section:

(a) Imagery Interpretation support for Operation JUNCTION CITY II consisted of the preparation of immediate reports, detailed LZ analysis, construction of mosaics, aerial reconnaissance and weather support.

(b) Aerial reconnaissance was flown during the operation from the MINH THANH Air Strip and VIP helipad.

(c) Imagery Interpretation support for JUNCTION CITY II consisted of the following:

<u>Aerial Reconnaissance</u>	<u>Missions</u>
Army UH-1B	3
Army OH-13	5
Air Force PAC	3
Total Hours	22.5

Photo Interpretation Reports:

Immediate	3
LZ Analysis	5

In addition, the aerial observer was utilized by S2 for radio operator and posting OB reports and overlays.

(2) Interrogation Section:

A statistical summary of personnel, documents and material processed during the operation follows:

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(1)

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Detainees:

VC	0
Returnees	0
Civil Defendants	0
Civilians	4
<u>Documents</u>	3,705

Weapons:

Rifles and Carbines	16
Pistols (Flare Type)	1
AT Grenade Launchers	2
Light Machineguns	4
Recoilless Rifle (57mm)	1
Sub-Machineguns	3

Ammunition:

Assorted u/a Rounds	4,252
AT Grenades	4
Hand Grenades	89
70mm Howitzer Rounds	3

Mines and Demolitions:

Anti-Personnel	8
Claymore Type	12
Shaped Charges	3
Explosives (TNT)	37 lbs
Blasting Caps	187
Electric Cord	1,100 ft

Clothing 323 lbs

Medical Supplies 58 lbs

Web Gear 137 lbs

Misc Shop Tools & Equipment 1,000 lbs

(3) Significant Findings as a Result of Document Exploitation:

(a) During the operation, documents were uncovered concerning the existence and organizational structure of the Mechanized Section, Military Staff Committee, COSVN. These documents also revealed geographic areas of responsibility and operational missions of all elements of this section.

(b) Discovery of documents fulfilling intelligence requirements for SICR U-UPE-U0799, subject; VC/NVA Medical Statistics.

12. Mission: Operation JUNCTION CITY II

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The mission of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) during Operation JUNCTION CITY II was as follows:

a. To secure the staging area at MINH THANH not later than 20 March 1967. The Brigade was then to remain at this staging area for preparation for airmobile assaults commencing on 23 March 1967.

b. On 23 March 1967, the Brigade was to conduct airmobile assaults into eastern WAR ZONE "C".

c. The Brigade's mission was then to conduct search and destroy operations to find, fix and destroy COVN/VCI/NVA forces and installation in assigned AO's with priority to Objectives ELM, OAK, and BIRCH.

d. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) was under the Operational Control of the 1st Infantry Division throughout the operation.

13. Concept of Operation: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) conducted Operation JUNCTION CITY in five (5) phases as follows:

a. PHASE I: Operation JUNCTION CITY II D - Day to D + 2 (20 - 22 March 1967)

The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) deployed from BIEN HOA Base Camp to a staging area in the vicinity of MINH THANH on 20 March 1967 in preparation for search and destroy operations commencing on 23 March. The Brigade's movement was accomplished by intra-theater airlift and road convoy. (OPORD 7-67)

b. PHASE II: Heliborne Assault and S & D - D + 3 to D + 20 (23 March - 9 April 1967)

The 173d Airborne Brigade conducted airmobile assaults into assigned AO's and assumed responsibility for the security of Fire Support Base PARRY with the 1/503d Infantry and conducted S & D operations in zone. (FRAG ORDER 1)

c. PHASE III: Shift to Psn ROCK - D + 20 - D + 23 (9 April - 12 April 1967)
FRAG ORDERS 2 & 3.

The 173d Airborne Brigade phased out of FSB PARRY and established a Fire Support Base at the edge of the MINH THANH Rubber Plantation at FSB ROCK.

d. PHASE IV: Prep for Redeployment D + 23 (12 April 1967)

The Brigade extracted the 1st and 2d Battalions, 503d Infantry from their AO to MINH THANH in preparation for movement to BIEN HOA. (FRAG ORDER 4)

e. PHASE V: Redeployment - D + 24 (13 April 1967)

The 173d Airborne Brigade redeployed to BIEN HOA by airlift and road convoy, thereby terminating their participation in operation JUNCTION CITY. (FRAG ORDER 5 & 6).

14. Execution

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report - Operation JUNCTION CITY I & II

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a. D - Day (20 March 1967)

Changes in Task Organization: 173d Abn Bds (Sep) became OPCON to the 1st Inf Div at 1500 hours

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) began deployment from BIEN HOA Base Camp to MINH THANH for participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY II and was placed under the Operational Control of the 1st Infantry Division at 1500 hours. A Brigade (-) convoy consisting of the 3/319th Artillery, E/17th Cavalry, D/16th Armor, the Brigade HHC, the 173d Engineer Company (-), and the BSOC departed base camp at 0550 hours and closed at MINH THANH at 1500 hours. At 0755 hours, the 3d Platoon of D/16th Armor moving with the trail party encountered heavy traffic vicinity XT 006050. While the convoy continued to move, a civilian vehicle cut in front of the lead element of the 3d Platoon, causing a three-track crash. The collision resulted in one man being injured and two tracks damaged, one of which required a wrecker. Upon the closing of all convoy elements, the Brigade CP was established at XT 643671. The Infantry elements of the Brigade remained at BIEN HOA making final preparations for deployment to the operational area.

b. D + 1 (21 March 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) completed deployment from BIEN HOA to MINH THANH for participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY II, under the OPCON of the 1st Infantry Division. The 1/503d Infantry, 2/503d Infantry and 4/503d Infantry moved by C-130 aircraft from BIEN HOA Airbase to an air strip at MINH THANH, completing the move by 1620 hours. Twenty-two (22) C-130 sorties were employed for the move. The infantry battalions established defensive positions and met with negative contact on this day. D/16th Armor and E/17th Cavalry conducted maintenance of their organic vehicles and set up perimeter defenses for the Brigade CP in the MINH THANH Rubber Plantation.

c. D + 2 (22 February 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: 2/11th ACR OPCON 173d Abn Bds (Sep)

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division established a Fire Support Base at Position PARRY (XT 495754), in preparation for a Brigade size assault on 23 March 1967. The 3/319th Artillery moved by CH-47 helilift from MINH THANH to Position PARRY beginning at 1040 hours and closed at 1730 hours. Forty-one personnel and equipment sorties were employed for the lift.

The 1/503d Infantry published FRAG ORDER 1 to OPORD 5-67 and a commander's staff meeting was called to discuss the implementation of the order at 1800 hours. Scheduled departure time from MINH THANH was 231342N March with the order of introduction into LZ ALPHA being C/1/503d, A/1/503d and Recon Platoon.

The 2/503d Infantry remained at MINH THANH conducting local patrolling and ambushes in addition to preparing to move to Objective PARRY on the following day. The 4/503d Infantry also continued final preparation for the assault into LZ ALPHA.

D/16th Armor and E/17th Cavalry continued to maintain defenses and conducted maintenance of vehicles.

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d. D + 3 (23 March 1967)

Changes in Task Organization: B/4/503d Infantry OPCON 2/11th ACR

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) under the OPCON of the 1st Infantry Division, conducted a Battalion size helicopter move and a two Battalion helicopter assault northwest and west of MINH THANH respectively. The 1/503d Infantry conducted a heliborne assault on LZ ALPHA (IT 488685) at 1327 hours with the last lift closing at 1415 hours. The Battalion immediately established defensive positions for the night and made preparations for a two pronged sweep to the northwest on the following day.

The 4/503d Infantry (-) also conducted a heliborne assault into LZ ALPHA employing 95 UH-1D sorties and closing at 1232 hours. The Battalion then conducted search and destroy operations to the northwest. At 1220 hours, C/1/503d Infantry received 5 rounds of s/a fire from an unknown number of hostiles at IT 487-688. Fire was returned with 1 VC KIA (poss) and one US WIA by friendly air. There was no further contact on this day reported by the 4/503d.

The 2/503d Infantry moved by helicopter to the Fire Support Base at Objective PARRY at 0900 hours. The 2/11th ACR with B/4/503d Infantry OPCON assisted in the defense of the FSB, and conducted local patrolling in and around the area. At 1730 hours, elements of G/2/11th ACR contacted an estimated 15 VC moving east at IT 470761. Artillery support was immediately called in on the enemy. The contact resulted in 2 VC KIA (BC) and negative US casualties.

At 1300 hours, a fire broke out at Position PARRY which was caused by the waste from the muzzle of a howitzer igniting a charge of an adjacent artillery piece. The fire was brought under control two hours later. Results of the accident were: from the 2/11th ACR (-) 8 WIA (one officer and seven enlisted men), 1 M-577, one (1) S. P. 155mm Howitzer and an unknown amount of ammo destroyed. One M-102 105mm Howitzer from C/3/319th Artillery received minor damage and 2 men from C/2/503d Infantry were wounded by flying shrapnel.

E/17th Cavalry and D/16th Armor continued to secure the Brigade CP at Fire Support Base DELTA (vic MINH THANH Rubber Plantation) and conducted local patrolling in zone. E/17th Cavalry (-) conducted patrols north and northwest of the CP with one contact. At 2035 hours, elements of the Cavalry Troop made contact with 2 VC at IT 625712. They pursued the enemy, however, the results were unknown. D/16th Armor and elements of E/17th Cavalry conducted local patrolling to the south and southeast without contact. Both units closed into the CP area by 1645 hours.

e. D + 4 (24 March 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY II under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division. Each Infantry Battalion of the 503d Infantry conducted air-mobile assaults into assigned AO's. The 1/503d Infantry conducted search and destroy operations to the northwest into Objective KIM. At 0930 hours, A/1/503d Infantry located and destroyed a squad size base camp at IT 487692. One hour later, C/1/503d Infantry located a battalion size base area at IT 495688 which was also destroyed

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after exploitation. At 1340 hours, Charlie Company fired on 1 VC who fled to the north. At 1405 hours, C/1/503d Infantry received an incoming claymore blast but suffered no casualties. Five minutes later, the infantrymen located a bamboo fence at XT 490696 and shortly thereafter received two additional incoming claymores resulting in 1 friendly casualty who did not require evacuation. Air strikes were called in, however, C/1/503d Infantry was not able to exploit the damage since their mission required that they return to the Battalion perimeter. The perimeter was established at XT 482701. At 1800 hours, a supply helicopter sighted 3 VC at XT 480702 and A/1/503d Infantry was dispatched to the area with negative results. A listening post from B/1/503d Infantry received one incoming grenade at 2016 hours with negative casualties reported. There were no further incidents during the night.

The 2/503d Infantry conducted an airmobile assault in Objective B-RCH beginning at 1150 hours and completed at 1400 hours. The battalion then conducted S & D operations in the area with negative contact.

The 4/503d Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in the vicinity of Objective OAK with negative contact throughout the day.

The 2/11th ACR (-) OPCON to the Brigade, continued their security mission of Objective PARRY and conducted local patrolling in and around the FSB, meeting with several enemy contacts. At 0820 hours, an APC of the 2/11th ACR (-) hit a mine at XT 504761 resulting in 1 US WIA. At 1030 hours, a tank retriever hit another mine at XT 538842 resulting in light damage to the vehicle and negative friendly casualties. At 1100 hours, a vehicle of 2/11th ACR hit an AT mine at XT 503707 resulting in light damage to the vehicle. Thirty minutes later, the armored unit made contact with 8 VC at XT 527741. The VC were taken under fire resulting in 3 VC KIA (Poss) and the location of a base camp in the area. At 1400 hours, elements of the 2/11th ACR received 2 recoilless rifle rounds and semi-automatic fire on the southwest corner of the FSB. A light fire team was dispatched to check out the area meeting with negative results. Another tank detonated an AT mine at 1530 hours with no US casualties. The perimeter of Objective PARRY received some sniper fire at 1510 hours with no casualties reported.

D/16th Armor and E/17th Cavalry continued their security missions at MINH THANH and conducted local patrolling in the CP area.

f. D + 5 (25 March 1967)

Changes in Task Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY II with heavy contact on this day. The 1/503d Infantry continued search and destroy operations in AO 1 (vic Objective ELM) uncovering several VC base camps of varying size. At 1335 hours, C/1/503d Infantry located a boobytrap and punji stakes at XT 493694. Shortly thereafter, a small base camp was located nearby containing four straw and wood buildings which were destroyed. One US casualty was sustained from a boobytrapped VC grenade, however, the casualty did not require evacuation.

From 0247 hours to 0320 hours, Company B/2/503d Infantry and C/2/503d Infantry received 40 rounds of 82mm and 81mm mortar fire at XT 445673 and received small arms fire from an estimated platoon size hostile force. Counter-mortar fire was placed on suspected firing positions and small arms fire was returned on the

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the VC platoon. Results of this action were 6 US KIA, 3 US WIA and 11 VC KIA (BC), two (2, AK-47 rifles, and a Chicom MG barrel captured. At 0900 hours, B/2/503d Infantry found 3 bodies in graves at XT 448674. The Recon Platoon of the 2d Battalion located 1 VC KIA in a B-52 crater at XT 441688. At 1105 hours, the Recon Platoon, while conducting a search and destroy operation, made contact with 6 well armed VC entrenched in bunkers at XT 441688. B/2/503d Infantry sent two platoons to reinforce the unit, in addition to airstrikes and artillery support. An aerial observer spotted the enemy mortar positions and called in artillery. The contact resulted in 1 US KIA, 3 US WIA and 4 VC KIA (BC).

The 4/503d Infantry continued search and destroy operations within AO 4 moving north toward Objective OAK. At 1115 hours, A/4/503d Infantry made contact with eight VC at XT 468694 resulting in four VC KIA (BC) and negative friendly casualties. Air strikes and artillery assisted in the action. A company size base camp was located at XT 477693 with negative findings. The camp was marked for later destruction. From 1150 hours to 1330 hours, Company D/4/503d Infantry made contact with an estimated VC squad armed with at least one light machinegun. Air and artillery were called in but were ineffective. The contact resulted in one VC KIA (BC) and two US WIA with one M-16 rifle lost. Dustoff was not available when initially called. After 1 hour and 15 minutes, the ship arrived, however, then the ship's hoist broke and casualties had to be evacuated to an LZ which took another 45 minutes. All elements closed into the harboring area at XT 465700 at 1600 hours. There was no further contact on this day.

The 2/11th ACR (-) continued security missions in the vicinity of Position PARRY. At 0244 hours, the Cavalry unit received semi-automatic fire and one recoilless rifle round at XT 496756. Fire was returned with the enemy. The results of the skirmish were 2 US WIA and one APC destroyed with 10 VC KIA (poss) and the capturing of numerous semi-automatic rounds in the area. At 1240 hours, an APC from E/2/11th ACR detonated a pressure type mine at XT 492755 resulting in 1 US WIA and light damage to the APC. At 2030 hours, E/2/11th ACR observed 3 - 4 VC at XT 479754 and engaged them with claymores and automatic weapons fire. The action resulted in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (poss) with 1 US WIA. **E/17th Cavalry with D/16th Armor conducted security missions at MINH THANH in AO 3.**

At 1745 hours, Company D/16th Armor (-) departed base camp on a mission to transport an LRRP team southwest of MINH THANH at XT 547625. At 1835 hours, the lead 3d Platoon had turned onto ROUTE 14 and headed south. At this time, the 3d Platoon took an estimated 10 to 12 enemy soldiers under fire. The enemy soldiers were dressed in green uniforms with steel helmets and LEE. They were believed to be VC Main Force or NVA, however, due to the intense volume of MG fire released by D/16th, the enemy contacted fled to the east and west. In the meantime, the 2d Platoon was sent back to secure the road junction. While the enemy retreated, one body was sighted lying in the road, but before elements could reach him, he was dragged off by his comrades. The CO requested an airstrike on the area. The Armor Company began to withdraw due to the fact that darkness was setting in and this limits the track's mobility. As D/16th Armor approached the road junction, the 3d Platoon was again fired on by an estimated 10 to 15 enemy soldiers. Again the platoon let loose with a heavy volume of fire, however, the VC again broke contact leaving 7 dead behind. The company then regrouped and proceeded to base camp. Final results were 8 VC KIA (BC) with negative US losses.

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g. D + 6 (26 March 1967)Changes in Task Force Organization: TF SPEARHEAD

E/17th Cav (-)
D/16th Armor
 2 Plts CIDG
 1 Section/4.2" Mtrs/1/503d Inf

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY II conducting search and destroy operations with three infantry battalions. At 0322 hours, three 105mm mortar rounds of unknown origin landed 75 meters in front of the 1/503d Infantry's perimeter. The rounds had negative effect. On this date, the 1st Battalion began movement towards Position PARRY traveling northwest with two columns abreast. There was negative contact during the day and the battalion established a perimeter for the night at XT 492726. At 2029 hours, a listening post of D/1/503d Infantry spotted 1 VC and activated 3 claymore mines with unknown results.

The 2/503d Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in Objective BJORN without contact. They located a few base camps and numerous supplies were found and evacuated or destroyed in place. Company "C" and the Recon Platoon provided security for the Battalion CP.

The 4/503d Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in the southeast portion of Objective OAK. Company B provided security for the Battalion CP. At 1315 hours, A/4/503d Infantry fired on one VC wearing khaki shorts and a black pajama top at XT 468695. The VC fled southeast and the area was thoroughly searched with negative results. At 1430 hours, Alpha Company received a command detonated claymore mine at XT 968694. The blast resulted in 3 US KIA and 2 US WIA. No further contact was made during the day and all units harbored at XT 465700.

The 2/11th ACR (-) Troops E and G conducted search and destroy operations south of Position PARRY. "F" Troop conducted dismounted sweeps 300-400 meters from the fire support base and around the perimeter. At 1110 hours, G/2/11th ACR fired on an unknown number of VC at XT 508732. The VC fired RPG, 2 rounds with negative results.

