SUBJECT: Quarterly Historical Report

The following quarterly historical report is submitted in compliance with Brigade Regulation 670-6.

[Signature]

ARMOR 1, COAB
1LT ARMOR
OPERATING
UNIT HISTORY

The New Year found D-16 Armor at Dong Tri, FSB #2. Elements of the 2nd Plt. provided convoy security from Phu Hiep to Vung Ro Bay. The day closed without incident.

The period 2 Jan to 6 Jan, the company served as convoy and FSB security with no incidents.

On the morning of 6 Jan, while escorting Brigade vehicles, 13 hit a mine at coord: C0940772 resulting in 6 WIA's, none serious. All were dusted off. The convoy continued on and at coord: C0123635 numerous large holes, resulting from exploding mines, were noticed in the road. The convoy continued to Miami Beach closing at 1050 hours. The return trip was run without incident and closed Phu Hiep at 1400 hours.

Events continued normally through the 7th, 8th, and 9th of January.

On 10 Jan, D-16 was escorting a convoy to Miami Beach but received word to stop because a bridge at coord: C0666136 was blown. The convoy returned to Phu Hiep without incident while the Koreans moved in to repair the bridge.

On 11 to 13 Jan the company served as convoy security for the Tuy Hoa Sub-Area Command without incident.

At 1730 hours 14 Jan at coord: C0941770, 34 was temporarily damaged by a mine. One individual was injured and dusted off by 1615 hours.

Company D, 16th Armor remained in the motor pool pulling maintenance and resupplying the vehicles for up coming missions on 15 Jan.

The 16th of Jan was spent on the roads from Phu Hiep to FSB #6 and Miami Beach. The day of patrolling passed without incident.
The night of 16 Jan D-16 readied itself for possible use as a reaction force for ARK and ARVN convoys and also for a daylight raid on Phu Sen.

The daylight raid was scrubbed so the company continued action as a ARK and ARVN reaction force while providing security for THSAC convoys. There were no significant sightings or incidents reported.

The 18th of Jan while securing PEB# 9 D-16 received fire from a ARK convoy apparently reconning by fire without knowledge of our presence. There were no damage or injuries.

The 19th of Jan, D-16 elements acted as a reaction force for an ARVN convoy. The remainder of D-16 acted as a relay for the Brigade and forward elements. The day passed without incident.

The 20th of Jan, D-16 elements escorted an ARVN convoy from PEB# 9 to Tuy Hoa commencing at 1005 hours and closing at 1540 hours without incident. The day was also spent helping the 319th Arty exchange D/319th for C/319th at PEB# 9. C/319th was escorted from An Khe without incident.

The 21st of Jan was spent at PEB# 9 pulling maintenance and preparing for future missions.

On 22 Jan D-16 elements secured E/17 and Brigade Arty vehicles from PEB# 9 to Phu Riep. At the same time a VC unit of unknown strength and size was spotted at coord: C9987416. Brigade was informed and snoopy was called in with unknown results. Late in the afternoon of the 22nd an individual with D-16, attached from E/17 fell and broke his ankle. A dustoff was called and completed by 1930 hours.
The 23rd of Jan D-16 received a report of a THSAC jeep hitting a mine during a night run, coord: 002330E. Small arms fire was received resulting in 3 WIA's. The company sent elements to the site as a reaction force but they returned with negative results. Again, on the 23rd, D-16 elements acted as a reaction force for an ARVN convoy.

The 24th of Jan found the company conducting search and destroy missions in the Phu Sen area. Many temporary hooches were burned and produced secondary explosions indicating the presence of enemy ammo and supplies. Carrying on the search and destroy one APC ran over an anti-personnel mine, believed to be an M-79 round. No damage or injuries resulted. The company returned to FSB/9 closing at 1600 hours.

On 25 Jan the company continued SAD missions in the area of operations. At 1400 the company fired on a large group later to be identified as friendly. There was also fire put upon individuals in black PJ's and carrying weapons.

The 26th of Jan found D-16 again divided with elements securing a convoy from FSB/9 to Phu Hiep and other elements securing an LZ for the L/503d. Both missions were completed without incident and the entire company was back at FSB/9 by 1110 hours.

At 0930 on 27 Jan in the Phu Sen area 1 VC wearing black PJ's. Fire was placed upon the individual with unknown results. The company was also prepared for a move into the northern part of the Phu Sen AO scheduled for the following day.

The 28th of Jan the company conducted search and destroy missions in the Phu Sen AO.
At 1110 hours D-16 elements received fire from a hill to their east. Permission for return fire was denied because there were friendly lines in the area.