Company D/16th Armor moved out of the base camp area to pick up elements of E/17th Cavalry, CIDG Strike Force, and the Mortar Platoon of 1/503d Infantry (TF SPEARHEAD) and then moved along ROUTE 13 and conducted S & D operations north and south of the road, southwest of FSB "D". At 1005 hours, the TF intercepted an enemy supply convoy. The material confiscated was 9 bicycles, 100 pounds of concho material, 100 pair of black trousers, 100 pounds of polished rice, assorted packages of bread and tobacco and 50 pounds of suspension tools. The 3/319th Artillery continued to support the Brigade Operations from Position PARRY.

h. D + 7 (27 March 1967)Changes in Task Organization: 2/11th ACR OPCON to 1/503d Inf

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY II under the OPCON of the 1st Infantry Division. The 1/503d Infantry continued movement north toward Position PARRY closing at that location at 1510 hours. Upon arrival, the Battalion deployed to provide

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perimeter security for the 3/319th Artillery. At 1630 hours, the 2/11th ACR came under the OPCON of the 1st Battalion. At 2349 hours, 1 VC was sighted and engaged with small arms fire and a claymore mine by A/1/503d Infantry.

The 2/503d Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in and around Objective BIRCH in AO 2. At 1250 hours, A/2/503d Infantry made contact with an enemy element when a scout dog spotted 1 VC. The enemy soldier fled into a bunker. Fire was exchanged and grenades were thrown by elements of Alpha Company. The action resulted in 1 US WIA and 2 VC KIA (BC).

The 4/503d Infantry continued S & D operations within AO 4 in the vicinity of Objective OAK. Having departed the base camp at 0920 hours, B/4/503d Infantry located an old platoon to company size base camp at XT 464704, 75% of which had been destroyed by B-52 strikes. At 1705 hours, D/4/503d Infantry spotted 2 VC at XT 470692. The two VC were engaged with semi-automatic fire resulting in the death (BC) of one of the enemy. Company C's LZ security squad detonated one AT mine at XT 468702 resulting in one US KIA and one US WIA. No further contact was made on this day.

D/16th Armor and E/17th Cavalry continued to provide security of the Brigade CP at Fire Support Base "D" (XT 460675).

1. D + 8 (28 March 1967)

Changes in Task Organization: 2/11th ACR released OPCON 1/503d Inf

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY, OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division. At 0003 hours, Position PARRY sustained a mortar attack of 10 minute duration, receiving an estimated 100 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Friendly casualties were 16 WIA. Counter-mortar fire was initiated by the 3/319th Artillery, 2/11th ACR and organic mortars of the 1/503d Infantry at 0018 hours. Dustoff ships were summoned to the scene and the evacuation of wounded personnel (6 required evacuation) was completed at 0120 hours. The 1/503d Infantry continued to secure Position PARRY for the 3/319th Artillery. At 0800 hours, the 2/11th ACR was released OPCON of the 1/503d Infantry and departed the area. At this time, the 1st Battalion began to consolidate its perimeter and conducted local perimeter patrolling. At 1340 hours, C/1/503d Infantry sighted and fired on 2 VC at XT 488754. The enemy fled west. At 1440 hours, a FAC sighted a suspected VC base camp at XT 537730. The Battalion planned H & I fires for the area. At 1820 hours, the 1/503d Infantry withdrew its security elements from the eastern LZ and closed the perimeter for the night.

The 2/503d Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in Objective BIRCH in AO 2. B/2/503d Infantry operated in the southern portion of the objective while Charlie Company operated in the west. There was no significant contact on this day.

The 4/503d Infantry continued search and destroy operations within AO 4, vicinity of Objective OAK. Throughout the day, the 4th Battalion made numerous discoveries of rice, weapons, bicycles and parts, and assorted tools. All of the equipment located appeared to be brand new and many items were still crated. At 1505 hours, C/4/503d Infantry made contact with a VC force of unknown size at XT 447703. Charlie Company took one casualty as a result of the contact (WIA) with enemy losses unknown. Fifteen minutes later, C/4/503d Infantry again made contact with a VC force (estimated 30 - 40 enemy). Artillery, airstrikes and a light fire team were called in on the enemy with unknown results. At 1700 hours, D/4/503d Infantry found a base camp at XT 464692 consisting of several huts, in which were found several claymore mines, grenades, miscellaneous documents and assorted s/a

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rounds. At 1640 hours, B/4/503d Infantry initiated movement to secure the cache. At 1800 hours, Bravo Company received automatic fire from their right flank. The contact lasted until 1920 hours and the company took 4 WIA with enemy losses unknown. Dustoff was not required at that time since the casualties were not of evacuation status.

D/16th Armor conducted a recon mission to the south of MINH THANH. The Armor Company closed into FSB "D" at 1215 hours with negative contact reported. E/17th Cavalry continued its security mission of the Brigade CP at Fire Support Base "D" (vic MINH THANH Rubber Plantation).

j. D + 9 (29 March 1967)Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), under the OPCON of the 1st Infantry Division, continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY II. The 1/503d Infantry continued their security mission in the vicinity of Fire Support Base PARRY, conducting small unit patrolling around the FSB perimeter. The sole contact of the day occurred at 2200 hours when Company A received one incoming semi-automatic round. Fire was returned with unknown results.

The 2/503d Infantry also met with no significant enemy contact as they conducted search and destroy operations in the vicinity of Objective BIRCH. All companies closed into the Battalion CP (XT 449677) for the evening.

The 4/503d Infantry continued search and destroy operations within AO 4, vicinity of Objective OAK with concentration on an area where a possible VC warehouse was located. At 0415 hours, Company D/4/503d Infantry reported three US WIA due to 81mm mortar fire which was supporting friendly forces who had reported suspected movement in the vicinity. At 1335 hours, C/4/503d Infantry made contact with an unknown number of VC fighting from bunkers at XT 445702. The VC were engaged with artillery and air resulting in one (1) VC KIA (B1) and 1 US WIA (who died later of wounds). C/4/503d Infantry sent a patrol back into the area of contact but the element was unable to check it out due to the time factor. As they returned, they hit a boobytrap, resulting in one WIA (XT 446703). At 2120 hours, Bravo Company, 4th Battalion reported that one of its LP's had spotted two VC moving across their flanks, 15 - 20 meters out. The VC were engaged with results unknown. At 2230 hours B/4/503d Infantry fired one claymore after an LP detected movement. The results of the claymore were unknown and the Battalion had no further contact on this day.

D/16th Armor and E/17th Cavalry continued to secure the Brigade CP in the vicinity of the MINH THANH Rubber Plantation.

k. D + 10 (30 March 1967)Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY II. The 1/503d Infantry continued to improve defensive positions and to conduct local patrolling in assigned AO. All units of the 1/503d Infantry established daylight ambushes in the vicinity of the LZ with negative contact. At 2055 hours at XT 493750, A/1/503d Infantry's night ambush

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received 2 incoming mortar rounds from the southeast. At 2335 hours, the element reported another round of small caliber mortar fire. There were no friendly casualties and A/1/503d Infantry returned the fire with 81mm mortars.

Companies A and B of the 2/503d Infantry patrolled from the Battalion Base Area (XT 447676) into the northwest portion of Objective BIRCH meeting with negative enemy contact during the day.

The 4/503d Infantry continued search and destroy operations within AO 4. Companies A and D/4/503d Infantry closed out the old CP area and moved to the Company B and C location (vicinity of VC storage site) and established a new CP in that location. B/4/503d Infantry located a bunker system at XT 454701 with some live ducks and pigs. C/4/503d Infantry found one M-16 rifle with blood on the weapon, .300 pounds of rice, salt, pepper and 6 - 8 hand grenades at ST 448702. All Battalion elements closed to the new CP location by 1530 hours.

The 1st Platoon of D/16th Armor had the mission of picking up an LRRP team north of MINH THANH at vic XT 613724. This mission had to be abandoned however, since an impassable stream located at XT 622714 lay in the path of the armored tracks. The stream was reconned to the north and south, however, no suitable point of passage could be located. The 1st Platoon returned to the vicinity of the Brigade CP at 1023 hours. The 2d and 3d Platoons of D/16th Armor conducted a thorough screening maneuver throughout the MINH THANH Rubber Plantation meeting with negative results. E/17th Cavalry maintained security in the Brigade CP area throughout the day.

1. D + 11 (31 March 1967)Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY II. An ambush patrol of A/1/503d Infantry received one incoming rifle grenade at 0013 hours. There were no friendly casualties and fire was returned with 81mm mortars with unknown results. The 1st Battalion continued to secure Position PARRY in support of 3/319th Artillery. Line companies patrolled the perimeter with platoon and larger sized elements with negative contact. At 1425 hours, the Battalion was placed on a one hour alert for possible movement to XT 430855 to support elements of the 1st Infantry Division (1/26th Infantry). All units were instructed to call in their patrols to prepare for the move on order. The 1/503d Infantry remained on alert for the remainder of the day.

At 0715 hours, Companies B and C/2/503d Infantry commenced movement to LZ 1 (XT 433695), conducting search and destroy operations enroute. Upon arrival, they secured the LZ and the 4.2" Mortar Platoon was moved by helicopter to the Landing Zone. Company A departed LZ CHARLIE and closed at LZ 1 at 1555 hours without incident.

The 4/503d Infantry continued operations in the vicinity of Objective OAK. At 0950 hours, B/4/503d Infantry located two boobytraps and fresh punji pits at XT 447701. All were destroyed in place. Company C/4/503d Infantry disarmed and destroyed one boobytrap at XT 445702. Two hours later, Bravo Company received one long artillery round at XT 455698 which resulted in 3 US WIA, two of which required immediate penetrator extraction. At 1440 hours, B/4/503d Infantry arrived at the area of contact of 26 March. They disarmed and destroyed five 60mm mortar rounds and three Chicom grenades rigged as boobytraps in addition to finding six additional Chicom grenades, two M-16 rifles, two rucksacks, a medical kit and an "L"-shaped bunker with overhead cover. All elements closed by 1800 hours with no further contact reported.

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D/16th Armor continued to conduct a roving patrol within the Rubber Plantation, to include security of the Brigade CP and FSB with E/17th Cavalry. At 0900 hours, D/16th Armor was alerted to pick up an LRRP team at vicinity of grid coordinates 6270. This was undertaken by two elements of the 1st Platoon. There was negative enemy contact throughout the day.

m. D + 12 (1 April 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY II on this date. The 1/503d Infantry continued to secure Position PARRY. At 0720 hours, the Battalion was again placed on immediate alert to move northwest to support elements of the 1st Infantry Division. At 1300 hours, the 1/503d Infantry was relieved of the immediate alert status and again was placed on a one hour alert which continued for the rest of this date. At 2210 hours, an LP of A/1/503d Infantry suffered one WIA from friendly mortar fire. The man did not require evacuation.

The 2/503d Infantry conducted platoon size patrolling from the Battalion base area at XT 434695 north of Objective BIRCH. At 1152 hours, C/2/503d made contact with an estimated VC squad while conducting search and destroy operations in the vicinity of XT 426701. Air strikes and artillery supported the contact which broke at 1730 hours. There were 2 US WIA and 1 VC KIA (BC) as a result of the action.

The 4/503d Infantry moved from Objective OAK to a position in the vicinity of XT 461711 conducting search and destroy operations enroute. The battalion was proceeding to Objective FIR. At 1300 hours, Company A/4/503d Infantry hit a boobytrap at XT 457711, wounding three (3) individuals, two of which had to be evacuated. All elements closed at a harbor site by 1530 hours and ambush patrols were dispatched, meeting with negative contact.

D/16th Armor and E/17th Cavalry continued to provide security for the Brigade CP in the vicinity of MINH THANH Rubber Plantation.

n. D + 13 (2 April 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued operations in the vicinity of MINH THANH, under the OPCON of the 1st Infantry Division. The 1/503d Infantry continued to secure Position PARRY. At 0006 hours and at 0409 hours, the 1/503d Infantry received SLAR reports of movement at XT 430745, XT 437737, and XT 477758. The 1/503d Infantry fired organic mortars and Artillery into the suspected areas with unknown results. During the day, Company C and the Recon Platoon/1/503d Infantry secured the fire support base while Company A patrolled southwest of Position PARRY and B/1/503d Infantry patrolled south of the FSB on the western side of ROUTE 244. There was negative contact throughout the day.

The 2/503d Infantry conducted S & D operations from the Battalion base located at XT 433695 with Companies B and C/2/503d Infantry. The two Infantry companies patrolled to the southern edge of Objective ASH. At 1212 hours, Company "C" sustained 2 WIA as a result of an activated booby trap at XT 427709. While A/2/503d

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Infantry was returning to the FSB, they received automatic weapons fire resulting in 1 US WIA. A Dustoff helicopter trying to evacuate the wounded man received 7 hits and was grounded at the Battalion FSB with negative casualties.

The 4/503d Infantry continued to operate within AO 4 moving north to Objective PIR. At 0905 hours, C/4/503d Infantry received one sniper round resulting in 1 US WIA (XT 462713). Fire was and soon followed by friendly air and artillery support. The action resulted in two (2) VC KIA (BC), killed by air as their bodies were located later that afternoon by Companies B and C. A/4/503d Infantry detonated a boobytrap at XT 461700 resulting in four US WIA. There were no further significant contacts on this day.

D/16th Armor and E/17th Cavalry continued to provide security on the Brigade CP at Fire Support Base DELTA.

o. D + 14 (1 April 1967)Changes in Task Force Organization:

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade continued to participate in Operation JUNCTION CITY II under the OPON of the 1st Infantry Division. The 1/503d Infantry continued to secure Position PARRY and C/1/503d Infantry and the Recon Platoon conducted daylight patrols to the south. At 1320 hours, Recon Platoon found a VC base camp at XT 513732 consisting of seven bunkers with overhead cover. Medical supplies, tools, bicycle parts and cooking utensils were found in the area, all of which was destroyed. At 1427 hours, Recon Platoon/1/503d Infantry made contact with an estimated enemy squad at XT 574733 who were employing automatic weapons from dug-in positions. The Platoon immediately called in air strikes which commenced at 1512 hours and lasted for over a half hour. After the Recon Platoon had initiated movement back to their base area, they again came under fire at XT 513732 from an enemy force of squad size in bunkers. Two friendly WIA were suffered. Artillery was called in on the enemy as the Platoon withdrew. At 1725 hours, the casualties were evacuated by Dustoff helicopter and the unit continued movement to Position PARRY. A platoon from both Alpha and Bravo Companies were dispatched to help secure the return route of Recon Platoon. At 1840 hours, Recon/1/503d Infantry again was subjected to automatic weapons fire at XT 513723 from an estimated squad of dug-in VC. One WIA was sustained as a result of the contact. The Platoon was not able to break contact, therefore, they established a perimeter for the night at this location. Two air strikes were put into the area. At 1925 hours, A/1/503d Infantry was ordered to link up with Recon Platoon. The perimeter of Position PARRY was strengthened by 50 men of 3/319th Artillery. At 2200 hours, a Dustoff ship attempting to evacuate casualties received heavy automatic weapons fire and made a forced landing at Position PARRY. At 2100 hours, A/1/503d Infantry linked up with the two platoons and continued to move to link up with Recon Platoon.

The 2/503d Infantry moved overland to LZ 2 (XT 435722). Companies A and B moved at 0830 hours and secured the LZ for movement of the 4.2" Mortar Platoon and Battalion HQ by air at 1225 hours. C/2/503d Infantry followed the Headquarters element by ground movement. The 2/503d Infantry continued to conduct S & D operations in assigned AO. At 1310 hours, C/2/503d Infantry received 35 - 40 rounds of semi-automatic fire, 2 claymores and 6 rifle grenades, all with negative results. At 1425 hours, Alpha Company received a command detonated claymore resulting in two (2) US WIA.

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The 4/503d Infantry continued operations in AO 4 with all companies deploying platoon size patrols on search and destroy missions. At 1150 hours, B/4/503d Infantry located a 200 meter trench system (XT 450726) with one bunker which was destroyed. All elements closed into the Battalion perimeter by 1500 hours with negative contact.

D/16th Armor, OPCON to E/17th Cavalry departed base camp to pick up elements of E/17th Cavalry, Mortar Platoon/4/503d Infantry and a CIDG Strike Force (composite forces - TF SPEARHEAD) to conduct a recon and S & D mission to the southwest of MINH THANH. At 0715 hours, the Mortar Platoon and a 10-man CIDG party were positioned at XT 596655 to establish a FSB. At 0745 hours, an APC from the 2d Platoon of D/16th Armor hit an anti-tank mine at vic XT 548646. E/17th Cavalry immediately dismounted to secure the area. This AT mine resulted in 3 US WIA, one of whom required evacuation. In the meantime, a mine detector was brought forth to clear an LZ so that a Dustoff could be executed. While checking the area, an additional mine was uncovered approximately 25 meters in front of the damaged vehicle. As the 1st Platoon of D/16th Armor was moving up to secure the right side of the road, one of their tracks hit a mine. This resulted in one WIA which had to be evacuated also, however, Dustoff could not be executed since the LZ had still not been cleared. E/17th Cavalry therefore sent out patrols to the west and south and CIDG elements began to move north to recon. At 0930 hours, the 1st Platoon/E/17th Cavalry made contact with an estimated 3 to 6 VC at XT 545627. Fire was exchanged with small arms, mortars and air strikes resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). The enemy broke contact and fled to the south. The Cavalry Troop (-) continued to patrol and found a base camp at XT 532629 with 35 bunkers. It was estimated to be approximately six to eight months old. At the southern edge of the camp, three small kitchens were found. As the Cavalry Troop began to withdraw to the 81mm mortar position, again contact with the enemy was established at XT 546622 with the hostile force estimated at squad size. The VC were believed to have been equipped with two automatic weapons. Again fire was exchanged and reinforcements were sent in to aid the Troopers. The enemy finally broke contact and fled southeast. There were no US casualties and VC losses were unknown. All elements closed at XT 548646 and began to move back to MINH THANH, completing the move without incident at 1700 hours.

p. D + 15 (4 April 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY II in WAR ZONE "C" under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division. Company A/1/503d Infantry affected a linkup with Recon Platoon/1/503d Infantry at 0450 hours. At 0610 hours, the composite unit conducted a "sound off" which touched off incoming semi-automatic and automatic fire from the north and northwest. At 0830 hours, the Battalion CO's helicopter picked up the Recon Platoon's serious casualty and took him to Position PARRY for MEDIVAC. Companies B and C/1/503d Infantry continued to secure Position PARRY while A/1/503d Infantry and Recon Platoon conducted S & D operations back toward the Battalion CP. At 0945 hours, two air strikes were placed on the sites of the previous day's action. Strikes were terminated at 1030 hours. At 1300 hours, A/1/503d Infantry located a battalion size base camp at XT 515736. In the camp were found tools and medical supplies which were evacuated. At 1409 hours, Alpha Company found three graves at ST 513734 which contained the bodies of VC who had apparently been killed by air strikes conducted three days prior. At XT 505743, A/1/503d Infantry located a battalion size base camp which had not been used in several months. The composite Company

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closed at Position PARRY at 1645 hours. At 1912 hours, the Fire Support Base came under mortar attack from the north-northwest. The barrage lasted 20 minutes, during which time approximately 150 82mm mortar rounds were received. At 1916 hours, counter mortar fire from organic mortars and artillery from Position THRUST began. The 1/503d suffered a total of 6 WIA, to include 3 slightly WIA incurred by 81mm mortar round charges igniting prematurely in the tube.

The 2/503d Infantry conducted S & D operations from their Battalion base area with platoons from Companies A, B, and Recon Platoon. At 0955 hours, A/2/503d Infantry received one grenade, 25 rounds of s/a fire and two claymore mines from an estimated enemy squad at XT 436720. Fire was returned with artillery, air-strikes and small arms resulting in one VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (poes).

The 4/503d Infantry continued to search the area within AO 4 moving toward Objective FIR. All elements closed into harbor site (XT 443754) by 1430 hours having met with negative contact. At 1600 hours, B/4/503d Infantry located a base camp with 45 bunkers at XT 442754. From 1935 hours to 1945 hours, an ambush patrol from A/4/503d Infantry engaged a number of VC which resulted in the confirmed death of one, and one VC KIA (poes). No further contact was made on this day.

E/17th Cavalry and D/16th Armor continued to secure the Brigade CP in the vicinity of MINH THANH without significant contact.

q. D + 16 (5 April 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organisation: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) under the OPCON of the 1st Division, continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY II in WAR ZONE "C". The 1/503d Infantry continued to secure Position PARRY in support of the 3/319th Artillery. B/1/503d Infantry patrolled to the southwest. At 1320 hours, Bravo Company located several freshly used bunkers with overhead cover at XT 488727. One VC was spotted at this location, taken under fire and killed (NC). Artillery was placed at XT 490729 and B/1/503d Infantry moved in to check the area, receiving semi-automatic and automatic fire. The infantry sustained one WIA and air strikes were called. Company B was directed to return to Position PARRY and closed at 1753 hours.

The 2/503d Infantry continued search and destroy operations in AO 2 with Companies A, C, and Recon Platoon patrolling north, east and south of the Battalion Base Camp. They located and destroyed several enemy base camps, however, significant enemy contact was not established.

The 4/503d Infantry continued operations within AO 4 in the vicinity of Objective FIR. At 1030 hours, Company B located an old base camp at XT 446756. Company A clearing patrol located one dead VC and an AK-47 rifle as a result of the ambush sprung by elements of Alpha Company on the previous night. An LZ clearing team from the 1st Division spent the day clearing the LZ in preparation for extraction on 8 April. All Battalion elements were closed into the base perimeter by 1620 hours. There was no further contact.

At 1640 hours, the Command and Control helicopter of the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry with the Battalion commander and S3 aboard spotted two VC at XT 452704. Jointly, the Battalion CO, S3 and door gunner opened fire resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC).

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At 1500 hours, the Commanding General while flying over an enemy base camp at XT 545696 observed movement. Artillery was adjusted and placed in the area by the CG, resulting in 3 enemy being killed by artillery.

Between 2330 hours to 0015 hours, the Brigade Command Post at MINH THANH received 30 - 40 incoming rounds of 82mm mortars. Counter mortar fire was placed into suspected enemy firing areas with unknown results. During the incident, 5 paratroopers received wounds and three were evacuated for further medical treatment.

r. D + 17 (6 April 1967)Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY. The 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry continued their security mission of Position PARRY while Companies A and B patrolled to the south. At 1016 hours, A/1/503d Infantry directed planned air strikes on XT 512722. The company subsequently entered a previously located base camp at XT 512728 and found 6 new model bicycles with "Hands Across the Sea" markings and one 1.5 KW generator of German manufacture. All equipment was evacuated. At 1516 hours, B/1/503d Infantry sustained 1 WIA from a VC boobytrapped grenade at XT 492730. At 1600 hours, B/1/503d Infantry reported entering a base camp in the same vicinity and located several blood trails. Artillery and air strikes were reported to have been effective. At 1725 hours, Bravo Company had their casualty extracted by Dustoff at XT 492730. Alpha and Bravo Companies were closed at Position PARRY by 1845 hours.

The 2/503d Infantry began dislocation north of Objective ASH at 0730 hours. Company C and the Recon Platoon remained at the old position and provided security for the 4.2" mortars. The mortar tubes were lifted to this location (LZ 3, XT 472745), however the personnel remained with the Battalion. Company C and Recon Platoon moved north and joined the Battalion (-) closing at 1500 hours. There was negative contact throughout the day.

The 4/503d Infantry continued S & D operations within AO 4 in the vicinity of Objective FIR. At 1135 hours, A/4/503d Infantry spotted seven VC and fired on them with negative results at XT 427776. Charlie Company located four bunkers with overhead cover and several unused trails. At 2335 hours, two mortar rounds of unknown origin landed 500 meters from the Battalion perimeter. No further contact was reported.

On 6 April 1967, D/16th Armor (-) with 2 Platoons of E/17th Cavalry moved out to recon southeast of MINH THANH. The 1st Platoon of D/16th Armor was sent with one platoon of E/17th Cavalry to recon in the vicinity of XT 058654 and upon completion of the move, were able to link up with the remainder of the Cav/Armor elements. This plan had to be aborted, however, since CIDG elements were working in the area. At 1100 hours, D/16th Armor picked up four individuals (1 VN man and 3 women) who were coming from the east on ROUTE 13. They were checked for ID cards and searched. Upon returning to the Brigade CP, the 4 individuals were turned over to the 173d MP's for future interrogation.

s. D + 18 (7 April 1967)Changes in Task Organization: None

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Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY II. The 1/503d Infantry continued their security mission of Position PARRY with C/1/503d Infantry and Recon/1/503d Infantry patrolling from the perimeter. Throughout the day, the 1/503d Infantry made numerous discoveries of enemy fortified areas, consisting mostly of bunkers, many with overhead cover. At 1407 hours, C/1/503d Infantry took two VC under fire at XT 478757. The VC fled east.

The 2/503d Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in the vicinity of Objective ASH with Company A in the northwest, Company B in the northeast and Charlie Company providing security for the Battalion CP. There was negative enemy contact throughout the day, and the Battalion harbored at XT 422796.

The 4/503d Infantry continued search and destroy operations in the vicinity of Objective FIR. Company B and D initiated movement at 0915 hours and at 0935 hours respectively. Company A and Company C/4/503d Infantry assumed the security of the Battalion perimeter. At 1030 hours, Company E reported detonating one boobytrap at XT 443766 resulting in 1 US KIA and 7 US WIA. Dustoff was completed at 1223 hours. Company D/4/503d Infantry found two bunkers and four CBU's at XT 454759 and destroyed them in place. At 1605 hours, Bravo Company sighted four VC at XT 443764 and fired on the enemy with unknown results. At 1623 hours, B/4/503d Infantry reported receiving heavy semi-automatic and automatic weapons fire from the same vicinity, resulting in one US WIA. Contact lasted until 1900 hours. At 1815 hours, C/4/503d Infantry received three s/a rounds into their perimeter. Fifteen minutes later, D/4/503d Infantry initiated movement from the Battalion perimeter to link up with Bravo Company, completing the move at 1900 hours. At 2130 hours, A/4/503d Infantry reported movement to the north, pulled LP's back and fired claymores with unknown results. There was no further contact made by the 4th Battalion.

3/17th Cavalry and D/16th Armor continued to provide security for FSB DELTA and patrolled to the north and east without contact with the enemy.

t. D + 19 (8 April 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organisation: B/4/503d Inf OPCON Bde HQ

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY II under the OPCON of the 1st Infantry Division. At 0130 hours, an ambush site of Recon/1/503d Infantry suffered one friendly KIA. One patrol member got up from his position and walked to another position in the area. He was challenged by another patrol member who received no answer. He fired one round and heard nothing more. The friendly KIA was discovered at the first light of morning. The 1/503d Infantry continued to secure the FSB at Position PARRY. At 1045 hours, a preplanned airstrike was delivered at XT 490728. There were no significant contacts made on this date.

The 2/503d Infantry continued to conduct S & D operations in Objective ASH. Companies A and B operated in the north and Charlie Company was in the south. At 1110 hours, C/2/503d Infantry spotted 2 VC in the vicinity of XT 413742. The company fired on the VC who fled. Artillery was called in and the contact resulted in two VC KIA (BC). Contact was reestablished at 1215 hours with an estimated VC squad in the same vicinity. A platoon was sent to reinforce the platoon in contact. Results of the second contact were 3 US KIA and 3 US WIA. All elements of the Battalion harbored for the night at XT 423752.

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The 4/503d Infantry continued operations in the vicinity of Objective FIR. B/4/503d Infantry moved by air to FSB "D" and then moved by vehicle to FSB ROCK to secure one battery of artillery at XT 607683. Upon arrival at FSB "D" (MINH THANH), Bravo Company became OPCON to Brigade. A/4/503d Infantry secured the Battalion perimeter while Charlie Company moved north on S & D operations to the area of contact of 7 April. At 0756 hours, D/4/503d Infantry initiated movement from their harbor site (XT 443761) closing at the Battalion perimeter at 0900 hours. At 0815 hours, B/4/503d Infantry departed the base area for Position ROCK (via FSB "D"). At 0940 hours, C/4/503d Infantry initiated movement north finding punji pits at XT 443-764. At 1240 hours, C/4/503d Infantry made contact at XT 444765 with an estimated VC squad resulting initially in 2 US WIA. The enemy was equipped with 4 automatic weapons. Contact was broken at 1330 hours with three US WIA (total) and one KIA. Air and artillery supported the contact. At 1425 hours, one WIA died. After subsequent airstrikes, C/4/503d Infantry moved through the contact area finding one VC (KBA) and one AK-47 rifle. There were no further contacts on this day.

E/17th Cavalry and D/16th Armor continued to provide security for FSB DELTA. The Cavalry Troop cleared the road for convoys between the Brigade CP and FSB ROCK. A/3/319th Artillery was helilifted from Position PARRY to FSB "D" and then moved to Position ROCK by road. The Battery was in position by 1540 hours.

u. D + 20 (9 April 1967)

Changes in Task Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY II this date. The 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry displaced from Position PARRY to the southeast in two elements. At 0810 hours, Alpha Company, HQ (-) and Recon Platoon departed FSB PARRY. At 1016 hours, A Company and Recon Platoon received an incoming carbine round at XT 509742. Artillery was called in. At 1215 hours, the same element located a base camp at XT 528748 containing several bunkers, spider holes and a hut with thatched roof. At 1500 hours, 3/319th Artillery (-) completely cleared Position PARRY with the Battalion CP, Bravo and Charlie Companies of the 1st Battalion and commenced movement towards a position located at XT 523741. At 1755 hours, the 1st Battalion consolidated at this position for the night. At 1758 hours, the 1/503d Infantry received approximately 5 incoming rifle grenades. One VC was observed east of the perimeter and was taken under fire with semi-automatic and M-79 weapons. The VC fled southeast. Two US WIA were sustained as a result of the action and were evacuated on a LOC helicopter.

The 2/503d Infantry commenced a heliborne assault from LZ 3 to LZ ROBERT (XT 512663) at 1122 hours. The LZ was prepared with 105 and 155mm artillery and TAC Air. At 1143 hours, the first lift with elements of Company A landed on LZ ROBERT. The first lift was composed of twenty ships and included the Recon Platoon and elements of the Mortar Platoon. As elements of A/2/503d Infantry moved out of the perimeter to the east, they received fire from an estimated reinforced squad. One man was wounded immediately and fell in front of the bunkers from which fire was issuing. Artillery could not be delivered on the enemy positions due to the close proximity of the wounded. The remainder of the 2/503d Infantry was diverted to MINH THANH since the LZ was not considered secure for landing. At 1525 hours, they were again helilifted to the LZ. Sniper fire continued in the vicinity of contact until 1715 hours. TAC Air was finally delivered and artillery support was used throughout the afternoon. In addition, CS in powdered form was dispensed with a Mighty Mite. Results of the contact were 4 US KIA, 17 US WIA and 5 VC KIA (RC).

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The 4/503d Infantry (-) conducted an extraction from an LZ located at XT 445754 (vic Objective FIR), to Fire Support Base DELTA and moved by road to FSB ROCK. Order of extraction was HHC, Companies A, C, then D. At 0822 hours, C/4/503d Infantry received one short artillery round resulting in five US WIA. Dustoff was completed at 0840 hours. At 0855 hours, 4/503d Infantry (-) commenced extraction using four slicks per lift. During the move, enemy activity was reported 500 meters to the south. The area was suppressed with gun ships with unknown results. All elements were closed at FSB ROCK (XT 607683) at 1038 hours. The companies then issued platoon size clearing patrols which met with negative contact.

E/17th Cavalry and D/16th Armor continued to provide security for the Brigade Command Post at FSB DELTA.

v. D + 21 (10 April 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade continued to participate in Operation JUNCTION CITY II this date under the Operational Control of the 1st Infantry Division. The 1/503d Infantry continued to search and destroy south towards Objective SAND. Company A departed the Battalion perimeter first and at 0815 hours, they took five VC under fire at XT 520740. The enemy fled to the west and artillery was called into the area. Forty minutes later, a scout of A/1/503d Infantry suffered three casualties from enemy fire at the same vicinity. Contact was made in an old base camp containing bunkers, huts and trenches. At 0908 hours, contact was broken when artillery was called in. Results of the skirmish were 2 US WIA and 1 VC KIA (BC). Alpha Company's casualties were evacuated by Dustoff at 0950 hours. C/1/503d Infantry engaged 4 VC armed with s/a weapons at XT 525737. The VC fled south with unknown results. At 1035 hours, Alpha Company located the bodies of 2 VC killed by air at XT 521733. Throughout the morning, the Battalion made contact several times with small groups (1 or 2) of VC, however, on each occasion, the enemy fled before substantial fire could be placed upon them. At 1605 hours, C/1/503d Infantry engaged 2 Viet Cong on a bicycle and placed fire on them, claiming 1 VC KIA (BC) and the bicycle. The action took place at XT 524720. The 1st Battalion consolidated for the night at XT 523709.

The 2/503d Infantry initiated movement from LZ ROBERT (XT 510669) toward Objective DUST. At 1120 hours, A/2/503d Infantry located a bunker complex at XT 519671 where they received sniper fire from an unknown number of Viet Cong. Contact was broken, however, with unknown results. At 1140 hours, Bravo Company received sniper fire from XT 519676. Charlie Company of the 2d Battalion moved west to maneuver the enemy left flank. At 1215 hours, Charlie Company entered the base camp, however, contact was not broken for an hour and 15 minutes. There were two friendly WIA as a result of the action. The battalion harbored for the night at XT 520678.

The 4/503d Infantry continued search and destroy operations in the vicinity of Position ROCK issuing platoon size patrols of Companies A, B, and C. At 0941 hours, Company D dispatched a squad size patrol, but due to a Brigade alert, the patrol returned at 1043 hours. In view of intelligence indicating a VC attack on MINH THANH, Company D/4/503d Infantry with the 81mm Mortar Platoon from Alpha Company was attached to E/17th Cavalry, arriving at FSB ENITI at 1240 hours. All units closed the Battalion perimeter by 1600 hours. No further contact was reported.

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On this date, the 3d Platoon of D/16th Armor was sent to clear the road from MINH THANH to FSB ROCK for convoys moving to and from the Fire Support Base. At 1300 hours, the 3d Platoon was relieved by the Brigade MP's. A report from S2 was received at this time that the Viet Cong were planning an attack, therefore, all elements of D/16th Armor returned to the CP and set up defenses at XT 638-670. E/17th Cavalry remained at the Brigade CP in readiness for possible enemy offensives.

w. D + 22 (11 April 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: None

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade, OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division, continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY II conducting S & D operations in Objective DUST and north of Objective SAND. The 1/503d Infantry remained at XT 523709 base area this date and conducted search and destroy and patrolling operations in AO SAND. At 0917 hours, a platoon of C/1/503d Infantry spotted 1 VC at XT 525718. The Viet Cong fled southeast and 81mm mortars were fired into the area. Beginning at 1015 hours, the first of two preplanned airstrikes were delivered at XT 517718. At 1032 hours, another VC was spotted by elements of Alpha Company. The enemy soldier fled west when taken under fire. At 1050 hours, the second planned air strike was completed and Alpha Company continued to move toward the base camp located on 10 April. At 1240 hours, the first elements of the 2/503d Infantry closed at the 1/503d Infantry's perimeter in preparation for air movement from that location on 12 April. By 1600 hours, Company A entered the air strike area finding a fresh grave. There was only minimal damage to the bunkers in the enemy base area. Twenty minutes later, one of A/1/503d Infantry's elements came under fire from 5 VC employing automatic and semi-automatic weapons from trees. Contact was not broken for an hour and twenty-five minutes owing to the enemy sniping activity. There were 2 US KIA, 6 US WIA and 1 VC KIA (EC) as a result of the contact. "A" Company was advised by a Command and Liaison ship to proceed to an LZ to the east for extraction of wounded personnel, however, mechanical difficulties were experienced with the Dust-off aircraft and the extraction was finally accomplished by the C and L ship. Artillery was called into the contact area and illumination was fired as a navigational aid to the paratroopers. The Company closed at the Battalion position at 2355 hours.