The 29th of Jan was spent conducting S&D missions throughout the AO. They were called in by 4/503d Inf to secure an LZ. The LZ was secured and the company returned to PEB# 9 without incident.

No offensive moves were planned for the 30th of Jan. However at 1030 hours D-16 received word of aggressive activity throughout A VN by VC and NVA troops. At 1040 it was confirmed by Brigade and unit was informed that the truce was officially cancelled at 0945. Commanding Officer Robert F. Helmick requested permission to work the Phu Sen area. Permission granted. During the days search and destroy mission one individual wearing black PJ's was retained and turned over to the 4/503d Inf for interrogation.

The last day of Jan brought the most unpleasant task for any trooper. The day was spent retrieving KIA's from a battle the night before. The KIA's were from the Brigades 4/503d Infantry Battalion. The task was completed and returned to PEB# 9 at 1710 hours.
P-16 began the month of Feb securing convoys with 1 platoon in Phu Hiep and 2 platoons conducting operations from FSB 9. The morning of 1 Feb was spent rotating one of the platoons at FSB 9 with the platoon at Phu Hiep. The company received word from Brigade that the entire country was under Martial Law. There was also intelligence received that FSB 9 was to be attacked that night or the following morning so the afternoon was spent readying for the attack.

On the morning of 2 Feb the company received the word to move so preparations were made. At 0930 five individuals wearing black PJ's were spotted. Permission to fire was denied by artillery did fire and the individuals fled. The move to FSB 11 was completed at 1600. The company was granted a new AO and operations were to continue the following morning.

The 3rd of Feb was spent sand bagging out positions at FSB 11. The 1st Platoon secured a convoy from FSB 11 to FSB 9 then to Phu Hiep and returned to FSB 11 without incident.

On the 4th the CO utilized a chopper while himself and several other officers made an aerial recon of the area around FSB 11, looking for a site to relocate FSB 11. FSB 11 was deemed too small for maximum effectiveness. There were also intelligence reports of enemy activity in the area.

On 5 Feb P-16's 3rd platoon was securing a 173d Engineer convoy south of FSB 11 when large numbers of civilians started running from a village to their front. The civilians were questioned and found friendly. The convoy was completed and the 3rd platoon returned to FSB 11 without incident.
6 Feb was an active day for the 3rd platoon. The 3rd herd departed FSB #11 at 0820 on a prearranged mission. At 0830 hours approximately, 200 civilians carrying NVA flags were spotted marching 3 abreast in the road. The individuals were women, children and old men. The individuals carrying the flags were detained and extracted and 36 elements continued on the road. At 0945 36 elements arrived at a village flying many NVA flags. A large sign was found draped with a large NVA flag. The 36 elements knocked the sign down running over it and continued on with the mission of clearing the road.

The 7th of Feb D-16 moved out at 0845 hours for the village of An Ngiep, vic 0740. Upon arriving at this destination 6 reported many civilians. Arrangements were made to extract these personnel by "Big Windy". During the day approximately 250 detainees were extracted. At 1200 hours 2 infantrymen from D/4/303d who were attached to D-16, killed one VC and wounded another when the VC threw a M-26 fragmentary grenade at them. At 1755 the company returned to FSB #11 with the rice that could not be extracted earlier.

Again on the 8th of Feb the platoon from Phu Hiep was rotated with a platoon at FSB #11. The day was spent relocating the detainees who were extracted the 7th and returned the 8th.

The 9th was spent relocating the detainees and loading rice on trucks so it could be hauled away. The company was alerted against a large enemy offensive suspected in the area.

D-16 readied itself, on the 10th, for movement to a new FSB to take place on the 11th.
At 0200 on the 11th of Feb the move to FSB Razorback was started. The move was completed at 0915 and the day was consumed setting up the new FSB. The next two days were utilized to sandbag positions and erect a defensive perimeter.

14 Feb was spent conducting search and destroy missions around FSB Razorback the days operations ending at 1755 hrs.

The CO conducted search and destroy missions west of Razorback on the 15th of Feb. The company found one 8" artillery dud and destroyed it in place. There were also signs of troop movement in the area. D-16 returned to FSB Razorback at 1605 hours.

16 Feb began with CO departing FSB Razorback on a S&D mission. At 1115 hours attached elements found what appeared to be enemy positions dug into rock formations vic, C0444.58. At 1145 hrs a dustoff was called for "Doc" Palmer, a medic on 66, when he was hit by friendly grenade fragments. At approximately the same time PFC Muller and SSG Gallentine were wounded when an M-3 submachine gun held by 1Lt Hunt accidently discharged. All three individuals were dusted off to the 91st Evac. All three lived and were evacuated to the CONUS.