The 2/503d Infantry moved from their harbor position of the previous night to LZ WILLIAM. They closed the LZ at 1230 hours without further contact. The battalion conducted search and destroy operations enroute and located and destroyed several small base camps and small amounts of supplies. At 1300 hours, the Battalion HQ element and A/2/503d Infantry located a fresh grave at XT 522696 containing a dead VC. The Battalion harbored approximately 250 meters from the 1st Battalion.

The 4/503d Infantry (-) continued security of FSB ROCK with local patrolling. All patrols had departed the Battalion Base Area by 1010 hours and returned by 1600 hours meeting with negative contact. At 1621 hours, C/4/503d Infantry received two incoming mortar or rifle grenades landing 50 meters to the front of their perimeter. Patrols were sent to investigate, however, they made no contact with the enemy.

D/16th Armor and E/17th Cavalry continued their security mission at the Brigade CP.

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x. D + 23 (12 April 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: B& C/1/503d Inf OPCON E/17th Cav

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade continued Operation JUNCTION CITY II in WARZONE C, OPCON to the 1st Division. The 1/503d Infantry lifted behind the 2/503d Infantry from LZ WILLIAM to vicinity of MINH THANH with the first lift departing at 1059 hours and the last lift closing MINH THANH at 1616 hours. At 1530 hours, Bravo and Charlie Companies of the 1st Battalion became OPCON to E/17th Cavalry and subsequently moved out to assist in securing HIGHWAY 245. The Battalion CP was located at XT 663847.

On this date, the 2/503d Infantry was extracted from LZ WILLIAM and moved by helicopter to MINH THANH where it assumed the responsibility of securing the 173d Airborne Brigade Headquarters and the BSOC.

The 4/503d Infantry continued security of FSB ROCK with local patrolling. Companies A, B, and C/4/503d Infantry conducted platoon size patrols within their sectors, with all elements departing at 1030 hours and closed by 1500 hours. They met with negative contact. At 2005 hours, an ambush platoon spotted movement at XT 594678. 81mm mortars were fired with unknown results. There was no further contact reported by the 4th Battalion.

E/17th Cavalry and D/16th Armor departed MINH THANH at 1000 hours to clear HIGHWAY 245 to HIGHWAY 13 and escorted a convoy from the 1st Infantry Division to MINH THANH. All convoys were closed by 1930 hours. The 3/319th Artillery continued to support Brigade Operations from FSB ROCK.

y. D + 24 (13 April 1967)

Changes in Task Organization: 173d Abn Bde (Sep) released OPCON of 1st Inf Div

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade terminated their participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY this date with all units redeploying from their respective areas to the Base Camp at BIEN HOA. The 1/503d Infantry departed from MINH THANH at 0930 hours by CH-47 helicopter to LAI KHE. Upon arriving at LAI KHE, the 1st Battalion boarded trucks and returned to BIEN HOA closing at 1845 hours.

The 2/503d Infantry was moved by CV-2 aircraft from MINH THANH to BIEN HOA. The Battalion closed at the Brigade Base Camp at 1210 hours.

The 4/503d Infantry departed MINH THANH by CH-47 helicopter at 0745 hours enroute to LAI KHE where they also boarded trucks for BIEN HOA at 1402 hours. The 4/503d Infantry closed at BIEN HOA at 1830 hours.

The howitzers of the 3/319th Artillery were transported from MINH THANH to Base Camp by C-123 aircraft. The movement started at 0730 hours and was completed by 1210 hours. All vehicles of the 173d departed MINH THANH in a convoy of three serials, with the lead element leaving the area at 0730 hours and the rear element closing at BIEN HOA at 1845 hours. No contact was reported during any phase of the movement. The Brigade was released from the Operational Control of the 1st Infantry Division at 1850 hours.

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15. Revolutionary Developmenta. Civic Action Activities:

(1) The following distributions were made in the AO of Operation JUNCTION CITY II:

Ammo Boxes, wood	15,256
Polished Rice	23 tons
C-Rations, Box Misc	150 lbs
Nails	50 lbs

b. Brigade SS Activities:

(1) MEDCAP and DENTCAP:

DATE	LOCATION	MEDCAP	DENTCAP
23 March 1967	HOA MY/MINH TH/NH	97	0
27 March 1967	MINH HOA/MINH THANH	55	115
	Total	152	115

(2) Psychological Operations: Speaker and Leaflet Missions

DATE	THEME	MISSION	TIME/AMOUNT
22 March 1967	Chieu Hoi	Leaflet	53,000
	Safe Conduct	Leaflet	56,000
	Tape A-12	Speaker	1 hr
	JUSPAO Newsletter	Leaflet	25,600
24 March 1967	Safe Conduct Pass/Wpons Rwd	Leaflet	181,000
	Chieu Hoi	Leaflet	100,000
	Powerful Sky Soldier	Leaflet	1,000
	Rally Instructions	Speaker	1 hr
25 March 1967	Safe Conduct Pass/Wpons Rwd	Leaflet	181,000
	Chieu Hoi	Leaflet	100,000
	Powerful Sky Soldier	Leaflet	1,000
	Why You Should Rally	Speaker	1 hr
29 March 1967	Chieu Hoi	Leaflet	50,000
	Safe Conduct Passes	Leaflet	70,000

(3) Solatium:

(a) 3,000 \$VN - to the amt of a boy gored by water buffalo which was startled by gunfire.

(b) 1,500 \$VN - payment for repair of damage to houses at the end of the air strip at MINH THANH.

16. Logistic/Administrative Activities

a. General: A Brigade Support Operations Center (BSOC) was established at MINH THANH to provide direct logistical support for the Brigade throughout Operation JUNCTION CITY II. Resupply was accomplished by fixed wing aircraft from JCN HOA to MINH THANH and by rotary wing from the BSOC location to forward elements.

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b. Supply and Transportation:

(1) The following resupply sorties were flown from MINH THANH to the forward units:

UH-1D	1,257
CH-47	296

(2) The following resupply sorties were flown between BIEN HOA and MINH THANH:

C-123	100
C-130	205

(3) The following amounts (short tons) of supplies were handled:

Class I 361.19 ST

Class II 71.80 ST

Class III 74.30 ST

Class III-A 793.60 ST

Class V 2,204.70 ST

TOTAL 3,505.59 ST

c. Maintenance:

(1) The BSOC maintenance contact team consisted of two officers and twenty-five enlisted men. Back-up support and repair resupply was accomplished by air from BIEN HOA.

(2) During the operation, a total of 608 requirements for support were received, categorized as listed below:

SECTION	JOB RECEIVED	JOB COMPLETED	JOB UNCOMPLETED
Mech Maint & Eng	100	92	8
Armament	287	275	12
Signal	221	200	21
TOTAL	608	567	41

d. Medical: A Brigade Clearing Station was set up upon arrival to furnish medical, surgical, dental and medical supply support as needed. The initial complement was composed of 38 EM and four officers including two physicians, one dentist and one MSC officer. A 20 bed holding facility was utilized to care for the sick and wounded until such time as they could be returned to duty or evacuated to a larger medical installation. Urgent cases were flown to the 3d and 45th Surgical Hospitals via "Dustoff" or Slick helicopters. Routine cases were evacuated to BIEN HOA by C-130. A total of 536 patients were treated by the clearing station forward. A breakdown is as listed below:

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<u>PATIENT TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER PATIENTS</u>
KIA30
WIA156
Injuries84
FUO9
Dermatological17
Eye6
Gastro-Intestinal48
Genito-Urinary (Including VD)44
Neuro-Psychiatric5
Other Medical54
Other Surgical26
Dental33
Vietnamese3
TOTAL	536

e. Communications: The Brigade CP displaced to MINH THANH on 20 March 1967 and communications were established immediately with the 1st Infantry Division CP at LAI KHE by FM Radio. Single side band radio was established simultaneously with the Brigade Base Camp at BIEN HOA. Upon establishing a VHF system, the single side band was deactivated. This was the first time that the modified weapons carrier (M-274) "Walking Mule" was used at Brigade level. It proved quite successful. Upon the establishment of a Tactical CP at Fire Support PARRY, communications were tied back to MINH THANH by both FM and 4-Channel VHF radio. The Tactical CP was able to establish and maintain FM radio communications with all maneuver elements not capable of communicating with the forward CP at MINH THANH. On 9 April, FSB PARRY closed down and the artillery elements displaced to Position ROCK. VHF 4-channel was established from the FSB to MINH THANH to the 3/319th and 4/503d switchboard. From time to time during the operation, it was necessary to provide an airborne relay to insure communications to Battalion CP's during their displacements.

17. Special Equipment/Techniques

a. LZ Defense: During the heliborne assault on LZ ROBERT, the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry encountered resistance from VC who were entrenched in bunkers located 75 meters from the LZ. CS powder was dispersed from a Mity Mite but proved ineffective. CS grenades on the other hand were highly effective. A contraction type defense as used during the extraction from LZ 3 proved highly successful. With the proper planning and coordination, a contraction defense is effective in minimizing enemy resistance encountered during extraction.

b. LZ Construction Team: On two separate occasions, the 4th Battalion successfully utilized an "LZ" construction team provided by B Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry Division. An LZ was constructed for resupply purposes. The team and its equipment were brought into the operational area by a CH-47 using a sling load and ladder. The second LZ was constructed to enable the battalion to extract on 9 April 1967. Consideration should be given to forming such a team within the 173d Airborne Brigade's resources.

c. Marking Friendly Positions for Air Strikes: Difficulty was experienced in marking friendly positions for airstrikes by the forward elements in contact with the VC. This difficulty can be reduced or eliminated by having the elements not in contact mark their positions with smoke and relay the distance and direction from their positions to where friendly elements are located.

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d. Additional Marking Technique: An additional technique in marking enemy positions for air strike was used on this operation. The ground unit in contact places artillery or mortar fire in the target area where he wants the strike. Once the fighters are on station and contact has been made with the FAC, one or two WP rounds are fired. This not only gives the ground element close and continuous fire support, but also expedites the target orientation for the FAC.

18. Results of Operation JUNCTION CITY IIa. Friendly Losses(1) Personnel:

KIA	30
WIA	156
MIA	0

(2) Equipment:

APC Destroyed	1
APC Damaged	1
M-79	1
Pistol, .45 Cal	2
Rifles, M-16	7

b. Enemy Losses - Personnel

KIA (BC)	95
KIA (poss)	31
KBA (BC)	2
KBA (poss)	1
Detainees	4

Weapons:

Mosin Nagant Rifles	8
AK-47 Rifles	7
US Rifles	5
Machineguns	3
B-40 Rocket Launchers	2

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Ammunition:

Grenades	150
VC Grenades	8
Claymore Mines	32
Rifle Grenades	121
Small Arms	5,873 rnds
Howitzer Rounds	52 rnds
7.62mm Rounds	15,800 rnds
Mines	15

Food:

Rice	3,785 lbs
Dried Fish	242 lbs
Chickens	31
Pigs	21
Russian Canned Milk	72 pints

Equipment:

Uniforms	25
Rucksacks	4
Rubber Sandals	21 pair
Gas Masks	13
Bicycles	49
Assorted Clothing	400 lbs

Structures:

Bunkers	449
Foxholes	149
Huts	136
Bomb Shelters	20

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Mortar Positions	6
Anti-Aircraft Positions	4
<u>Documents:</u>	3,705
<u>Miscellaneous</u>	
Wire	5,000 ft
Copper Wire	2,000 ft
Electrical Wire	3,078 ft
Batteries	6,650
Assorted Equipment195 lbs

19. Commander's Analysis and Lessons Learned

a. Commander's Analysis: The following are a series of comments made by Brigadier General John R. Deane Jr. at a critique of Operation JUNCTION CITY II held on 24 April 1967 at BIEN HOA Base Camp.

(1) Operation JUNCTION CITY II had several difficult landing zones. Commanders should continually improve LZ's in their areas, especially trees in the approach and departure routes.

(2) General Deane cautioned against C & L ships flying too low.

(3) There is a possibility that the KAC codes will replace the present use of points of origin. It will entail more time but will be more secure.

(4) General Deane had noticed that air strikes were being called in when troops were unable to break contact, forcing the jets to be sent away. Commanders were instructed to make a practice of selecting alternate targets to be used if the primary target cannot be hit.

(5) Personnel calling in air strikes were advised to start thinking about how they will describe and mark the target. Orientation of the FAC must be quick to get efficient and timely results.

(6) Command emphasis is required in the maintenance program.

b. Lessons Learned: Lessons Learned will be discussed by unit and restricted to the significant items brought forward at the critique of 24 April 1967.

(1) 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry

Item: 20mm Cannon

Discussion: The 2/503d Infantry questioned the effectiveness of the 20mm cannon on TAC Air missions against base camps. CPT Widick recommended that the 20mm cannons be replaced by other ordnance such as napalm to improve the strike effectiveness against base camp targets.

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Observation/Recommendations: Major Lancers, the Brigade ALO, informed the Brigade that the 20mm cannon is an integral part of the aircraft and is necessary for the fighter's defense, in addition to its employment against targets of opportunity. It was further felt by the ALO, and agreed upon by the CG, that there would be no appreciable increase in ordnance carried by fighters if the 20mm cannon were replaced by other ordnance.

Item: Mighty Mite

Discussion: The 2/503d Infantry discovered that the Mighty Mite had proved to be inadequate for dispensing CS gas when a unit was in contact on 9 April 1967. LTC Sigholtz recommended greater use of the CS dispenser mounted on rocket pods of gunships or to improvise a system similar to the "MAD" Bomber for accurate placement of CS when required.

Observation/Recommendation: General Deane informed the Brigade Aviation Officer to train our pilots in the MAD Bomber technique. He further stated that CS should be distributed from Rocket pods and fuzed bags made of plastic. The fuses may get damp and would require frequent refills. General Deane further questioned the Brigade surgeon concerning the effects of CS on our wounded, especially those with head and chest wounds. The Brigade Surgeon informed the CG that it could have serious effects.

Item: Command and Liaison Aircraft

Discussion: The 2/503d Infantry recommended that the Battalion Commanders be provided the newer command and liaison ships during extraction operations. The requirement to be filled is that the helicopters be equipped with consoles rather than the PRC-25 radio.

Observations/Recommendations: General Deane directed the Brigade Commander to get a status of consoles by type and capabilities available to the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate). If there are deficiencies or several different types of consoles, General Deane will contact General Terry, (Commander, 1st Signal Bde), to alleviate the problem.

Item: Use of Napalm

Discussion: It was recommended that more napalm be employed in the Air Force preparation of LZ's and that it be placed on the edges of the LZ. The 2/503d Infantry noted that the large amount of artillery and Air preparation on LZ ROBERT on 9 April was not successful in destroying prepared VC positions.

Observations/Recommendations: Major Landers, The Bde ALO, stated that the heavy canopy surrounding various LZ's broke up the effect of napalm and inhibited its desired placement. He further stated that the burning which might result after an extensive napalm strike could conceivably interfere with helicopter landings.

Item: Placement of Bombs

Discussion: Colonel McQuarry informed all present at the briefing that if the bombs are placed effectively, through proper planning, the ultimate mission could be accomplished.

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Observation/Recommendations: The lesson learned is to plan LZ preparations carefully, and in advance. It is essential that the desired contact area be known before the Air Force is on station. General Deane stated that there was no knowledge of the bunkers on LZ ROBERT, therefore, it was believed that Air and Artillery preparation would be sufficient. The only truly effective weapon against bunkers of this type is the 8" howitzer. The responsibility for preparations rests with the Battalion commanders and they must consult the FAU's to be effective. Preparations must be diagrammed and the Air Force notified well in advance to insure that the desired ordnance is received.

Item: Chain Saws

Discussion: The 2/503d Infantry recommended that all chain saws be replaced by one common brand of saw. This will facilitate maintenance of the saws and establishment of PLL's.

Observations/Recommendations: The Support Battalion stated that better maintenance and attention to maintenance at all levels could solve the problem. The CG instructed the Supp't Battalion Commander to have classes conducted on the maintenance of chain saws.

(2) 4th Battalion; 503d InfantryItem: Use of Smoke

Discussion: The 1/503d Infantry found it difficult to use smoke to mark targets when the units are in close contact. Colonel Jackley stated that the 4th Battalion had gotten M-16 smoke streamers of all colors to include red for marking the enemy. General Deane cautioned about using red smoke in dense jungle areas. Gunships have been drilled on hitting an area covered by red smoke. In these densely foliated areas, there is a possibility of gunships delivering fire in an unsafe proximity to friendly troops.

Observation: General Deane instructed the Brigade Aviation Officer to have all pilots practice throwing smoke from high altitudes accurately. He cautioned personnel in C & L ships about going too close to throw smoke. This is an unnecessary risk of both lives and equipment.

Item: M-79 Efficiency Against Bunkers

Discussion: The M-79 grenade has proven in recent operations to be inefficient in the destruction of Viet Cong fortified positions. Therefore, the 4th Battalion now has HEAT rifle grenades and these will be employed on subsequent operations.

Observation/Recommendations: Colonel Goad warned that with the rainy season approaching, units will have to rotate their M-72 (LAWs) more often and even then will find a large percentage of duds.

Item: Use of Napalm

Discussion: LTC Jackley was not in favor of using napalm in LZ preparations because of the danger to ammunition in the fire support base.

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Observation: LTC Jackely recommended that napalm be used only on Air Cap unless the canopy was open over the target area and if the target is well defined.

Item: Direct Fire - Beehive Rounds

Discussion: Direct fire weapons with the Beehive round were planned during this operation, however, they were not required.

Observation: The Beehive round will continue to be planned on future operations.

Item: Instant Landing Zone Teams

Discussion: LTC Jackely was highly pleased with the 1st Infantry Division's Instant Landing Zone Team.

Observation/Recommendation: It was recommended that the 173d Engineers train a similar team for use on subsequent Brigade operations.

Item: Dustoff Nets

Discussion: LTC Jackley feels that it is much simpler to clear the Battalion Admin/Intelli net than the Command net for communication with Medical Evacuation helicopters.

Item: Extraction of Lister Bags

Discussion: The 4/503d Infantry employed lister bags on JUNCTION CITY II to preclude extraction of water cans at an inconveniant time. The water was delivered in cans and poured into lister bags. The cans were then set out and collected the same day.

Observation/Recommendation: This procedure was quite helpful in speeding up the extraction of the Battalion on the following morning. General Deane advised that this procedure become standard practice. The only problem encountered was the acquiring of lister bags in sufficient quantity.

Item: Miscalculated Artillery

Discussion: On three occasions, elements of the Battalion were hit by friendly artillery or mortar rounds. The problem was not due to long or short rounds but to a lack of FO's knowledge of the probable error box.

Observation: The FO's failed to realize that the probable error box allowed that a certain percentage of rounds were going to fall short. FO's must be thoroughly oriented to avoid friendly casualties due to misplaced artillery support.

(3) 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry

Item: Coordination for Perimeter Defense

Discussion: LTC Sachr stated that careful coordination was required for perimeter defense when two Battalions were going into the same LZ.

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Observations/Recommendations: LTC Sachs considered the major problem encountered in this type of operation to be with the light organics. The perimeter and fire plans must be fully coordinated. There is a very strong possibility that with two battalions on the same LZ, there may be a blank in the defensive fires.

Item: Night Navigation

Discussion: Night navigation and preparation for night moves proved to be a problem as shown in two instances as noted below:

Incident 1 - The Recon Platoon of the 1/503d Infantry was engaged on a BDA mission which ran into the hours of darkness, forcing them to remain out overnight. In preparing another unit to move out to meet them, it took three hours. LTC Sachs stated that a reaction force should be able to move out immediately. If their aid isn't needed, they can be halted enroute to the linkup.

Incident 2 - During the course of a long move, A/1/503d Infantry came across a large base camp. The infantrymen worked the area over well and returned to the camp site the next morning. Upon their return, they went into an area that had not been hit. The platoon leader let 4 people fan out too far resulting in 2 dead and 1 wounded. This is an excellent example of a small unit losing control.

Observations/Recommendations: It was noted that in both cases at night the 1/503d Infantry had found that flares were excellent for night navigation. The artillery flares could not be continued because of the small basic load. After using all the flares, the flare ship, "SPOOKY" was employed with outstanding results. Another type navigational aid was the firing of 81mm mortars on the flanks of the moving ground troops. The employment of this type of fire kept Alpha Company on a straight line for 3,000 meters. The mortar rounds were fired on the flanks, rather than the front to avoid the possibility of rounds falling short on the lead element.

(4) 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery

Item: Coordination of Perimeter Defense

Discussion: Major Bruemmer stated that in the reconnaissance and selection of position areas, close coordination had to be made with the unit providing perimeter defense.

Observation: If coordination is not effected, it may cause one or both units to have to alter the location of the position area. Major Bruemmer stressed the need for coordination between infantry and artillery elements, especially when direct fire weapons are being employed.

Item: Unfuzed Ammunition and Varied Lots

Discussion: The Artillery Battalion emphasized the need for fuzed ammunition and large lots. It was noted that a battery may have as many as 20 different lots. All lots have different ballistic characteristics.

Observations/Recommendations: The Support Battalion Commander stated that LONG BINH was clearing out their many different lots at this time. The Support Battalion Commander stated that they wanted the Brigade Artillery Batteries to fire up the small lots during H & I fire. The problem with unfuzed ammunition will continue because it happens to be available. LTC Drake stated that of the two problems

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the problem of having numerous lots is the most dangerous. General Deane instructed that a letter be drafted concerning this matter. The letter should contain figures reflecting how many rounds were fired in a 4 month period, and of which, how many were unfuzed.

(5) "E" Troop, 17th CavalryItem: Helicopter Support

Discussion: Owing to a lack of sufficient helicopters, the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols of the Cavalry Troop could not be employed effectively.

Observation: It is recommended that more helicopters be placed at the disposal of LRRP's, thereby increasing the effectiveness of this intelligence finding unit.

Item: Placement of 105mm Howitzers

Discussion: Major Sutton recommended that the Brigade CP be kept in range of 105mm Howitzers.

Observation: If these artillery pieces are placed out of range of the CP, patrols issuing from the CP are limited.

Item: Coordination of Perimeter Defense

Discussion: The situation at MINH THANH during Operation JUNCTION CITY II would have been bad for the maneuvering of a reaction force, due to the large number of tents in the area.

Observation: It was recommended that the HQ Commandant and commander of the perimeter coordinate the inner and outer perimeters. The HQ Commandant should be responsible for the inner perimeter and the perimeter commander responsible for the outer perimeter.

Item: Control of Serial Marches

Discussion: Serial commanders and march unit commanders should exercise extreme care in keeping their speeds and proper distance for good convoy control.

Observation: To allow the least possible amount of vulnerability during serial movement, strict convoy control is essential.

(6) Company D, 16th ArmorItem: Digging in of Armored Personnel Carriers

Discussion: It was recommended that when bulldozers are available, that APC's be dug into the earth.

Observation: The digging in of APC's will provide better grazing fires, in addition to an increase of both crew and vehicle protection.

Item: Maintenance Capability During Marches

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Discussion: It was recommended that each march unit have a maintenance capability of its own. This capability would aid the trail party and speed up the entire convoy.

Observation: The S3 was instructed to include this maintenance capability in coordinating instructions for future operations.

(7) 173d Support BattalionItem: Resupply Aircraft

Discussion: The C-123 aircraft was discussed as a problem for carrying cargo due to the limited tonnage capability and the inability of the aircraft to be loaded with outsize cargo.

Discussion: The Support Battalion Commander reflected that there was a problem with loading aircraft with explosives. The problem was due to Air Force regulations on non-capable munitions.

Observation/Recommendations: It is recommended that compatibility of munitions regulations be waived in combat support operations. General Deane directed that someone with experience in the handling of explosives draft up a letter concerning the inherent dangers of the various explosives.

Item: Night Dustoff

Discussion: There has been a problem with the summoning of Dustoff ships during the hours of darkness for personnel who were not seriously injured, that is, not requiring immediate evacuation.

Observation: It was recommended that the Surgeon be notified and try to ascertain the condition of the wounded man. General Deane pointed out that a platoon engaged in a night maneuver could not adequately determine the seriousness of a wound.

Item: Improper Maintenance

Discussion: There has been an increase in the problem of items being turned in as "unserviceable" when in actuality the problem lay in improper maintenance or improper cleaning on the part of the operator.

Observation: General Deane directed that figures be kept on the units for improper maintenance and the turning in of items as unserviceable when in fact the problem lies in operator maintenance.

(8) SignalItem: Radio Squelch Position

Discussion: The Brigade Signal Officer stated that all radios should operate in the old squelch position, however, difficulties in communication are often encountered.

Observation/Recommendation: If communications are not good in the old squelch position, radios should be switched to operate in the "OLD OFF" position.

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Item: Preparation of Messages

Discussion: Major Moulton advised that there were a number of personnel who were not prepared to give their message before contacting another station.

Observation: It is recommended that messages be organized prior to the beginning of the transmission.

Item: Communication Security

Discussion: It is imperative that all classified information and messages be transmitted with the most extreme security measures.

Observation: The utilization of codes is now being taken under consideration.

(9) Engineers

Item: Handling of Demolitions

Discussion: Major Raudebaugh stated that in resupply of demolitions, explosive items were received in the same container with detonation cords and blasting caps. This is a dangerous practice and he warned against it.

Observation: It is recommended that all personnel concerned listen to the advise of the demolition specialist to insure the safety of the troops.

Item: Demolitions Made Available for Infantrymen

Discussion: Often while on search and destroy operations, infantrymen do not have sufficient demolitions to destroy enemy installations and tunnel complexes they encounter.

Observation: The Brigade Engineer recommended that the Infantry Battalions make it SOP for each infantryman to carry a 2½-pound block of demolitions. This would provide sufficient demolitions to destroy base camps and tunnel complexes while conducting S & D operations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E. B. ROBERSON
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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
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Tab C

Maps of Operation


JUNCTION CITY I & II

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OPN JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE PARACHUTE ASSAULT

PART I OF PHASE I



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
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
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
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






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
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
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
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
PART 2 OF PHASE I




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






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
**OPN JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE
PHASE 2. 20 MARCH TO 13 APRIL**








Major contact with the enemy.
Battalion's movement on foot.





* Due to heavy ground fire the 2/503d was diverted temporarily to Minh Thanh. The battalion resumed the heliborne assault on LZ Robert later the same day and completed the operation.

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TO
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MR. BDF HHC - 173 ENGD
10 MARCH 67

503-2/503-4/503

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
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**Annex E (Operations Overlay)
to OPORD 7-67
(Opn JUNCTION CITY 2)**

ORDER



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
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AO-4

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
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CONFIDENTIAL

Địa Điểm Định Dị Hiếu Văn

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Tab D

PARACHUTE ASSAULT

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CONFIDENTIALAirborne Operation (JUNCTION CITY)

1. Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE was a multi-unit operation involving the 25th Infantry Division, 1st Infantry Division, 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment minus one squadron. The purpose of the operation was the destruction of COSVN and VC/NVA forces and installations in western WAR ZONE "C" (northern TAY NINH PROVINCE). D - Day for the operation was 22 February 1967. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) was placed under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division for the operation.

2. Initial coordination with the 1st Infantry Division was made on 8 February 1967. A joint reconnaissance was made of the 173d's proposed Area of Operations, tentative missions were outlined and airlift (helicopter) requirements were discussed. A suitable drop zone was noted during this initial reconnaissance. Based upon the initial coordination and reconnaissance, the 173d Airborne Brigade S3 proposed to the Commanding General that consideration be given to conducting an Airborne Assault.

3. The requirement for helicopter lift on D - Day was substantial. The 1st Infantry Division had five infantry battalions to put in by air assault and the 173d had three infantry battalions. In addition to the requirement for UH-1D helicopters, there was a tremendous requirement for CH-47 lift for positioning artillery, command posts and resupply. Recognizing that an Airborne Assault would result in a considerable savings in helicopter lift, the 173d Airborne Brigade S3 presented to the Commanding General an Airmovement Comparison Study (Incl 2) based on a Battalion Task Force size jump. The results of the study showed a saving of sixty (60) UH-1D helicopters for a period of 2 hours and 30 minutes and six (6) CH-47 helicopters for a period of 3 hours and 30 minutes. The study had a major impact on the decision to continue planning for the Airborne Assault.

4. A critical point in the development of the Airborne Assault Plan was action required to prevent compromise of the Drop Zone. The Brigade had earlier planned for an Airborne Operation which later had to be cancelled because of possible compromise of the Drop Zone. Action taken to prevent compromise in the operation under discussion included:

a. The decision to proceed with the airborne plan was known initially by only the Commanding General, Deputy Brigade Commander, Brigade S3 and S3 Plans Officer. Additional Staff Officers were briefed on the operation as the planning progressed.

b. It was felt necessary that a cover plan involving another DZ located outside the planned area of operations be used for planning purposes. The cover plan developed was based on a mission assigned to the 1st Infantry Division by Headquarters, II FFORCEV to secure a CIDG and airfield construction site during Phase II of the operation at a point where ROUTE 246 crosses the SAIGON River (XT 624815). In conjunction with division, it was agreed that their initial order for JUNCTION CITY would give the 173d Airborne Brigade a mission requiring an Airborne Assault with a Battalion Task Force into a DZ at SROC CON TRANG (XT 565855 - See Aerial Photograph, Incl 7). This was the nearest DZ available to the proposed CIDG camp. The Brigade mission to the Task Force required the establishment of a Fire Support Base with one artillery battery at SROC CON TRANG and then an attack overland to seize and secure the site of the proposed camp. This mission was written into the initial operation orders of both the 1st Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade. Headquarters II FFORCEV was advised of the cover plan prior to completing the detailed planning.

c. Knowledge of the true assault objective was limited initially to the four individuals noted above. All staff sections were briefed on the cover plan and proceeded with detailed planning for the Airborne Assault at SROC CON TRANG.

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The staff sections were not given the true objective until the latest possible time and then only those staff officers whose activities were definitely affected by the exact DZ were read into the plan. The S4 for example was brought into the plan on about 12 February, but the Signal Officer was informed of the exact DZ only two days prior to D - Day.

d. The true plan for the Airborne Assault Phase of the operation was not published until late the night of 20 February and was not distributed to the units until 211900 hours February, the evening before D - Day. The Task Force Commander (LTC Sigholtz) briefed the troops on the operation the afternoon of the 21st, and then sealed his battalion area so word of the operation could not be passed to other troops or indigenous personnel.

e. The cover plan was used for all initial planning and coordination with the Air Force. The Air Force received their final briefing from the Brigade S3 on 20 February and at that time were given all pertinent information on the actual DZ. This procedure can work very well provided that the actual DZ and cover DZ are approximately the same size. The Air Force can then accomplish their planning based on the cover DZ and will require only adjustment in flight route, check points and IP's for the actual DZ.

5. The 173d Airborne Brigade's mission - Day was to block enemy escape routes along HIGHWAY 4 between coordinates XT 324886 and coordinates XT 307946. It was determined that this would require two battalions. An additional battalion would be required to secure a Fire Support Base within the AO from which the airmobile assaults and subsequent operations could be supported. This mission was assigned to the Airborne Task Force in the actual plan. The Airborne Assault permitted rapid seizure of the Fire Support Base, and the introduction of the Brigade Command Post and a battery of artillery. In addition, it freed helicopters for movement of other forces as outlined earlier.

6. Aircraft requirements for the drop were thirteen (13) C-130's for personnel, eight (8) C-130's for heavy drop and two (2) C-130's for CDS. The technique of drop was as follows:

Aircraft in trail - 10 second interval

Jump Altitude - 1000 feet

Two passes - 15 man "licks"

Turn around time - 6 minutes

Heavy Drop altitude - 1500 feet

CDS drop altitude - 400 feet

Timing of the drop was as follows:

TAC Air preparation - 0710 - 0855 hours

Personnel drop - 0900 - 0910 hours

Heavy Drop - 0925 hours

CDS - 0930

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7. A Combat Control Team was not used for the personnel drop. A PAC marked the IP with rockets and the lead men in the first stick then threw smoke marking their impact point so the aircraft could adjust if necessary for the second pass. This procedure worked very well. The CCT jumped in the second pass and were used for control of the heavy drop and resupply drops that continued the day. It should be kept in mind that if a CCT is used, they have to be put in at least 20 minutes prior to drop time. Putting them in ahead of the drop could alert the enemy and give him time to react and close on the DZ. In instances where the DZ is clearly defined and there is little likelihood of dropping in the wrong place, it is felt that there is no requirement for a CCT to go in ahead of the personnel jump.

8. In Inclosure 3 is a summary of the peculiarities and technical aspects of detailed planning involved in an airborne operations. This Inclosure can be used as a guide in planning future Airborne Operations.

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AIRMOVEMENT COMPARISON STUDY

1. Problem: To determine the practicality of making an airborne assault with a battalion size task force as opposed to making an airmobile assault using UH-1D and CH-47 helicopters.

2. Assumptions:

a. That sixty (60) UH-1D and six (6) CH-47 helicopters would be available to support an airmobile assault.

b. That the staging area for the 173d Airborne Brigade would be QUAN LOI and the assault area at the vicinity of KATUM (distance of 50 kilometers).

c. That an airborne assault force would consist of an infantry battalion reinforced, an artillery battery and elements of the Brigade Headquarters.

3. Discussion:

a. Organization of Airborne Assault Force:

(1) Personnel:

Inf Bn	- 510
Arty Btry	- 110
Engr Sqd	- 10
MP Sqd	- 8
IPW Tm	- 4
Sig Sec	- 12
Spt Bn	- 30
Bde Hq	- 43
TOTAL	- <u>726</u>

(2) Equipment:

Inf Bn

1 - 1/4-ton truck
 6 - M274 Mules
 4 - 4.2" Mortars
 6 - 81mm Mortars

Arty Bn

1 - 1/4-ton truck w/trlr
 6 - M-102 Howitzers
 2 - 3/4-ton trucks

Bde Hq

1 - 1/4-ton truck-w/trlr
 3 - 1/4-ton trucks

b. Aircraft requirements to conduct an airborne assault with the task force outlined in paragraph 3a above would be 13 C-130's for personnel and 10 C-130's for heavy drop of equipment. It is envisioned that a portion of the heavy drop aircraft would be utilized for a second drop of bulk supplies to support the entire brigade operation. A minimum of two days would be required for rigging of heavy drop equipment and bulk supplies.