D-16 pulled maintenance on weapons and vehicles the 17th of Feb.

S&D operations were resumed with vigor on the 18th with negative results.

On 19 Feb, 16 elements and 36 elements departed on separate missions. At coord: C0091236 found bunkers and positions in the village of NGOC SCH. After searching the area a tunnel complex was found. Smoke and CS was used in the tunnels but no NVA or VC, were found inside. The platoons closed FSB Razorback at 1640 and a detailed report on the tunnel system was prepared and sent to Brigade at 1920.
New commitments for D-16 tracks were made by Brigade on the 20th of Feb.

One platoon was to provide perimeter security for the Tuy Hoa Area while another provided convoy security.

The 21st of Feb had 16 elements providing security while the remainder of the company pulled maintenance and cleaned weapons.

D-16 worked with an EOD team on the 22nd of Feb, to destroy the tunnel complexes found in recent operations.

The Company Commander attended a conference at TOC on the 23rd and D-16 was alerted for a possible attack on Tuy Hoa North or FSB Razorback.

The 24th was spent pulling perimeter security and preparing for a possible attack.

On 25 Feb 16 elements conducted MED missions without incident and closed FSB Razorback at 1425 hours. At 1540 D-16 received information that 173d LRRP was in contact via O591. D-16 was alerted as a reaction force. At 1610, 16 elements were called to the LRRP's point of contact. Immediately after departing FSB Razorback 16 was called back as the LRRP extraction was accomplished by helicopter.

The 26th was spent inside the perimeter preparing for an upcoming move.

The 27th was another moving day. The FSB was disassembled and burned and the company moved back to Phu Hiep. Upon reaching camp maintenance was pulled and weapons were cleaned.

The 28th and 29th of Feb were spent maintaining the vehicles.
The first three days of March were spent in Phu Hiep with entire company pulling maintenance and cleaning weapons.

On 4 March D-16 was alerted for an offensive action at Q645. The company intact, moved to Tuy Hoa North airbase in Tuy Hoa AVN, at coord: C4155479. The CO then made coordination with an ARVN advisor to form a task force consisting of 1 ARVN Inf Company and D-16.

The TF then moved into the village at coord: 167485. Shortly after moving into the village the company made heavy contact and held contact until 1846 hours when contact was broken. The TF was then terminated and the company moved to Tuy Hoa North for the night.

During the day Co D, lost 24 men, 5 KIA, 3 MIA, 16 wounded, The enemy took a much greater loss as an estimated 2 NVA companies were killed. The CO praised the men of D-16 for a job well done. Though largely inexperienced the men of D-16 proved themselves beyond the shadow of a doubt.

The 5th was spent at the battle site trying to find identification of the company's 3 MIA's. The day closed with negative results.

The 7th to 12 Mar was spent running various convoys for TRAC and Brigade, and pulling maintenance. There were no incidents through this period.

On 13 Mar 12 track hit a mine coord: C4302978, resulting in 3 slight injuries. The individuals were dusted off and the convoy continued.

The 14th, 15th, 16th of Mar were spent running various training convoys for the replacements to familiarize themselves with the vehicles. Time was also spent at Tuy Hoa North battle site in search of KIAs who still remain MIA.
The 17th of Mar found the 1st and 2nd Platoons moving into the Phu Sen area and conducting search and destroy missions.

18 through 22 March shows 2 Platoons operating in the Phu Sen area and one platoon providing convoy security for various convoys throughout the area.

On 23 Mar enemy mortars hit the Phu Kiep airstrip and D-16 was alerted.

The 24th of Mar D-16 provided convoy security from Phu Kiep to Quin Nhon and returned at 1830 without incident.

The 25th, 26th and 27th passed without incident with 2 Platoons in Phu Sen and one platoon securing convoys. One man injured when he improperly disassembled a claymore and hit the blasting cap detonated injuring his hand. A dustoff was called and completed.

The 28th and 29th were spent preparing to move and moving from TISAC to the Brigade area. This was a move of 2 miles and was done relatively smoothly with no incidents.
The period of 1 April through 16 April was spent providing convoy security for TSBAC and Brigade. During this period no incidents were reported however several times the company was alerted for possible missions to North Field, Tuy Hoa.

The 17th of Apr found 36 elements enroute to Cung Son on 7B when at 1530 the convoy ran into an ambush. The estimated size of the enemy force was set at 2 platoons. Air strikes were called in and 500 pound bombs were dropped with unknown results. At approximately 1600 hours 34 hit a mine disabling it. One individual was slightly wounded and dusted off.