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c. The introduction of the same task force into the operational area using UH-1D's and CH-47's based on the assumptions made in paragraph 2 would require 105 UH-1D sorties and 22 CH-47 sorties. The UH-1D's would require 1 hour and 30 minutes to get the force into the area plus an additional 1 hour for refueling. The CH-47 lift could be completed in an estimated time of 3 hours and 30 minutes.

4. Conclusions:

a. An airborne assault would result in freeing sixty (60) UH-1D's for a period of 2 hours and 30 minutes for support of additional forces.

b. An airborne assault would result in freeing six (6) CH-47's for a period of 3 hours and 30 minutes for support of other forces.

5. Recommendation: Recommend that an airborne assault be conducted with a task force as outlined in paragraph 3 above and the helicopter resources be used to move additional forces into the objective area immediately following the airborne assault.

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SUMMARY OF PECULIARITIES AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS
OF PLANNING AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

1. General: Planning for airborne operations begins with the selection of an objective area. This area may be selected by higher headquarters and directed as an assault objective, or as was the case on Operation JUNCTION CITY, the objective may be selected by the commander of the force to be employed. Once the objective is determined, the planning sequence used is what is commonly referred to as the Reserve Planning Sequence. It begins with a visualization of operations in the objective area (Ground Tactical Plan). Next to be considered is the Landing Plan. The Landing Plan is followed by the Air Movement Plan and Marshalling Plan.

a. Ground Tactical Plan: The Ground Tactical Plan includes the assignment of objectives and missions to subordinate units, task organization, unit boundaries and provision for a reserve. A specific ground tactical plan will depend upon the forces available and specific objectives and missions. In the case of a one battalion task force operation, such as JUNCTION CITY, the Task Force Commander develops the Ground Tactical Plan based upon the mission assigned by Brigade.

b. Landing Plan: The Landing Plan includes the sequence, time and method of delivery of troops and material necessary to support the scheme of maneuver, the plan may include any combination of Parachute Assault, air land (AF aircraft) or airmobile (Army Aviation) movement into the objective area. In planning Intra-Theater Airborne Operations, consideration should always be given to use of airmobile assaults in conjunction with Airborne Assaults and to use airmobile forces as a reserve.

c. Air Movement Plan: The Air Movement Plan involves preparation of Air Loading Tables (prepared by Army), selection of loading sites and flight routes (prepared by the troop carrier) from the departure airfield. If more than one unit is involved, an Air Movement Table must be prepared. In manifesting aircraft loads the key is to cross load personnel so that the men exit the aircraft in the area of the Drop Zone that corresponds to his initial assembly area, thereby permitting quicker assembly and less movement on the part of the individuals to reach their assembly areas. If a brigade size operation is planned, then the brigade must block out a number of aircraft for each unit and establish the priority or order of aircraft manifesting is the responsibility of each specific unit.

d. Marshalling Plan: The Marshalling Plan involves movement to temporary camps, (if required) movement to loading sites, and loading of personnel and heavy equipment. The S4 prepares the Marshalling Plan.

2. Since Airborne Operations are "joint operations" a Joint Planning Conference is required early in the planning. The purpose of this conference is to arrive at complete agreement and firm decisions on the various aspects of the operation. The decisions arrived at become the basis upon which both the Army tactical unit commander and the troop carrier unit commander publish their orders. The S3 should be prepared to present the following information at the Joint Planning Conference.

- a. Number of personnel to jump.
- b. Amount and type of heavy equipment to be dropped.
- c. Number of CDS loads to be dropped if any.
- d. Drop Zone location, pinpointed on four corners by six-digit coordinates. Also, the location of the desired impact point (IP) for both personnel and heavy equipment. Aerial photographs of the Drop Zone should be considered a must for planning and coordination of these points.

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e. Desired jump altitude and size of sticks. These two points along with the aircraft formation are normally debatable as the Air Force will have their views also. The Air Force will provide necessary information on turn-around times and flight times to the objective area.

f. The Air Force will want to know what type weather delays are desired and a rendezvous point must be agreed upon where the Army Commander and Troop lift Commander can meet early on D - Day to make a joint weather decision.

g. A code word to be used in the event of a no-jump situation or for recall of the aircraft must be established.

h. Radio callsigns and frequencies must be exchanged and should include VHF and UHF.

i. On Operation JUNCTION CITY, a TAC Air preparation of one hour and 45 minutes was used. In addition, helicopter gunships were used to escort the troop carriers on the last 5 minutes to the DZ and they remained in the area during the early stages of the assembly.

j. A time for the Joint Load Inspection conducted by a Brigade representative and USAF representative must be established.

k. The Air Force will provide the time that the aircraft will be available for loading, station time, take off time, flight time, and aircraft parking plan.

l. If a FAC is used to mark the Drop Zone, the color smoke used and its meaning must be agreed upon during the planning conference. On this point, the FAC can use his WP rockets very effectively for marking the IP on the DZ.

3. The employment of airborne forces is normally visualized as an Inter-Theater Operation aimed at achieving strategic surprise and positioning forces in strategic areas where other means of positioning cannot be used. Consideration should be given to the employment of airborne forces in Intra-Theater operations whenever significant advantage in tactical surprise can be gained by the sudden, undetected, mass delivery of troops. Although parachute delivery of troops and equipment is a relatively inefficient method of introduction, the combat environment of the Vietnam Theater often lends itself to this type employment. The shifting of operations from one location to another about the country requires considerable air movement and positioning of forces before operations can begin. When multiple units are involved in operations, there is always a greater demand for helicopter lift than there are helicopters to provide support. Often a significant advantage can be gained introducing airborne forces directly into an operation. Intra-Theater employment of airborne forces can be particularly advantageous when employed in conjunction with other forces.

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RESUME OF COMBAT PARACHUTE ASSAULT

The following comments are a resume of the planning and organization for the Combat Parachute Assault conducted on 22 February 1967.

All planning was oriented to support the ground tactical plan. The ground tactical plan was designed to accomplish the Task Force's basic assigned mission of security for the 173d Airborne Brigade's CP, Brigade Fire Support Base and the heavy drop zone. The Commanders plan was to be executed in three (3) phases. Phase I - Three (3) rifle companies after landing on the DZ would move to the edges of the DZ and establish security and prevent the enemy from placing observed fire or "no D". Each company was given approximately one-third of the area to secure, for example, Company A would secure the north edge and one-half of the northeast portion of the DZ. Company B would secure the southwestern end and portions of the north and southeastern sides. Company C would secure one-half of the northeastern end and the majority of the southeastern side. Recon Platoon would be the TF reserve. Phase II - the rifle companies, which were now assembled by virtue of the loading plan (explained below), and the assembly plan contract the perimeter to secure the heavy drop zone (HDZ). This was reasonable when the size of the personnel DZ (1000' x 600') and the HDZ (500' x 1200') are compared. Each rifle company retained its relative position with the adjacent rifle companies. Phase III - also included a contraction of the perimeter. The basic requirement during this phase was to secure the Brigade CP and the Fire Support Base. Each of the three phases were executed on D - Day. On D + 1 thru D + 6, the battalion would expand the perimeter at 0830 hours to secure the HDZ (Phase II) and at approximately 1700 hours, the perimeter would contract to execute Phase III.

To support the ground tactical plan, the entire Task Force was cross loaded aboard 13 C-130 aircraft with 60 passengers in each, for a total force of 780 combat troops. On the majority of the aircraft, each rifle company was given 10 spaces and the remainder were given to HHC/2/503d Infantry, Alpha Battery, 3/319th Artillery and support element: from the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate).

The first priority was to get as many infantry on the ground as soon as possible. This had to be considered because although the DZ had a flight length of approximately 26 seconds, two passes would be required to deliver all of the personnel in the Task Force. Company B was given the first five spaces by each door, Company A was given the next 10 spaces for the left door, and Company C was given the next 10 spaces for the right door. This was just the basic start of cross loading which would place the personnel from the rifle companies on the DZ in the area they would secure. The detail cross loading was accomplished by the rifle company commanders when they filled their allotted spaces on each aircraft with personnel from each platoon. This technique permitted the members of a platoon to all land in close proximity to each other because they all had occupied the same relative position on different aircraft.

On 21 February, the Battalion S4 drew all air items that were required for the parachute assault. On the afternoon of the 21st, the entire Task Force was assembled and briefed by the Task Force Commander. Jumpmasters assembled their chalks and issued shoe tags to each soldier, because of the technique of detailed cross loading, it was felt that the regular manifest would not work at this phase and was made an item of record at company level with copies forwarded to the Battalion S1. The shoe tag, which was filled out to contain the same information as a manifest, contained four parts. The fourth part was given to the jumpmaster, the first part was tied to the kit bag with parts two and three intact. The jumpmaster then moved their personnel to the air item issue point located at the Battalion S4 Office. After all air items were drawn, all equipment was packed in the appropriate container and parachutes were fitted and checked. All equipment was then stored in prescribe buildings to be guarded during the night. Jumpmasters then conducted their detail briefing which was outlined for them that morning. Their briefing included such things as PLF's (Parachute Landing Falls) and emergency landing techniques.

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On 22 February, vehicles arrived in the marshalling area (Camp Zinn) where the entire Task Force had spent the night of 21 February. The trucks moved to the storage areas and jumpmasters assembled 'hair chalks'. All equipment was secured and the personnel loaded by chalks to depart for the airfield.

The order of march was not in numerical sequence but in accordance to the aircraft parking plan. All aircraft were positioned prior to the arrival of the Task Force at the departure airfield. Upon arrival, each chalk load was met by a guide (guides carried a numbered sign which was the same as the chalk number) who led that chalk to the awaiting aircraft.

The soldiers off-loaded from the trucks and moved along the sides of their chalk. The distance traveled by each soldier did not exceed 100 feet and was much less in most cases. This procedure was designed to conserve the energy of the soldier, save time, and reduce the distance the soldiers would have to walk with their equipment and PAB bags when loading the aircraft.

The aircraft began departing at 220825H February. The first was jumped at 0900H with the last at 0910H. Assembly problems were reduced primarily because of two things: cross loading and the initial requirement to move rapidly to the flanks of the DZ.

The normal control measures were used such as assembly areas (During Phase II), smoke and colored balloons. Initially, smoke was thrown to give direction to those soldiers who may have become disoriented during descent. During Phase II, it was thrown in the unit assembly areas. Balloons were also flown at this time.

In conclusion, the effectiveness of this parachute assault was due in large to the results of lessons learned during the two practice parachute jumps executed in October and November 1966. The soldiers were well trained. They had been in combat and knew what to expect, but more important, they did what was expected of them.

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CONFIDENTIALROSTER OF PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING IN COMBAT ASSAULT

Listed below are the individual participants of the Combat Parachute Assault of 22 February 1967. This listing is broken down into two separate groups: key personnel and other soldiers conducting the jump. It has not been the intent to slight the value of any one person's participation, but rather to give due credit to those who shared the burden in planning, organization for the final execution of this Combat Jump.

Roster of Key PersonnelBrigade HHC

<u>DUTY</u>	<u>NAME/SERVICE NR</u>	<u>GRADE</u>
Brigade Commander	Deane, John R. Jr. G2 024835	Brig Gen
Brigade SGM	Mrsich, Robert A RA 16228228	SGM E9
S3	Peters, Elmer R. INF 059198	LTC
Ast to Bde Cdr Formerly Spt Bn Cdr	Siska, John E. QMC 038284	LTC
Bde Surgeon	Hinna, Einar MC 089395	LTC
Senior ALO 19th TASS CPB Bien Hoa AFB	Burrow, Henry W. PR 26482	LTC
S3 Plans Officer	Crump, Roger L. Inf 088360	MAJ
S1	Bethke, Gerald H. INF 075927	MAJ
S2	McCoy, George H. INF 092496	MAJ
S4	Palmer, William T. INF 076488	MAJ
S5	Anderson, James L. INF 066656	MAJ
Signal Officer	Darling, Gregory SMB 099812	MAJ
Provost Marshall	Friend, Bernard D. MPC 094927	MAJ
Bde Aviation Officer	Uzman, Charles D. INF 082373	MAJ
Bde PIO	Dixon, Allen C. Jr. 077363	MAJ
5lst Chem Det Cmdr	Carr, Milton B. CMCL 089804	CPT

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<u>DUIT</u>	<u>NAME/SERVICE NR</u>	<u>GRADE</u>
Bde Chaplain	Gigliello, Xavier Jr. 0997810	LTC
Asst Bde Chaplain	Walker, Conrad N. 05500422	MAJ
Asst S2	Motchette, Claude R. ARTY 086473	CPT
Asst S3	Clark, Paul C. Jr. INF 136079	CPT
Bde Arty LNO	Cole, Robert H. 089832	CPT
LRRP Cadr E/17th Cav	Phillips, Alan B. 087310	CPT
172d MI Det Cadr	Bowen, Harry R. 05307180	CPT
Asst Bde Sig Officer	Mc Cateer, Peter J. Sig OP 101586	CPT
S3 Air	Ward, Peter H. INF 092977	CPT
Acting Aide de Camp	Mozden, James P. INF OF 101621	CPT
ALO	Callaghan, James T. FR 56232	CPT
Asst Bde S5	Boyle David J. INF 05236366	1LT
S2 Operations SGT	May, William H. RA 15256759	MSG E8
S3 Operations SGT	Waye, Harold A. RA 44193224	MSG E8
Asst Operations SGT	Ashwood, Benjamin H. RA 13636303	SPC E7
S4 Operations SGT	Rine, Dana W. RA 13255002	MSG E8
<u>H&S Btry 3/319th</u>		
Bn XO	Mountel, Robert OP 105495	MAJ
Bn CO	Nordin, William 059137	LTC
<u>A/3/319th Arty</u>		
Btry CO	Anderson, Charles C. Jr.	CPT

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A/503d Inf

<u>DUTY</u>	<u>NAME/SERVICE NO.</u>	<u>GRADE</u>
DR CO	Sigholts, Robert H. 087614	ETC
Pa 10	Watson, Henry 072431	MAJ
SGM	Proffitt, Edward A. RA 14259801	SGM (E9)
33	Phillips, Don 091352	MAJ
51	Jurskie, Joseph S. 05320176	CPT
32	Willoughby, Lawrence 05310558	CPT
HQ Company CO	Kearney, John P. 05009613	CPT
Asst S3	Baty, Robert GP 104765	1LT
<u>A/2/503d Infantry</u>		
CO	Caras, Edwin H. J., Jr. 098628	CPT
1SGT	Pigion, Louis P. RA 11283706	1SGT E6
Plt Ldr	Owens, John J. 05-327-102	1LT
Plt Ldr	Pumerton, Arthur E. 05-326884	1LT
Plt Ldr	Rees, Palmer M. 05329639	2LT
Plt Ldr	O'Leary, Bartholomew 05329896	2LT
<u>B/2/503d Infantry</u>		
CO	Kaplan, Kenneth 086347	CPT
1SGT	Lewis, Donald L. RA 20377774	1SGT
Plt Ldr	Mitchell, Robert 05713470	1LT

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<u>DUTY</u>	<u>NAME/SERVICE NO.</u>	<u>GRADE</u>
Plt Ldr	Fox, Robert C. OF 105953	1LT
Plt Ldr	Feeham, Donald F. GS 325404	1LT
Plt Ldr	McGill, William F. 05325134	1LT
Plt Ldr	Gallen, Kenneth A. 02321802	2LT
<u>C/2/503d Infantry</u>		
CO	Carney, Thomas P. 096627	CPT
1SGT	Davis, Edward F. Jr RA 12275211	1SGT E6
Plt Ldr	Geyer, Albert H. 05020511	1LT
Plt Ldr	Paul, Alfred J. 05329250	1LT
Plt Ldr	Callahan, Welborn A. Jr. OF 105132	1LT
Plt Ldr	Hollis, Joseph P. Jr 05327702	1LT

In addition to those cited above, the following individuals were members of the Airborne Task Force which executed the combat jump of 22 February 1967.

BMC/2/503d Infantry

<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Fischer, Bruce	SSG	RA 56120672
Scott, Samuel	SGT	US 55923250
Cole, Kenneth	SP4	US 55781428
Hatcher, Clayton	PSG	RA 23175632
Gardner, Cicero	SGT	RA 32597691
Radmann, Bruce	SP4	RA 15835108
Shotts, Donald C.	PPC	US 52050706
Dessalles, Norman	PPC	US 51579631
Rocha, Richard	SP4	RA 18731651
Taylor, Robert W.	SP4	RA 13845512
Burnette, Larry G.	SP4	RA 14916496

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Dockery, Willard	SFC	RA 24962835
Aughn, Cecil. N	SP4	US 54364302
Jaynes, Richard	SGT	RA 51456555
McDonald, Elson D.	PPC	RA 18751516
Byers, Terrence	PVT	RA 15733378
Kendall, Robert	MSG	RA 54061795
Sims, Deborah	SGT	RA 39402781
Haggard, Roy	SP4	US 52643395
Beaver, Gerald	PPC	US 53406716
Nesse, David	ILT	05326288
Hassler, Gerald	SP4	US 53405578
Newland, Leslie	SP4	US 51546259
Durham, Clyde	PPC	RA 12771859
Crowe, Marion	SSG	RA 52378447
Kelley, Donald	SP4	US 56394822
Lumbrazo, Andrew	SP4	US 55834834
Moffett, Herbert	PPC	RA 19874632
Gant, Nethenie	SP4	RA 13856729
Brown, Joe	SGT	RA 14489896
Tipton, Doyle	SP4	RA 14857627
Larson George	SP4	RA 19860902
Kuitert, Gary	SP4	RA 16829803
Fuller, John	PPC	RA 14898563
Dee, Manfred	PPC	RA 11550078
White, Jehue	PPC	US 56624570
Sanders, Donald	VFC	RA 10820993
Cohen, Thomas	SP4	RA 19411502
Guerra, Pedro	SP4	RA 18643888
Meunier, Glenn W.	SSG	RA 27937549
Maya, Jesse	SP4	US 56379943

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Strambersky, Robert	SP4	US 56379943
Johnson, David	PPC	US 55882902
Abernathy, Ronald	SP4	US 55835235
Castaneda, Felomeno	PPC	RA 26249972
Scarino, Augustino	SP4	RA 12738988
Wright, Evander	PPC	US 53409607
Gray, Frank	SGT	RA 18693152
Johnson, James	PPC	US 53348224
Rodriguez, Santos	SSG	RA 18534564
Hudson, Jack	SP4	RA 19789935
Bowe, Clarence	SP4	RA 19845641
Holmes, J. T.	PPC	US 54363073
Raser, Clifford	PPC	RA 18650579
Bonchue, Thomas	PPC	RA 14824751
Fernandez, Gilbert	PPC	RA 19840009
Spagnola, Charles	PPC	RA 13832741
Detten, William	SGT	RA 18715660
Worbalow, Elmer	SP4	RA 17737496
Johnson, Robert	SP4	US 51575524
Roehl, Gary	PPC	RA 17737501
Lester, Michael	PPC	RA 16844802
Dombrowski, Larry	SGT	RA 16684122
Mahone, James	SGT	RA 13643774
Powell, Marcus N.	SSG	RA 14272096
Taylor, Robert	SP5	RA 16629779
Cortes, Miguel	SP4	RA 18752765
Pendleton, Ronald	PPC	RA 17701342
Parker, Harold	SP4	RA 14905644
Johnson, David	SGT	RA 14761584
Corbitt, Alfred	SSG	RA 24635093

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Nixon, Milton	SSG	RA 33996263
Allen, Johnny	PFC	RA 14889502
Harris, Hohn	SGT	US 53407940
Booker, Richard	PFC	US 56401664
Chase Walter	SGT	US 53401381
Warnic, Ben	PFC	RA 12737269
Leader, William	PFC	RA 19884901
Morris, Robert	PFC	RA 11701909
Dillon, James D.	CPI	RA 14489824
Hand, James	PFC	RA 14967545
Leibowitz, Bruce	PFC	RA 12754748
King, Harold	SP4	RA 13868529
Myers, Donald	SGT	RA 16743478
Ham, William	PFC	RA 11482559
Miller, Ira D.	SP4	RA 19852570
Smith, Donald	CPT	Or 105827
Roundtree, John	SSG	RA 14505542
Richardson, Charles	SP6	RA 13472514
Grant, Frederick	SP5	RA 51416047
Wallace, Raymond	SP5	RA 16570282
Gleason, Arthur	PVT	RA 12714828
Bowman, Edward	SGT	RA 13831707
Howard, Robert	PSG	RA 16542145
Wenzel, Thomas	LT	05325335
Crews, Tim	SP5	US 53400614
Saigh, Gregory	SP4	RA 14917604
Smith, William	PFC	RA 15740288
Fisher, Alton	PFC	US 56408170
Harvey, Jack	PFC	RA 14857385
Jackson, Carl	SP4	US 53382422

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Marts, Leroy	PFC	RA 17300016
Stickler, Rexford W.	LT	05325327
Mitchell, Gerald	1SG	RA 17224872
Griffin, David	SP4	RA 14922524
Mills, Jerome	SP4	RA 14853390
Thompson, Gary	PFC	RA 18701762
Smith, Charles	PFC	US 53382408
Allen, Eddie	PFC	RA 1A895519
Clark, Gene	PFC	US 53400550
Drayton, Johnny	SP4	RA 18734571
Whitehead, Curtis	SP4	US 51556808
Acfalle, Jose	PFC	US 50010462
Wilson, James	PFC	US 56393252
Warner, Larry	SPC	RA 19542522
Najera, Richard	PFC	US 56396056
Abrham, Thomas	LT	OP 104583
Carter, Timothy	PVT	RA 19825363
Hicks, Dorch	PFC	RA 14909333
Harmon, Kenneth	SSG	RA 53309001
Dineen, John	PFC	US 51561987
Snider, Billy	PFC	US 55823957
Vaglic, Rafel A.	SSG	RA 21936414
Mavroudis, Stergios	LT	05016241
Skorupa, Mergert D.	SPC	RA 55374515
Fitzroy, James	SP4	RA 12725084
Short, Lee	SP4	RA 14911491
Ian Wagner, Raymond	SP4	RA 12735250
Patton, George	PFC	RA 12765135
Elders, Sylvester	PFC	US 53394274
Lindsey, William	SP4	US 56693574

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Dillard, John	SP5	RA 14771176
Rice, Harley G.	SP4	RA 19061117
Borba, Robert	PFC	US 56402385
Hall, Albert	PFC	RA 11856140
Lee, Luther	SP4	RA 14920904
Chain, Willie	PFC	RA 14932561
Guerra, Pedro	SP4	RA 18643848
Johnson, David	SGT	RA 14761584
Sebastian, Gerald	SGT	US 52627298
Solie, Terence	PFC	RA 16813099

A/2/503d Infantry

Anderson, Donald E.	SP4	RA 16941961
Duncan, Dallas	PFC	RA 13869343
Fike, Woodrow	PFC	RA 14925492
Gregory, Ronnie	PFC	RA 56407046
Wilson, Raymond E.	SP4	RA 15740146
Ison, Terry	PFC	US 56411507
Burns, Charles W.	PFC	US 51560450
Harris, Greg N.	PFC	RA 16873019
Levert, Michael	PFC	RA 17727181
Perkins, Paul S.	PFC	RA 19877493
Sanchez, Rickie	SSG	RA 19726172
Kelly, John	SP4	RA 13258754
Cooper, Jackie	SP4	RA 12862181
Rogers, Dennis	SP4	RA 19825252
Wiseman, Larry L.	PFC	RA 19852522
Hart, Lannon	PFC	RA 11461833
Taufel, Thomas	PFC	RA 13877839
Crowder, Alonso	PFC	US 52638933
Wilson, Terry	PFC	US 50202595

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Delcoach, Loyd	PFC	RA 15803702
William, Richard	SGT	RA 53380727
Whiteman, Ronald	PFC	RA 15748866
McEachin, John R.	SP4	RA 12737297
Young, Joseph	SP4	RA 19858515
Booth, Robert L.	PFC	RA 11564619
Hall, Leon	PFC	RA 10972426
Craig, Gary P.	PFC	RA 19825654
Gibson, Burrell	PFC	US 53373744
O'Kelley, Rick	PFC	US 53393744
Fumerton, Arthur E.	1LT	05326984
Degregrio, Daniel	PFC	RA 12750752
Walder, Ephron	SGT	RA 52373607
Kajucawsky, Robert	PFC	RA 19875036
Green, Larry	PFC	US 56389396
Carrier, William	PFC	RA 11462312
Barse, Randolph E.	PFC	RA 17739831
Florence, Theddis	PFC	US 54400961
Tucker, Ronald	PFC	US 53559218
Bobowski, Jan	SSG	RA 10812753
Everson, Wesley	SSG	RA 16583741
Reynolds, William	PFC	RA 16811776
Hersham, Walter	SP4	US 56395760
Tyree, Edward M.	PFC	US 53407913
Macum, David G.	PFC	RA 13869168
Amstine, Mark	PFC	US 54308394
Cutbirth, Harry	PFC	RA 10887259
Lytwyn, Michael	PFC	US 53249875
Reyes, Johnie	SSG	RA 19276172
Gonzales, Leroy	SSG	RA 19507652
Crowford, Dana	PFC	RA 16745047

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Henderson, Carl	SSG	RA 17448073
Renfro, Norman	PPC	RA 14910695
Smith, David	SP4	RA 18945802
Macko, John	PPC	RA 12755470
Schultz, Peter	SP4	RA 16829763
Funches, Henry	PPC	US 52620541
Johnson, William	SP4	US 54364200
Menke, Theodore	SP4	US 52648831
Ernst, Gary	PPC	RA 17719828
Laster, Leroy	PPC	US 53402775
Hostack, Leon	PPG	RA 16233087
Williams, Richard L.	SSG	RA 13363425
Lafas, Robert	PPC	RA 13858022
Schramm, Nicholas	PPC	RA 12753076
Green, Charlie	SGT	US 53469612
Marcolins, John	PPC	RA 19845719
Wheeler, Joseph C.	PPC	RA 19863405
Cleveland, Wayne	PPC	RA 11566811
Kelley, Stephen	SP4	RA 14920672
Adair, Dennis	PPC	RA 13875047
Moore, Ronald C.	SP4	RA 19863551
Richard, John	SP4	RA 17701514
Watson, Leon	PPC	RA 12842461
Walker, Charlie	PPC	RA 14960688
Bents, Edward	PPC	RA 15832730
Parrow, William	SGT	RA 26755715
Pendarives, Sylvester	PPC	RA 12691932
Vellozzi, Lauren J.	SP4	RA 12732989
Gilbert, Willie	SP4	US 53430012
Scott, Walter R.	SP4	RA 15909902

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Palmer, David	SP4	US 51569693
Newport, Daniel	SP4	RA 16824586
Torres, Francis	SP4	RA 16824586
Tyson, Arthur	PPC	RA 14896697
Henley, Gonzale	PPC	RA 18774358
Kapatanakes, Glenn	PPC	RA 14967204
Weissenbacher, Warren	PPC	RA 14967204
Dickman, Gregory	PPC	US 50806335
Mickna, John R.	SSG	RA 17484116
Burnette, Thomas	PPC	RA 18743890
Taylor, Thomas	SP4	US 51340552
Hood, Bobby	PPC	RA 14888783
Engle, Russell	PPC	RA 12768343
Stephens, David	SP4	RA 14925888
Spears, Patrick	PPC	RA 14889406
O'Rourke, Edmund	PPC	RA 11467659
Schamb, Melvin G.	PPC	RA 11449302
Reece, Gary J.	SP4	RA 16839183
Goudia, Kornell	SP4	US 54365681
Ulloa, Franceses	PPC	US 50011975
Hunt, Paul L.	PPC	US 55823965
Emory, Walter K.	PPC	RA 12733627
Bertrand, Arlen A.	PPC	US 52347711
Card, Vincent W.	SSG	RA 17391829
Quarterman, Theodore H.	SP4	US 56329135
Swartz, Charles	PPC	RA 12748599
Brown, Harvey	PPC	RA 16870385
Marles, Jeff	PPC	RA 14902790
Elliott, Harlen	SP4	RA 16839043
Gerber, Robert	PPC	RA 13865843

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Micholls, William H.	PFC	RA 12757502
Minchew, Roy A.	SP4	US 54365195
Gregory, Ronnie	PFC	RA 56407066
O'Kelly, Rich	PFC	US 53393744

B/2/503d Infantry

Adams, Mack J.	PSG	RA 14538868
Wood, Harris	SGT	RA 24770212
Cleland, Harry T.	SP4	RA 16831201
Cory, John M.	SP4	US 55835593
Grossman, Gary J.	SP4	RA 13831116
Knapp, Thomas J.	PFC	RA 14917095
Banks, Holly	PFC	RA 13761459
O'Donnell, Richard E.	SP4	RA 19868181
Murable, Martin H.	SGT	RA 16634782
Brown, Donald W.	SGT	RA 14825305
Pearod, Arthur	PFC	RA 16877661
Schwartz, James J.	SP4	US 52647967
Roes, William A.	PFC	RA 14921291
Winters, Jon	SP4	RA 14915660
Elgin, Robert G.	SP4	RA 19862498
Mathews, Gordon	PFC	RA 16831020
Wirth, David N.	SGT	RA 14773845
Richburg, Jerry	SP4	US 53412571
Jaegerui, Balilio	PFC	US 54365133
Minore, Frank	PFC	US 51605453
Patrick, Gary T.	PFC	RA 18764937
Major, Henry	SP4	US 53402876
Payne, Jesse	SP4	US 53381812
Shoemaker, Sammie	PFC	US 53403078
Smith, Mathew V.	PFC	RA 11465729

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Fanner, Leonard	PVT	RA 1769463C
Reid, William B.	PPC	RA 14911365
Strode, James H.	PSG	RA 53066499
Yates, Reginald	SP4	RA 13888115
Shirley, James	PPC	RA 18722006
Fitzgerald, Eldon	SSG	RA 13436832
Scrimager, Samuel	SGT	RA 18685839
Brozostowski, Sigmund	SP4	RA 12742707
Stevens, Wilber	PPC	US 52648218
Jardine, Gene	PPC	US 60014176
Johnson, Dennis C.	PVT	US 56402388
Bell, James H.	SP4	US 54365628
Brown, George	SGT	RA 52631145
Smith, Richard	PPC	RA 18755359
Rodriguez, Carlos	SP4	RA 51553238
Austin, James G.	PPC	RA 13989453
Bright, Ralph	SGT	US 53399579
Young, Edward	SP4	US 53403003
Gooch, Calvin C.	SGT	RA 14810778
Palcey, John	PPC	RA 12768757
Smith, Gary D.	PVT	RA 17738127
Baker, Dale W.	SP4	US 56392052
Kassa, Richard	PPC	RA 19776133
Carter, Edmond	PPC	RA 19840879
Henges, Randall	PPC	US 55826873
Chapin, Norman	PPC	US 55926873
Seman, James D.	PPC	RA 15862539
Alvarez, Jose	PPC	US 56366456
Benton, Lester H.	PPC	US 53405092
Townsend, Jack	SSG	RA 14502083
Daniels, Glen	SGT	US 51553858

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Dillard, Oliver	SP4	US 53402866
Capalbo, Kenneth A.	SP4	RA 11440467
Chavis, Jimmy	SGT	RA 53393143
Monforti, Richard	PPC	RA 12736596
Adams, James	PPC	US 52639001
Keith, James	PPC	RA 14936451
Lucas, Levi	SP4	US 54365626
Flowers, Jimmy	PPC	US 53408820
Holman, Delane	SP4	US 54365005
Grant, Edward O.	PPC	US 51569740
Wright, Alton	PPC	RA 16872281
Ladas, Michael	PPC	RA 16820444
Boggs, John S.	PPC	RA 15743094
Rowell, Harold B.	SSG	R. 14678508
Rice, Pandall	PVT	RA 19817594
Koover, Ernest L.	PPC	US 52640969
Blackshear, Clarence	SP4	US 53400968
O'Neal, Larry	SP4	US 56025505
Lindsey, J. B.	PPC	RA 14889420
Rowlette, Lee	CPL	RA 25266871
Hatcher, Thomas U.	SP4	RA 12773674
Banot, John F.	PPC	RA 14953460
Braxley, Don	SP4	RA 12753282
Deammon, Wayne R.	PSG	RA 17311973
Thompson, Alex	SSG	RA 57321112
King, Samuel	SP4	RA 13867078
Perry, Lemon C.	SP4	US 52643825
Smith Larry	PPC	US 55827966
Harris, Michael	PPC	RA 18742306
Routt, Rubin R.	SGT	US 52634046
Hly, Charles	SP4	US 52620089

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Perez, Roberto	SP4	US 50177619
Long, James R.	PPC	RA 15741875
Tomlin, Melvin	PPC	US 53497134
Latham, Billie R.	SP4	RA 14389405
Duncan, Phillip	PPC	RA 11566802
Royal, Teddy	PPC	US 54366501
Caruso, Joseph	SP4	US 51549537
Maples, Francis	PPC	RA 15955475
Cunningham, Richard B.	SP4	US 54369001
Cassidy, Raymond	PPC	RA 12763646
Boisvert, Kenneth	SP4	RA 14925976
Tippa, Joseph	PPC	US 51506791
Bills, Steven	PPC	RA 19849876
Arnold, Dale	PPC	US 55834930
Cambell, Kenneth	SP4	RA 19851410
Perez, Melvin	PPC	RA 12756292
Pruden, Linwood	PPC	RA 13876480
Dyaart, Bertis	SSG	RA 27532907
Scarella, Fredrick	SP4	RA 11465702
Bankton, Johnie	SP4	US 54369681
Toland, Desyne	SP4	RA 19873669
Paterno, James B.	SGT	US 51541078
O'Bryan, Bill	SGT	RA 19869173
Kreutz, Leonard	PPC	US 56366389
English, Raymond	PPC	RA 15925617
Davis, Joe	PPC	US 56392050
Krager, Richard	PPC	US 56945569
Brooks, Johnny	SGT	RA 13767144
Dohon, Chester	PPC	US 54372558
Peraliz, Isador	PPC	RA 19853183

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Schmuck, Helmut	PFC	RA 12754438
Smith, William B.	PFC	RA 16836210
Kapule, Wilfred	SGT	RA 10112789
Thornhill, Jesse	PFC	RA 14931981
Cruz, Gerald	SP4	RA 17731902
Johnson, Phillip	PFC	US 56693853
Kohaya, Bobby S.	PFC	RA 18906073
Sizemore, Earl	SGT	US 52636196
Hopkins, Elmo	SP4	US 55834844
Fitzanko, Steven	SP4	RA 16838962
Pierce, Lynwood	PFC	RA 12730531
Nolden, Joseph	SSG	RA 13485031
McMahan, Troy C.	PFC	RA 14912878
Crane, Richard	PFC	US 55642544
Beck, William	PFC	RA 14926798
Parks, Peter	PFC	RA 13976065
Wilson, Chester	SP4	RA 19851255
Williams, Willie T.	PVT	RA 19842696
Gist, Roger	SGT	RA 14624896
Dulin, George	SSG	RA 15378502
Sebastian, Gerald	SGT	RA 13261704

C/2/593d Infantry

Deane, James R.	PFC	US 52628650
Gordy, Charles N.	SSG	RA 14704311
Smeding, Peter M.	SGT	RA 51532462
Lietaert, William P.	PFC	US 55828047
Lynch, Peter F.	PFC	RA 18774585
Lorring, Kenneth	SSG	RA 15538739
Blattenberger, Richard	SP4	RA 12690763
Wood, James C.	PFC	RA 15765263