On the 18th of Apr 26 and 36 elements departed at 0030 to search the ambush site for NVA's and a dud 500 pounder from the previous days action. During the day 200-300 individuals were spotted but permission to pursue was denied. At 1245 both platoons returned and headed west. The night was spent logged in on a position on 7B.

The 19th, 26 and 36 elements completed clearing the road to Phu Tue and logged there for the night.

The 20th, 21st, and 22nd of Apr were spent clearing the area in the near proximity of the Cung Son Special Forces Camp.

On the 23rd D-16 had a mission of clearing the road between Cung Son and Phu Son. During the day the company was ambushed when one APC hit a mine. Small arms fire was received from both sides of the road and was returned with unknown results. The 106 team travelling with D-16 found another large mine just 200 meters from the first mine. It was detonated in place and the company logged in for the night.
On the 24th the company moved into the Phu Sen AO. Soon after entering the AO about 25 individuals were spotted. D-16 and the Nationalist Police detained 2 of them for questioning.

On 25 April at 0830 two platoons departed their logger sites for coord: 00425120. At these coord there was a search and destroy of the area.

The 26th of Apr the 2nd and 3rd platoons made a detailed search of the Phu Sen area, finding little. After logging in for the night at 2105 hrs. the CC spotted a candlelight in a small hut approximately 800 meters to his front. After receiving clearance 50 cal was fired with unknown results.

The 27th and 28th were spent conducting search and destroy missions in the AO. No significant incidents occurred.

The 29th the company returned to Phu Hiep at 1015 hours. At 1830 hours all elements were alerted and moved to Tuy Hoa North Field, reaching THNF at 1935 hours.

The 30th of Apr was spent securing a convoy of 173d Engr vehicles to Phu Hiep. During the convoy an Engr vehicle slid into a river causing a delay in the convoy which made it necessary to spend the night on the road.
UNIT HISTORY

MARCH 4TH 1968

1-16 Armor was alerted for an offensive action that began at 0815 and terminated at 2300 hours 4 March 1968. The Company intact, moved to Tuy Hoa North airbase in Tuy Hoa RVN at coord. C0155479. Here 6 made coordination with Golden Beacon (ARVN advisor). The task force was formed consisting of 1 ARVN infantry company and 1-16 Armor. The TF then moved into the village at coord. C0167485. Shortly after moving into the village the TF made contact with the enemy. The company maintained contact with the enemy until 1846 hours when contact was broken and 1-16 terminated TF and moved back to Tuy Hoa North.

During the day, the company lost 5 men killed, 16 wounded, and 2 missing (who are believed dead as two unrecognizable bodies were found). The enemy took a much greater loss. An estimated 2 enemy battalions, 95th Main Force (VC) and the 95th NVA regiment, were rendered ineffective as they had 297 MIA's, with 1-16 Armor receiving credit for killing 218.

The CO praised all the soldiers of 1-16 for a job well done. The company received a congrat note from General Westoverland, for their exceptional valor and gallantry in the Battle of Tuy Hoa North.

Every man had a friend die that day and for most it was their first real action. Though largely inexperienced they proved themselves beyond the shadow of a doubt.

The list of casualties is a long one but the wounds were not suffered in vain; those that died did so that others may live, those wounded lived to revange the death of their comrades.
Later changed to KIA

ST5 ROBERT WALKER 3rd Platoon
SFC MICHAEL RIOS 3rd Platoon
ST4 "Doc" PASCH HIC

KIA

ST4 ROBERT ANTHONY 2nd Platoon
SP5 CASEY NALL 2nd Platoon
SFC WILLIAM BOYKIN 2nd Platoon
SFC WILLIAM HOPPER 2nd Platoon
SFC TERENCE AHERN 1st Platoon

KIA

ST5 BRUCE MILLER
ST5 ROBERT JACKSON
ST5 ALEXANDER HOLLADY
SFC DONALD LINDSHAW
SFC HAROLD YOUNG
SFC GARY SULLIVAN
SFC DAVID VANCE
SFC ANTHONY TAYLOR
SFC LEE H. KING
SFC BILLY MITCHELL
SFC ROBERT WILLIAMS
ST5 GERALD CANNEL
ST4 HENRY KEY
SFC FLETCHER SMITH
SFC "Doc" GREEN
SFC ALBERT GRIFFIN
SFC ROLAND CANARY
SFC CHARLES LAMBORN
CPT ROBERT BOWICK
1LT P.K. MANTUA
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AVBE-AR

SUBJECT: Quarterly Historical Report

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APO San Francisco 96250

The following quarterly historical report is submitted in compliance with
Brigade Regulation 870-6.

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