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Fines, John G.	PFC	RA 14963938
Melton, Clayton	SGT	RA 18742395
Langham, Daniel W.	PFC	RA 18741828
Garcia, Pedro I.	SP4	RA 18745539
Drish, George R.	PFC	US 55899605
Tuttle, Lloyd W.	PFC	US 56336487
Kuhl, William D.	PFC	RA 12659222
Meeks, Richard L.	PFC	US 52620463
Supove, Peter	SP4	US 53400887
Culp, William F.	PFC	RA 18774219
Welch, Stephen	PFC	RA 18905783
Henderson, James R.	PFC	RA 16955209
Catossi, Paul H.	PFC	RA 12754222
Torres, Secundine	PFC	US 56378892
Coless, Joseph T.	PFC	RA 12751500
Oged, Wallace	PFC	RA 18752214
Constatino, Michael	SP4	RA 13875960
Plunkett, Braxton	SSG	RA 35820729
Hendon, Charles W.	SP4	US 55823232
McDonald, Charles J.	PSG	RA 11302193
Alexander, Douglas M.	SP4	US 54361280
Dove, Bernie S.	SSG	RA 54219243
Dembrowski, Bruce C.	PFC	RA 14902830
Soule, Dennis L. SP4	SP4	RA 11463357
Garvin, Patrick X.	SP4	RA 19833665
Horton, Bill W.	SP4	US 55823232
Bonilla, Ricardo	PFC	RA 12755479
Carter, Preston H.	PFC	US 53405106
Keller, William J.	PFC	RA 13862212
Cascadden, Roger D.	PFC	US 55895534

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Johnson, Ronald D.	SP4	RA 14827265
Mims, Marvin	PFC	RA 14921317
Lefler, James Pl	PFC	RA 19866812
Ellenwood, Russel O.	PFC	RA 16972028
Jenkins, William H.	SSG	RA 14670034
Montague, James W.	SP4	RA 17724199
Malone, Michael L.	PFC	RA 17737845
Bradley, Willie C.	SP4	RA 18737514
Hagwood, Nathaniel	PFC	RA 14912120
Thompson, Robert Jr.	PFC	US 53385495
Watson, LaMont	PFC	RA 18906080
Garcia, John	PVT	RA 18745539
Fabrisch, Keith C.	PFC	US 55880540
Mader, Phillip	PFC	US 55875545
Martino, Robert L.	SP4	RA 13887675
Bigger, Floyd	PFC	US 52666068
Walls, Calvin	PFC	RA 12756398
Wilson, Herbert Jr.	PFC	RA 12938793
Ebald, Michael L.	PFC	RA 15758656
Stalker, Johnny R.	SP4	RA 19857438
Walker, John F.	PVT	US 53398794
Carreon, John G.	PFC	US 56395730
Castillo, Jaime	PFC	US 19860403
Cartegena, Angel L.	PFC	US 51664650
Fluck, James C.	PFC	RA 13858748
Collins, Clifford C.	PFC	RA 13874798
Blizzard, Kenneth I.	SSG	RA 14574981
Moary, Cecil O.	SGT	RA 14771161
Iglio, Charles J.	SP4	US 51559878
Konen, David E.	SSG	RA 16249087

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Santelli, Robert J.	SP4	RA 13862590
Donestorg, Alfonse	PPC	RA 12753508
Brown, Julius	SG	RA 14473739
King, Nathaniel	SGT	RA 14718872
Loser, Ronald E.	SP4	RA 13858937
Mitchell, Linwood	SP4	RA 13876168
Wolfe, Paul E.	SP4	RA 24446906
Castello, Larry D.	SP4	US 55826909
Hill, Michael V.	PPC	RA 14848626
Norman, Martin C.	PPC	RA 14925211
Garrett, Walter J.	SP4	US 53402525
Seesley, William L.	SP4	RA 19709787
Sneed, Charlie Jr.	PPC	US 53385495
Farmer, Michael L.	PPC	RA 12733618
Nicholson, Sim C.	PPC	RA 16960714
Lewis, James R.	PPC	RA 19840110
Murry, James	SGT	RA 23325284
Cox, George T.	SGT	RA 14543008
Ross, George A.	PPC	US 53405392
Tyler, James L.	SP4	RA 18724200
Jenkins, Alvin F.	PPC	RA 12771045
Hall, Clarence	PPC	RA 11652015
Harris, Nathaniel	PPC	RA 14960558
Frierson, David S.	SP4	US 53408842
Holloway, William H.	PPC	RA 18773045
Gyant, Charles R.	SSG	RA 14623010
Bayne, Joseph P.	PPC	RA 13875099
Allen, Odell	PPC	RA 14945257
ST Julien, Leander	PPC	US 54375919
Depue, Robert F.	PPC	RA 15742825

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Sharp, Craig O.	PFC	RA 19996466
Foot, George	PFC	RA 18774721
Barrs, Talmadge G.	SP4	US 53400606
Handley, Larry C.	SGT	RA 18635737
Felix, Lorenz O.	SP4	RA 19857229
Jenson, Daryl R.	SP4	US 56392058
Hill, Robert L.	PFC	RA 17724818
Prouty, John M.	PVT	US 56372861
Hart, Berry L.	SP4	RA 13893862
Saez-Ramirez, Angel P.	SSG	RA 50127301
Alandt, Charles E.	PFC	1A 16848642
Green, Moses	SP4	RA 12735824
Moore, Douglas E.	SGT	RA 53337643
McIntyre, James F.	SGT	RA 14689374
Parris, Vernon L.	PVT	RA 51582557
Smith, James A.	PFC	RA 15761667
Stephens, Warren A.	SP4	US 52635318
Keston, David P.	SP4	RA 52566146
Skiles, James A.	PFC	US 51569634
Anthony, Lionell S.	PFC	US 56393665
Gilbert, Joseph P.	PFC	RA 16873304
Bothwell, Frank E.	SGT	RA 51466462
Craig, Norris R.	PFC	US 54375482
Wilson, Raymond C.	PFC	RA 15740140
Adams, John L.	SP4	RA 14898562
Drake, Michael J.	PFC	RA 12881505
Bennet, Charles H.	PFC	RA 14877382
Vasquez, Sylvester J.	PFC	RA 19889170
Curran, Paul W.	PFC	RA 12772830
Garrison, E. S.	PFC	RA 11461509

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Gould, Richard L.	PFC	US 52668243
Jones, Robert L.	PFC	US 53382282
Beura, Garyl	PFC	RA 34944418
Kores, Gary D.	PFC	RA 19871516
Johnson, Walter J.	SP4	US 56395398
Broady, Willie J.	SGT	RA 13372852
Leyva, Parra-Frias R.	PFC	RA 18835808
Strack, Lawrence	PVT	RA 12762429

H&S Btry 3d Bn 319th Arty

Weigand, Leo	PFC	RA 13871939
Sappington, Charles	SP5	RA 14683108
Schwartz, Harold	SP4	RA 19857510
Biggs, Homer	SGM	RA 14009653
Ragus, Morris E.	SSG	RA 14572969
Day, Dennis	SSG	RA 17519377
Worington, James	CPT	096291
Grant, Charles	PFC	RA 10825174
Solie, Terrence	PFC	RA 16833099

A/3/319th Artillery

Zanon, George J.	SFC	RA 28723097
Pascarella, Frank	ILT	05419050
O'Neal, George H.	1SG	RA 18230333
Oney, Henry L.	SFC	RA 13461816
Camus, Glyn	SGT	RA 19710015
Jones, Arceidus	SGT	RA 15550462
Evans, James L.	ILT	OF 103292
Pate, O'Neal J.	SFC	RA 14213408
Brooks, John	SSG	RA 51289130
Mitchell, Willis	SSG	RA 18473906
Salazar, Paul	SGT	RA 19590468

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Williams, Tommy	SGT	RA 18502095
Cruz, Guadalupe	CPL	RA 19857639
Cerescimo, Anthony	CPL	RA 12725507
Asbury, Clinton	SP4	RA 15725507
Baker, Hilbert	SP4	RA 13857423
Rogers, George H.	SSG	RA 24633635
Hardy, Richard L.	SGT	RA 14644648
Cruz, Peter	CPL	US 55359393
Drake, Randall	CPL	RA 15725226
Lindsay, Arthur	CPL	US 52626972
Matthews, Robert	SP4	RA 14897605
Bogan, Jimmie	PFC	RA 16856599
Carlyle, Dennis	PFC	RA 16841772
Chackei, Gino	PFC	US 56397137
Calderon, Juan	PFC	RA 19859544
Pearson, John	SGT	RA 53363290
Davis, Andrew	CPL	US 52548099
Woods, Cleophus G.	CPL	US 53403159
Call, Kenneth	SP4	RA 17701635
Foreman, Eugene	SP4	US 51541623
McManus, David	SP4	RA 19852208
Roberts, Billy R.	SP4	RA 18682712
Ward, Bruce G.	SP4	RA 19822508
Hale, Robert W.	PFC	RA 13867048
Harris, Franchot	PFC	RA 16857368
Young, Raymond	SSG	RA 53327273
Davis, Ronald	CPL	US 52626963
Rose, Keith	SP4	US 55859635
Chriswell, Truman	PFC	RA 19803684
Cortes, Alfred	PFC	RA 15754526

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Glen, Thomas	PFC	RA 13968443
Dinardo, Paul	PFC	RA 14915911
Ferek, John	PFC	RA 16810469
Evans, David	PFC	RA 15735194
Furnish, Raymond	PFC	RA 15735278
Eipson, Roosevelt	SGT	RA 54232016
Grant, James	SP4	RA 19857644
Gatlin, Carlton	PFC	RA 14943059
Golbeski, Philip	PFC	US 52652299
Jennette, Robert	PFC	RA 21146656
Johnson, William	PFC	RA 12734475
King, Wesley	PFC	RA 18755190
Lindberg, Steven	PFC	US 55788495
Look, Elmer	PFC	US 56396234
Lopez, Jimmy	PFC	RA 18743921
Pinkston, Hugh	PFC	US 53422833
Stroup, Kenneth	PFC	RA 16856770
Sutterfield, Gerald	PFC	RA 19889784
Tapia, Richard	PFC	US 56395087
Watson, Delando	PFC	RA 16824201
Webb, Leonard	PFC	RA 14912610
Winberry, James	PFC	RA 13968561
Zarate, Ignacio	PFC	US 56396225
Miller, John A.	PFC	US 51558830
Pinn, Reginald D.	PFC	US 51579553
Renteria, David	PFC	RA 18754148
Raines, Buck	PFC	RA 28764669
Samse, John	PFC	RA 17747693
Shortlidge, John	PFC	RA 15732785
Smith, Arthur	PFC	RA 14892523

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASR</u>
Stewart, John	PFC	RA 13871122
Dorsey, Thomas	LT	05110855
O'Conner, Roy F.	PFC	RA 12766022
Sturdevant, Thomas	SSG	RA 53068921
Denham, Charles	PVT	RA 14897493
Riggins, Alvin	SGT	RA 18386921
Kiaha, Henry	SP4	RA 10121251
Hayes, Thomas	PPC	RA 19874689
Funderburk, Rupert A.	SP4	RA 14923168
Beisswanger, Robert F.	SGT	RA 13627371
Haupt, Joseph C.	SP5	RA 12621280
Mountcastle, James L.	SFC	RA 23009758
Marchant, Charles D.	SP5	RA 18660216
Warner, Edmund M.	PSG	RA 17464614
Stout, Timothy N.	SGT	RA 12608596
Wilson, Leroy L.	SP4	RA 19831225
McCarthy, Richard T.	PPC	RA 11469126
Wright, Henry L.	PPC	RA 14926685
Ahrens, Henry M.	PPC	RA 14926261
Odgaard, Dennis R.	PPC	RA 17715265
Gwinn, Donald O.	PFC	RA 15744394
Ingram, John D.	SP4	RA 17729916
Green, Charles T.	SFC	RA 24903253
Dingess, John F.	SGT	RA 13636163
Delegado, Enrique	SGT	RA 19805543
Rivers, Herbert L.	SP4	RA 15578431
Means, Alex Jr.	SP4	RA 14883033
Taglis, Dean B.	SP4	US 51548573
Ortiz, Barroso	PPC	US 50183468
Nest, Richard S.	PPC	RA 11461519

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Jennings, Walter R.	PFC	US 57538424
Langley, Stanley D.	CPL	RA 16695294
Reiper, Peter L.	PFC	US 55867562
Curvan, Leonard J.	PFC	RA 18755121
Munsil, Richard G.	PFC	US 55866030
Toomer, Jerry A.	SP4	RA 13844576
Stewart, James	SGT	RA 13704407
Mulherin, James	SP4	US 55814379
Pattion, Berry	SP4	US 52634345
Secora, Michael	PFC	RA 19835376
Krolinowski, Gary	PFC	US 55831763
Lobdell, Barry	PFC	RA 16844872
Crigmyle, Arthur	PFC	RA 17726195
Reed, John J.	PFC	RA 13872273
Summers, Clarence	PFC	RA 19869734

Engr Co, 173d Abn Bde

Gwens, James D.	SGT	RA 14879591
Pereira-Rivera, U.	SGT	RA 29129978
Newton, Michael E.	SP5	RA 17723154
Barton, Richard B.	SP4	US 51560640
Nelson, James E.	SP4	RA 13890305
Collier, Melvin T.	PFC	RA 19873836
Swedenbord, Paul A.	PFC	RA 15742255
Batiste, John J.	PFC	TS 54605270
Robinson, Clarence	PFC	RA 53325513

Co A (Adm), 173d Abn Bde

Higgins, Michael R.	SP4	RA 16806632
Holland, Douglas C.	SP4	US 55792299
Epley, Louis P. Jr.	SP4	RA 14922675
Hall, Donald C.	PFC	RA 14916610

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
McKay, Jeffry S.	1LT	05022864
Waters, Charles J.	CPT	03139624
<u>172d MI Det</u>		
Foot, Lester M.	1LT	05418122
Burgess, Peter D.	CPT	093596
Starsiak, Richard P.	1LT	05326650
<u>16th Sig Det, II FFORCEx</u>		
Jacobs, Emelindo A	SP4	RA 50168949
<u>173d Spt Bn</u>		
	HHD	
Windsor, James A.	MAJ	091427
Cheatham, Lenell	SGT	RA 54194298
Kozak, Thomas	SP4	US 51548896
<u>Company C, Supply & Transportation</u>		
Melvin, Howard P.	CW4	W903538
Meridith, David L.	2LT	05241341
Mathews, Charles F.	SSG	RA 19479464
Smith, Richard M.	SP5	RA 14365501
Ward, Jimmy L.	SP5	RA 14520513
Bumgardner, Terry E.	SP4	RA 13842003
Barthule, Russel T.	SP4	RA 16809650
Hickman, Ronald J.	SP4	RA 12728004
Keller, Robert L.	SP4	RA 13852505
Nally, Charles	SP4	RA 15717294
Mix, George W.	SP4	RA 14890979
Herring, Wallace B.	SP4	RA 14874656
Gaines, Robert M.	SP4	RA 14904872
Flood, Clifford	SP4	RA 13944828
George, Eugene C.	PPC	RA 12753077
Bauman, Clifford W.	PPC	RA 13872663

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Brown, Jack F.	PPC	RA 11855642
Carver, Patrick H.	PPC	RA 14899270
Weber, Dale L.	PPC	RA 18761147
Harris, Sterling M.	PPC	RA 13889977
<u>Company E, Medical</u>		
Jackson, Bill K.	CPT	05712061
Harbinson, Matthew J.	1SG	RA 16232943
Ferguson, Robert L.	SP4	RA 19644529
Lecane, Roger	SP4	RA 18708095
Kessen, Harold R.	SSG	RA 15541546
Martin, Walter	SP4	US 54367438

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CIVILIAN PRESS COVERAGE - JUNCTION CITY

1. Phase I - Airborne Assault

a. The following correspondents arrived at DZ CHARLIE aboard the Commanding General's helicopter immediately following the jump.

Henri Huet - Associated Press

Dave Burlington - NBC

Jim Eury - NBC

b. The following personnel from Army Public Information Offices participated in the combat assault.

Major Dixon

Lieutenant Jeffery S. McKay

SP4 Michael E. Higgins

SP 4 Louis P. Epley Jr.

SP 4 Donald C. Hall

SP 4 Douglas C. Holland

c. The following civilian press correspondents also participated in the combat assault.

Kathy Leroy - French female freelance for AP

Bill Hall - Former Special Forces, freelance for UPI

Doug Sapper - Former Special Forces, South China Morning Post, Ltd, and

Petrell Associates

d. Ken Gale with two Vietnamese cameramen (ABC) came into the DZ aboard Colonel Shaw's helicopter.

e. The following correspondents stayed aboard C-130's during and after the jump:

Horst Paaz - Associated Press

Steinhadt - CBS

Don Moser - Life

Co Rentmeister - Life

Vosun - NBC

f. Robert J. Ellison (Petrell Assoc) came in later from the 1st Division by helicopter.

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2. Phase II - Airmobile assault

a. The following news correspondents were with the 1st Battalion, 503d Infan
try on the initial assault from SUOI DA.

Bill Wordham and two cameramen (Vietnamese) - NBC

Tom Buckley - New York Times

Horst Faas - AP

Ted Koppel - ABC

b. The following news correspondents were with the 2d Battalion during
the lift from vicinity KATUM.

Henri Huet - AP

SP4 Higgins and SP4 Hall (173d Abn Bde PIO)

c. The following were with the 4/503d Infantry during lift from vic KATUM.

John Lengle - AP

John Hart and two Vietnamese cameramen - CBS

Robin Hancock - Time Magazine

Leon Daniel - UPI

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